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Abstract
This thesis discusses the development of a new model for investigating the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities. The research consists of 
three stages. In the first phase, the structural features of the relationship, which are the 
characteristics of locations, the decision-making processes of households, and the 
interaction between transport and land-use, are identified. Existing approaches are 
reviewed using these three components. The review shows that no existing framework 
satisfactorily represents the requirements in modelling the relationship. Secondly, a 
bid-rent network equilibrium model is developed. The modelling is considered in 
terms of competition for locations. Difficulties in analysing the unique characteristics 
of locations, namely heterogeneity and indivisibility, are discussed. A hedonic 
interpretation is incorporated to overcome the difficulties. The model represents the 
decision-making processes of households using the framework of an n-player non- 
cooperative game. The Nash equilibrium for this game is defined. The game is 
accompanied by the systematic interactions between transport and land-use. A mutual 
adjustment process addresses these interactions. A bi-level mathematical programme 
is suggested to embody the three components. The resulting formulation is interpreted 
as an oligopolistic Cournot game, which is an approximation of the n-player non- 
cooperative game. The functional relationship between the decision variables of the 
upper and lower levels in the bi-level model produces endogenously-determined 
transport impedance and locational attractiveness. The model incorporates a 
multiclass framework to consider interclass interactions, which establishes a 
multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model. A heuristic algorithm is provided for 
the solution-finding technique of the bid-rent network equilibrium model. The 
algorithm combines a path-based routine for calculating the equilibrium solution to 
the lower level with the Newton-Raphson procedure for estimating the parameters of 
the hedonic-based stochastic bid-rent function in the upper level. The operation of the 
algorithm is examined using simple numerical examples. The final stage is an 
application of the bid-rent network equilibrium model to a real network. A medium­
sized city is chosen for the case study. The objective of the third stage is to 
demonstrate the ability of the model to investigate the relationship between transport
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and the location of activities. A base run and two policy runs are simulated. The base 
run means a simulation conducted using surveyed data. The policy runs represents the 
introduction of a congestion charge and the release of land for housing development. 
Class specific spatial behaviour is obtained. The behaviour is demonstrated using 
network performance indices representing transport impedance and locational 
attractiveness. Some policy implications of the simulation are presented.
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1. Introduction
This study explores the development of a bid-rent network equilibrium model for 
representing the relationship between transport and the location of activities. This 
relationship, traditionally, has been regarded as one of the most important components 
in land-use and transport interaction studies. The interaction between transport and 
land-use is a two-way process. The process is more complicated than other reciprocal 
processes that are frequently encountered in every day life. This is mainly because the 
various interactions take place over different time scales and involve factors with 
varying degrees of certainty. Hence, an analysis of the interaction between transport 
and land-use requires disentangling diverse relationships among the factors and so is a 
difficult quest. One way to tackle this problem is to try to understand the basic 
mechanisms involved and to incorporate the components in a general framework. The 
relationship between transport and the location of activities is generally regarded as 
the foundation of the interaction between land-use and transport. Thus, an 
investigation into this relationship is a core task to appreciate the interaction with 
respect to the representation of the present and the future states of such systems.
Conventionally, four types of behaviour have been identified in this relationship 
(Wilson, 1970; Boyce and Southworth, 1979; Boyce, 1980; Nagumey and Dong, 
2002b): households with fixed economic activity locations seeking residential 
locations; households with fixed residential locations seeking economic activity 
locations; households seeking both residential and economic activity locations; and 
households with fixed residential and economic activity locations. The first type of 
behaviour has been studied more actively than any of the other types. This is for the 
following several reasons. In the first place, residential land-use is more dominant 
than any other land-uses within a city (Alonso, 1965, p.2). This dominance means that 
an investigation into the residential land-use would offer a basic understanding of 
urban structure. Secondly, the residential location is the origin of the majority of 
travel demands. It has been found in practice that more than eighty percent of trips are 
generated in relation to the residence (Ortuzar and Willumsen, 1994, p.l 15). Thirdly, 
the model of the first type of behaviour can easily be converted into those of the other
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types of behaviour. Extensions of the model for the first behaviour to the other cases 
are generally straightforward with slight modifications.
The nature of this problem has attracted attention for reasons other than those 
mentioned above. First of all, the relationship recognises the unique characteristics of 
locations. In conventional economic analyses, two assumptions about the features of 
goods are required, namely homogeneity and divisibility. Locations, however, violate 
these two requirements. Indeed, a location is a heterogeneous product. There is a 
substantial variation in the structures, the transport connections, the quality of local 
public services, the characteristics of neighbourhood, and other factors (Ellickson, 
1981). Furthermore, a location is an indivisible product. There are observations on 
expenditure on locations, but imprecise references as to which components are 
purchased. There is no direct information on the prices of the components that are 
embodied. Thus, the process of production, exchange and consumption of each 
attribute is implicit. These unique characteristics require an alternative approach. 
Secondly, a complex decision-making process is considered in this problem. The 
decision-making unit for the selection of a residential location is a household. Each 
household normally consists of several members. The residential location may affect 
their patterns of activities. This means that the decision to select a residential location 
is a compromise that considers the locational requirements of all its members. Even 
though a decision has been made within a household, the location chosen is not 
always occupied by the household. This difference occurs because there are many 
potential competitors. This suggests that a household interacts with other households. 
Therefore, the decision about a residential location can be regarded as being the 
outcome of composite speculation within a household and between households. 
Finally, more than anything else, the problem deals with the interaction between 
transport and land-use. It is widely accepted that there is a two-way relationship 
between transport and land-use. Land-use influences travel demands and patterns. The 
impact of transport on land-use is represented by changes in the level of accessibility, 
which in turn affects changes in the location of activities. The location of activities 
has a cyclical relationship with transport because activities generate travel demands 
and change travel patterns. Transport and land-use keep exchanging mutual responses 
with each other. Therefore, it is useful to investigate both the impact of transport on 
land-use and the effect of land-use on transport as a mutual adjustment process.
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These three components are regarded in this study as the essential nature of the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities. There have been much 
effort and expense over the years in modelling the relationship. No approach, 
however, satisfactorily represents the relationship in the terms discussed above, which 
is examined in the literature review chapter. This is the primary motive of this study 
to develop an alternative model, namely the bid-rent network equilibrium model.
Against this background, the research objectives of this study are:
1. to identify the structural nature of the relationship between transport and the 
location of activities. This process shows that no existing approach 
satisfactorily represents the requirements in modelling the relationship.
2. to develop an alternative framework, which is called a bid-rent network 
equilibrium model, in order to examine the relationship successfully. The 
discussion is provided by both conceptual and theoretical investigations.
3. to validate and test the bid-rent network equilibrium model to a real network. 
The purpose of this application is to illustrate the ability of the model in 
addressing the nature of the relationship that has been identified.
This thesis has six chapters and two appendices. The structure is organised as follows:
In Chapter One, a general background of this thesis in terms of the objectives and the 
structure for the study is presented. In this chapter, the structural nature of the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities is discussed. 
Subsequently, a brief overview for the research is provided.
Chapter Two examines the literature to see the extent to which existing models 
represent the relationship between transport and the location of activities. Models are 
classified into four categories in terms of their mathematical structure. The ability of 
each group to address this relationship is examined. Comparative discussion about the 
advantages and disadvantages of models is provided.
In Chapter Three, an alternative framework, called a bid-rent network equilibrium 
model, is developed. The process shows difficulties in representing the characteristics 
of locations, namely heterogeneity and indivisibility. A hedonic interpretation is
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incorporated to overcome the difficulties. The model addresses the decision-making 
processes of households. The process is shown as an n-player non-cooperative game. 
The Nash equilibrium for this game is defined. The game is accompanied by the 
systematic interaction between transport and land-use. A mutual adjustment process 
between the two factors represents the interaction. A bi-level mathematical 
programme is proposed to embody the three components. The resulting formulation is 
interpreted as an oligopolistic Cournot game, which is an approximation of the n- 
player non-cooperative game. The model incorporates a multiclass framework, which 
allows the model to address interclass transport interactions.
In Chapter Four, a solution algorithm for the bid-rent network equilibrium model is 
proposed. Existing algorithms for bi-level mathematical programmes are reviewed. A 
heuristic routine is suggested which combines a path-based algorithm for solving the 
lower level problem and the Newton-Raphson procedure for estimating parameters of 
the upper level model. Simple numerical examples illustrate the operation of the bid- 
rent network equilibrium model. Results from the solution algorithm are discussed.
In Chapter Five, the bid-rent network equilibrium model is applied to a real network. 
The objective of the application is to demonstrate the ability of the model to 
investigate the relationship between transport and the location of activities. A 
medium-sized city is chosen. A base run and two policy runs are simulated. The base 
run is a simulation conducted using surveyed data. The policy runs represent the 
introduction of a congestion charge and the release of land for housing development. 
Class specific behaviour is obtained. The behaviour is demonstrated using network 
performance indices representing transport impedance and locational attractiveness. 
Some policy implications of the simulation are presented.
Chapter Six presents the conclusion in terms of the research summary and some 
suggestions for further work. The contributions of this study are discussed.
The first Appendix considers the fundamentals of game theory. This Appendix 
shows the background framework of the design for the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model. Game theory is defined and two forms of game representation are presented. 
Games are classified into cooperative and non-cooperative types. The non-cooperative
14
games are subdivided into dominant strategy and best response games. The Nash 
equilibrium is defined in the non-cooperative games under the best response strategy. 
Applications of game theory to transport studies are examined.
Appendix II represents a general framework of the inverse transform method, which 
is used in numerical examples of the bid-rent network equilibrium model at Chapter 
Four. The discussion is provided by both mathematical and graphical illustrations. 
The illustrations are followed by the description of the generation process for the 
household data in the numerical examples.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to examine the literature to see the extent to which 
existing models represent the relationship between transport and the location of 
activities. This examination is a process of comparison and contrast of various 
models, which is followed by the discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of 
the models for addressing the interaction. The relationship, traditionally, has been 
regarded as one of the most important components in land-use and transport 
interaction studies. This understanding could mean that an investigation into this issue 
is a core task to appreciate transport and land-use interactions with respect to the 
representation of the present and the future states of the system.
Demographics Land-use
Regional Economics
Location of Activities
Government Policy
Transport SystemExternal Effects
(Exogenous) (Endogenous)
--------------------  Direct Effect
.......................... Indirect Effect
Figure 2-1 A conceptual framework of land-use and transport interaction studies
The land-use transport interaction studies, as shown in Figure 2-1, deal with 
comprehensive factors. Exogenous factors include demographics, regional economics, 
government policy, and external effects. Endogenous factors represent the supply-
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demand mechanism in the system: the supply involves provision of facilities at a 
specific location for performing various activities such as housing, manufacturing, 
and retail and provision of transport infrastructures and services between locations; 
the demand refers to the requirements for services at a specific location as well as 
travel demands and patterns between locations (Boyce, 1986).
Examining all aspects enumerated is beyond the scope of this review. This study 
focuses on the decision of an individual regarding the location of activities by the 
process of the interaction between transport and land-use. This is because much of the 
important mechanism occurs at this level. As stated in the introductory chapter, four 
types of locational behaviours have been identified. Three essential components, 
which represent the unique characteristics of locations, the decision-making process 
of individuals, and the interaction between transport and land-use, have been 
proposed as the structural nature of this problem.
There have been many approaches to investigate the relationship. The models are 
generally very complex to appreciate. This is mainly because the models have been 
developed for different purposes, and so have been described in rather different terms 
(Mackett, 1981). Hence, it is difficult to understand exactly what the model structure 
is. This means that it is impractical to examine whole aspects of each model; instead, 
the models are considered in terms of a set of criteria that is closely related to the 
nature of this issue. As for the structural nature, three components have been 
suggested in this study. Thus, whether a model successfully represents these elements 
can be a key criterion for evaluating the model. In this context, this study considers 
the following as a set of criteria with which models are examined:
1. What is the mechanism of a model for the representation of the unique 
characteristics of locations?
2. How does a model represent the decision-making process of an individual?
3. To what extent does a model represent the interaction between transport and 
land-use?
As stated above, there are many models that address this problem. It would be almost 
impossible to enumerate all the models that involve the relationship; instead, it would 
be useful to investigate models that deal with the interaction directly and explicitly.
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For this reason, models whose primary objective is to represent this process are only 
considered. Therefore, some important models in land-use transport interaction 
studies are excluded in the literature review. First of all, input-output models such as 
MEPLAN (Echenique et al., 1990; Hunt and Simmonds, 1993; Mackett, 1991b; 
Williams, 1994) are not considered. This is because the input-output models mainly 
represent broad economic changes. Secondly, dynamic simulation models such as 
MASTER (Mackett, 1988 and 1992) and IRPUD (Wegener, 1986; Wegener et al., 
1991) are excluded. This group directly addresses the interaction between transport 
and the location of activities. The process, however, emphasises the effect of urban 
dynamics, which is indirect to the purpose of this study. Finally, DELTA (Simmonds 
and Still, 1998; Simmonds, 1999) is not dealt with in the review, even though the 
model is currently one of the most operational frameworks in transport and land-use 
interaction studies. In fact, DELTA belongs to a land-use model. When DELTA 
analyses the interaction, the model incorporates a transport counterpart.
Even though each model has its own theoretical, methodological, and operational 
aspects, it is useful to group models into certain categories. In fact, as models have a 
complex structure, a certain model may not be classified into a particular category. 
However, it is convenient to impose some form of structure onto the analysis 
(Mackett, 1981). In this study, models are classified into four categories in terms of 
their mathematical structure: spatial interaction models, mathematical programming 
models, random utility models, and bid-rent models. The spatial interaction models 
represent the flow of trips between locations; the mathematical programming models 
are designed to produce the optimal allocation of households; the random utility 
models explain the relationship between transport and the location of activities in 
terms of the utility-maximising behaviour of decision-makers; the bid-rent models 
represent the interaction in terms of a bid auction process for occupying locations.
In the next four sections, models are examined using the three criteria. In the 
subsequent section, comparative discussion on existing models in terms of their 
advantages and disadvantages is provided. Finally, conclusions are presented.
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2.2. Spatial interaction models
2.2.1. Introduction
In this section, spatial interaction models are considered. The modelling process of 
this group is straightforward. A study area is divided into several zones in an 
appropriate way. Then, the spatial interaction models represent the number of trips 
between each pair of locations. The primary purpose of this category of models is to 
allocate people across an area from a reasonable perspective. This process is 
represented using a joint function of a measure of transport costs and the activity level 
of each location. Mathematically, the general function can be expressed as follows:
T„ = k R .E jf fa )  (2.1)
where TtJ is the number of spatial interactions between locations i and j ;
k is a constant;
Rn Ej are the level of activities in locations i and j  respectively; and
/  (c^ j is a transport cost function between locations i and j .
In this type, the level of spatial interactions is supposed to be proportional to the 
activity level between locations and inversely proportional to the transport impedance 
between zones. This reasoning is analogous to Newton’s law of gravitational force. 
Hence, the spatial interaction model is sometimes referred to as a gravity model.
In the next section, the spatial interaction models are reviewed in the context of their 
historical developments. As mentioned in the previous section, the models are 
examined in terms of their fitness to the three criteria that have been suggested as the 
structural nature of the relationship between transport and the location of activities; 
the indices have meant that the unique characteristics of locations, the systematic 
decision-making process of households, and the cyclical interaction between transport 
and land-use. In the subsequent section, the advantages and disadvantages of this 
group of models are discussed. The discussion concludes that the spatial interaction 
models would not satisfactorily meet the three components in representing the 
interaction between transport and the location of activities.
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2.2.2. Review
Applications of the spatial interaction model to the relationship between transport and 
the location of activities trace their roots to the Lowry research of ‘A Model of 
Metropolis’ (1964). The Lowry model was an approach to investigating an urban 
form as represented by a land-use model. The model assumed that, everything else 
being equal, the place of employment determined the place of residence.
(2-2)
j
where P[ is residential population in a zone /;
g is a population scale factor; and
Ej is the given number of jobs in a zone j .
The Lowry model was a typical gravity type; the main factors that determined the 
location of activities were the quantity of economic activities in a zone and transport 
impedance between locations. The model propagated as follows: the resident 
population requires ‘services’, which determines the place of service employment; the 
service employees require housing; this means that new residents are induced; the 
additional population requires further services which are fulfilled by additional 
service employment; the new service employees require housing in relation to their 
place of work. This round of reasoning continues until no further service employees 
or households are located (Oryani and Harris, 1996).
The Lowry model was conceptually simple but comprehensive: the model included a 
variety of locations of activities such as residence, employment, and shopping; the 
model represented diverse transport components such as trips to work and shopping. 
For these attributes, the Lowry model has been applied many times. One of the 
interesting applications was the 7ime Oriented Metropolitan Model (TOMM) (Steger, 
1965). TOMM disaggregated households by income level and reformulated the 
Lowry model incorporating quasi-dynamics. Cripps and Foot (1969) modified the 
residential location sub-model using an intervening opportunity framework. The 
modified model was applied to test the impact of a new airport (Cripps and Foot, 
1970). The Lowry model was implemented to a new town project (Batty, 1970a) and 
a sub-regional study (Batty, 1970b). Another example was the Projective Zand-f/se
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Model (PLUM) (Goldner et al., 1972), which was proposed to test the effect of 
incremental growth in employment sections. Later, PLUM was replaced by two 
models, namely the /ntegrated Transportation Zand-Use Package (ITLUP) and the 
Projective Optimisation Zand-use /nformation System (POLIS). ITLUP extended 
PLUM into a comprehensive land-use and transport interaction model. POLIS 
reformulated PLUM from a mathematical programming perspective. The former is 
reviewed in this section, and the latter is considered in the next section.
The Lowry model would not meet the criteria that have been proposed in this study, 
though the model had reasonable operational contents. First, the model failed to 
represent the unique characteristics of locations. There was no consideration of the 
intrinsic attractiveness of locations. Simple proxy variables such as population and the 
number of jobs addressed the locational attraction. Secondly, the Lowry model 
offered little investigation into the decision-making process of an individual 
household. The Lowry model lacked the behavioural interpretation because the model 
was basically aggregate. The allocation process merely replicated aggregate trends 
without social or income disaggregation. Furthermore, there was no consideration of 
the relationship between user classes whose feedback might affect the way land-use 
was formed. Finally, the model offered limited information on the interaction between 
transport and land-use. The Lowry model might be used for testing land-use policies 
by introducing the modification of basic sector land-uses; even in this case, there was 
no mutual adjustment process between transportation and land-use.
Wilson (1970) generalised the Lowry model incorporating the entropy-maximising 
principle. The generalisation process can be described as follows:
First, a measure of the relative attractiveness of residential locations was introduced. 
The attraction measure partly represented locational characteristics.
7J, = BJVlaEJ exp(-/Jci;)
(2.3)
E F/“ exp(-/?c,y)
where Ttj is the number of workers who live in a location i and work in j ;
Vj is a measure of the relative attraction of a residential location /; and
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a , p  are parameters to be estimated.
Secondly, user groups were disaggregated. The disaggregation considered income 
groups, wage levels by locations, housing types, and variations in housing prices.
Tt = 'L L r?  (2-4)
h w
where h is a housing type h in a location i and
w is a level of wage.
Finally, four types of locational behaviour were suggested. This extension, which 
represents urban dynamics, made the spatial interaction model comprehensive. That 
is, the model considered different forms of spatial interactions taking into account the 
effect of changes in transport impedance and locational attraction with lagged time.
TA<) = 'k Tt {<) (2-5)«=1
where n=l is locationally unconstrained workers in time t ;
n=2 is fixed residence workers in time t ;
n=3 is fixed workplace workers in time t ; and
n=4 is fixed residence and workplace workers in time t .
To sum up, Wilson’s generalisation of the Lowry model made the spatial interaction 
model flexible; the Wilson model could partly represent the intrinsic locational 
characteristics; the behavioural difference between user classes could be 
implemented; the model considered urban dynamics. However, the model could not 
address the systematic linkage between transport and land-use because the model 
explained the interaction using given locational benefits and transport costs.
Mackett (1983) noticed the difficulty of the Lowry-Wilson framework in representing 
the interaction between transport and land-use. The Leeds integrated Land-use and 
Transport (LILT) model was proposed, which could assess the effect of changes in 
transport impedance and policy. LILT incorporated the trip distribution and the modal 
split stages of the traditional four-step travel demand model into the Lowry-Wilson 
framework. LILT comprehensively represented the relationship between transport 
costs and the spatial distribution of population, housing, jobs, employment and
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shopping. Afterwards, the traffic assignment procedure was incorporated during the 
research of the /ntemational Study Group on Zand-Use Transport interaction 
(ISGLUTI; Webster et al., 1988). The iterative loading capacity-restraint assignment 
addressed the effect of congestion. The standard Frank-Wolfe (1956) algorithm was 
used to find an equilibrium travel time. The essence of LILT can be described as 
follows: households were divided in terms of social status, car ownership groups, and 
modes of travel; households were allocated to residential and employment areas using 
a spatial interaction framework; jobs were assigned to three categories, namely 
primary, secondary, and tertiary; primary jobs were scattered in proportion to the 
existing distribution; secondary places were allocated on the basis of the previous 
employment distribution; tertiary sectors responded to the population distribution 
taking into account the relative cost of travel by each mode. LILT has been rigorously 
validated and tested (Mackett, 1983; ISGLUTI, Webster et al., 1988). Subsequently, 
the model was successfully applied to many studies (Mackett, 1990; Mackett, 1991a; 
Mackett, 1991b; Mackett, 1993a; Mackett, 1993b; Wegener et al., 1991).
Base Year 
Spatial Patterns Travel TimeTravel Times
Travel Times
MSA Procedure
EMPAL
Disaggregation
Aggregation
DRAM
Travel Demand
Traffic AssignmentTravel Times
Figure 2-2 The structure of ITLUP, source: Putman Association (1995)
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According to Oryani and Harris (1996), the most widely applied spatial interaction 
model is ITLUP (Putman, 1983; 1984; 1991). The model has been available since the 
early 1970s and has been improved over the course of the last three decades. ITLUP 
consists of three main sub-models, namely the Disaggregated Residential Allocation 
Model (DRAM), the DMPloyment Allocation model (EMPAL), and CALIB, which 
estimates the set of parameters for DRAM and EMPAL.
DRAM is a singly constrained residential allocation model. The model disaggregates 
households into several groups and forecasts the residential location of households. In 
this process, a spatial interaction framework is used. This is represented by a function 
of a measure of zonal attractiveness and accessibility to a workplace where 
employment locations are defined either outside the model or by the use of EMPAL.
w ;r { c ,j ) (2 .6)
where N "
I X / ’ fo ) .
is the number of type n residents in a zone i ;
is a region-wide coefficient relating the number of type k employees 
to type n households;
is the amount of employment in a sector k in a zone j ; 
is the composite measure of locational attractiveness in a zone i to 
employees from a residential group n ; and 
/ ” (cy)is a transport cost function for type n residents moving from i to j .
a*
E)
wr
The zonal attractiveness is calculated by a multiplicative power function that is 
similar to the Cobb-Douglas form:
r=W'(i+*,r'•(£;)’"-n 1+
b”
(2.7)
where L“ is the area of vacant and developable land in a zone i ;
xt is the proportion of developable land in a zone i which has already
been developed;
L\ is the area of residential land in a zone i ; and
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qn,rn,sn,bn are parameters to be estimated.
A gamma travel cost function is used for measuring accessibility to a workplace.
r{e,) = cfcKp(-/r<v) (2.8)
where y n ,p n are parameters to be estimated.
EMPAL forecasts employment locations by types in relation to an attractiveness 
measure and an employment type with lagged time. The model has a form of a 
modified singly constrained spatial interaction model.
+(1 -A )  E L  (2.9)
where E R is the amount of retail employment in a sector R of a zone j  in time 
period t ;
Pu_x is the total population of a zone i in prior time period t - l ;
AR_X is a balancing term;
W*_, is the attraction of a zone j  for a sector R in prior period t - 1; and
E r_x is the total employment of a zone j  for a sector R in period t -1 .
The measure of attractiveness is given by a composite index of the form
WJU = (E ;_ ,f  L f  (2.10)
where E*jt_x is the total employment of a zone j  in prior period t - l  and
L, is the total land area of a zone j .J  J
Lastly, CALIB is a calibration programme that estimates the equation coefficients in 
DRAM and EMPAL. CALIB produces maximum likelihood estimates for the 
equation coefficients, goodness-of-fit statistics, asymptotic t-tests of the statistical 
significance of the coefficients, and point elasticity for a sensitivity analysis.
ITLUP has recently been extended into the METROPolilaxi integrated Zand-i/se
System (METROPILUS). The METROPILUS model integrated ITLUP with Arc-
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View GIS. The integration enables the model to support an easy-to-use graphical user 
interface. The system provides increased data analyses and manipulation capabilities 
as well as a seamless combination with transportation modelling packages such as 
EMME/2 and TRANPLAN (Lee et al, 1999).
The overall structure of ITLUP is similar to that of LILT. It should be noted that both 
models have incorporated the traffic assignment stage. As stated above, LILT was 
associated with iterative loading capacity-restraint assignment that was solved by the 
Frank-Wolfe (1956) procedure. The traffic assignment in ITLUP showed incremental 
tree-by-tree loading on the network in which the traffic was added progressively to 
the links adjusting link travel times. In both models, the stage is integrated as a 
separate independent model. Thus, the equilibrium procedure between the travel time 
and the location of residences and workers is not necessarily very sound. Nevertheless, 
the two models are advanced compared with other spatial interaction models in the 
sense that both models try to represent the effect of congestion on the transport 
network. The internalisation of the congestible network would offer a more realistic 
opportunity to test the effect of changes in transport costs and policies.
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2.2.3. Conclusion
This section has reviewed spatial interaction models that are one of the groups of 
models that investigate the relationship between transport and the location of 
activities. The spatial interaction models represent the number of trips between each 
pair of locations using a function involving a measure of transport costs and the level 
of locational activities. In this process, the models adopt a spatial interaction 
framework that is an analogous procedure to the law of gravitational force of Newton.
This group originated with Lowry (1964) and has been rigorously applied to many 
studies because of the dual natural advantages of being both comprehensive and 
conceptually simple. In addition to these properties, the spatial interaction model has 
reasonable behavioural contents, which suggests that the model can be used for long­
term forecasting. The model is flexible to allow modifications for specific research 
purposes (Mackett, 1985). The spatial interaction model, however, would not meet the 
three criteria that have been proposed in this study for representing the nature of the 
interaction between transport and the location of activities. First of all, the model 
offers little information on the unique characteristics of locations. Even though the 
framework could include a measure of locational characteristics, the factor is 
normally one of the broad aggregate measures such as population and area of zones. 
Hence, the model would be regarded as representing not so much the intrinsic 
characteristics of locations but some proxies for locational attractiveness. Secondly, 
the spatial interaction model is fundamentally aggregate though there could be a 
disaggregation of user groups. This means that the model crudely represents the 
decision-making process of an individual household. Finally, the model could be used 
to test various transport and land-use policies. However, the process of the interaction 
between transport and land-use would not be explicit because of the lack of a 
systematic functional relationship between the two components. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to represent the mutual adjustment process between transport and land-use.
Overall, the limitations which have been discussed above would mean that the spatial 
interaction model would not be regarded as a suitable framework for representing the 
relationship between transportation and the location of activities.
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2.3. Mathematical programming models
2.3.1. Introduction
Mathematical programming models, which have been applied to the issue of the 
interaction between transport and the location of activities, are designed to produce an 
optimal allocation of households across a study area, subject to a set of constraints. 
The purpose of this type of model is to address the most efficient spatial structure. 
This objective is represented by minimising costs or maximising benefits rather than 
describing the spatial distribution process only. In other words, the emphasis shifts 
from the replication of current situations and the prediction of future outcomes to the 
design of an efficient spatial structure (Oryani and Harris, 1996).
The basic assumption of the mathematical programming models is that the pattern of 
the locational distribution of households can be investigated by allocating some 
quantities that are incorporated into an objective function. The objective function is 
optimised subject to a set of constraints.
M inZU)
\ \  (2.11) sJ. gj (x) > bjy j  = 1,2,•••,./
where Z (•) is an objective function and gj (•) are a set of constraints.
This type of model tries to realise some general objectives of urban areas such as 
accessibility and efficiency (Erlander, 1977). This means that the models seek the best 
possible urban structure, which has been a long-held aim of transport planners. In this 
context, this group of models is referred to as normative.
In the next section, a historical review for this group of models is presented. The 
examination starts with considering early models of this group that have been 
formulated using linear programming. Then, combined models, which integrate 
spatial interaction models with network models, are considered. Subsequently, some 
advantages and disadvantages of this type of model are discussed. The congestible 
network representation of this group is emphasised as a distinct characteristic.
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2.3.2. Review
The early application of the mathematical programming models to the interaction 
between transport and the location of activities can be found in the Herbert and 
Stevens study (1960). This research used a linear programming framework and was 
designed to distribute households to residential areas in an optimal configuration. The 
Herbert and Stevens model proposed the concept of ‘savings’, which was defined as 
the difference between ‘total budget’ and ‘costs’, for representing the behaviour of 
households in the choice of residence; the total budget was defined as the available 
money of households for consuming residential bundles and other commodities; the 
costs were defined as the money for consuming other commodities. Reasonable 
households were assumed to maximise the ‘savings’:
bih Cih )K=\ M h=l
n m 
i=l h-1
V K
U m
j r j vxfh =-N, V/
K=\ h=1OV
I
* 
5^ VK,i,h
(2.12)
where K  is a zone in a study area that is supposed to be homogeneous;
i is a household group;
h is a unique combination of the bundle of housing or residential
characteristics;
Xfh is the number of a household group i consuming the residential bundle
h in a zone K ;
bih is the residential budget of a household group i ; the budget is used to
purchase the residential bundle h ; and 
cfh is the annual cost of a household group i consuming the residential
bundle h ; the cost is used to buy other commodities.
The Herbert and Stevens model interpreted savings as the ‘rent-paying ability’ of a 
household group in the sense that the savings were the maximum amount that the 
household group could pay for the residential bundle. Since the model assumed 
households were reasonable, the resulting residential distribution would signify the
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Pareto optimal; no household group could increase the savings without reducing the 
savings of other groups and the total savings of the area.
The Herbert-Stevens model had an attractive framework to represent the behaviour of 
households from a theoretical perspective and the model provided an analogous 
solution to Alonso’s (1965) the unique bid-rent theory. The nature of the model, 
however, would not meet the criteria that have been adopted in this study. First, there 
was a crude representation on the locational characteristics. The model supposed that 
there were several zones in an area; however, there was no systematic examination in 
the intrinsic difference between the zones. Furthermore, the mechanism in terms of 
how the locational characteristics affect the location of activities and travel patterns 
was not investigated. Secondly, the model had limits to address the decision-making 
process of an individual household. The model could incorporate social or income- 
group disaggregation. The classification, however, was rather crude because the 
model was fundamentally aggregate. Finally, the model had no interaction mechanism 
between transport and land-use. In addition to these weaknesses, the model required 
such vast quantities of data, which made the model inoperational.
TOPAZ (Technique for the Optimal Placement of Activities in Zones) was developed 
to be a general planning tool (Brotchie, 1969). The model has been improved over the 
course of practical applications (Sharpe and Brotchie, 1972; Brotchie et al, 1980).
TOPAZ allocated activities to locations on the basis of maximising the net benefit that 
was assumed to be obtained from spatial interactions and land-use:
where X rt is the total activities of a type r to be loaded in time period t ;
X rit is the portion of X rl to be allocated to a zone i during period t ;
ri sj m t ri
(2.13)
2 X = * „  V r,t
i
x rtt> 0 V r,i,t
U (X rjt) is the total merit of the portion X rit;
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Tnsjmt is number of interactions between the activity r of a zone i and 
the activity s of a zone j  with a travel mode m in period t ; 
dijm is the distance between / and j  with a travel mode m in period t ;
x‘rjsjmt is the unit of the net interaction benefit;
xErU is the unit of the net establishing and operating benefit;
j r is the density per a unit area of an activity r ; and
Z, is an area available for all activities in a zone i .
TOPAZ represented transport components in terms of interactions between activities, 
but the mechanism was rather crude. Later, TOPAZ reformulated the transport sub 
model using Wilson’s (1970) entropy maximisation (Webster et al., 1988, p. 497). 
The sub model defined interactions as the number of trips between activity locations:
= An • Bs„ ■ 0„, ■ DSJI ) (2.14)
where Orj the number of trips generated from i by an activity r in t ;
DSJ the number of trips attracted to j  by an activity s in t ; and
An, > Bsjt are A°w balancing factors.
The overall structure of TOPAZ was similar to that of the Herbert and Stevens model 
(1960); both models used a linear programming framework with a maximisation 
perspective. However, it is important to note that TOPAZ might represent the mutual 
adjustment process between transport and land-use. By introducing the transport sub 
model, the model structure of TOPAZ was similar to a bi-level programme in the 
sense that the main objective function had the transport sub model in the lower level. 
Therefore, if TOPAZ had incorporated the iterative process, the model could have 
produced the endogenously determined number of interactions.
The Projective Optimisation Zand-use /nformation System (POLIS) was developed to 
provide a forecast of land-use, employment, housing, population, and transport 
demand (Prastacos, 1985; Prastacos, 1986a; Prastacos, 1986b). As noted in the review 
of the spatial interaction models, POLIS was one of the substitutes of PLUM. The 
model was formulated in a nonlinear programming framework. The model sought to
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represent a simultaneous decision-making procedure rather than the sequential 
process that can be shown in Lowry derivative models.
POLIS incorporated Williams’ (1977) surplus formula into the Wilson model (1970) 
from a mathematical programming perspective. The model assumed that the 
residential choice of households would be affected by a workplace location, a travel 
mode to work, and shopping behaviour:
MaxZ(TIJm,Sv) = J X I  Inf—a w  t - u  lJ m  t i t  L u  'JmP ijm  ^ V, / m /  J
^ ijm
f ( *  \  '\
- Y s  csjL-i IJU
IJ
WJV  J y
(2.15)sJ. Wf = exp
jm j
' L Tm - d ' ' L Slj - d ’Ej =°
im i
TijmA j >  0
where Tijm, Stj are the surplus functions of work and shopping trips respectively; 
uj  is the utility of living at a location i ;
Ej is the basic employment in a zone j ;
d , d \  d" are scale parameters; and
J3w,/3sA  are parameters that convert the utility of trip-makings into monetary 
units compatible with the transport cost incurred.
In the formulation, the objective function represented the sum of three surplus 
functions. This framework could flexibly incorporate other components. This would 
mean that the model could represent a multidimensional decision-making process.
Even though POLIS had the complex mathematical structure, the model produced, in 
the end, a doubly constrained spatial interaction model that was equivalent to the 
Wilson model (1970):
32
exp(-Ac,J„) 
X  exp (-A c,;)
S, = 4 sw ; e x p ( - ^ C;)
4 '=  2 > ;£ ,e x p (- /J 'c „ )
_ y
4 s =
-1
.5 7  =
-1
, 5 ; =
^ < / / ,e x p ( - y 3 ^ )
.  /
S 4 I^,exp(-/?'c,; )
-1 (2.16)
-1
where E* is the total service employment in a zone j .
There was no significant progress in POLIS to represent the three criteria compared 
with the existing models. Like the Herbert and Stevens model or TOPAZ, the model 
offered little information on the unique characteristics of locations; POLIS lacked the 
behavioural interpretation of decision-makers because the model was aggregate; the 
model addressed the crude interaction between transport and land-use.
Important progress in terms of the interaction between transport and land-use has been 
made in combined models. This group of models claimed that both the spatial 
interaction and mathematical programming models could not successfully represent 
the mutual adjustment process between transport and land-use because the two groups 
assumed fixed transport costs. The combined model integrated a network model with 
a spatial interaction framework tackling the crude representation (Evans, 1973; Evans, 
1976; Florian et al., 1975; Erlander, 1977; Erlander et al., 1979; Boyce and 
Southworth, 1979; Los, 1979; Boyce, 1980).
Min Z = X [ ' t ,
a P i /
k
v/,y
j
Vi (2.17)
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The above formulation produced the following:
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if /„* > 0, then (va)S°/  = c,_,
(1.19)
if /„* = 0, then £f„(v„)<5;* > c„
a
where Wf  is a measure of the relative attractiveness in an employment location j .
Equation (2.18) satisfies the constraints of trip ends, spatial interactions, and zonal 
attractiveness; equation (2.19) is needed to satisfy the Wardrop principle.
It should be noted that transport costs in the combined model is determined 
endogenously. The endogenous determination was achieved by the interaction 
between transport and land-use. This means that the model can consider a congestible 
transport network, and so the endogenous transport impedance is regarded as an 
innovative contribution of the combined model. Another important point that should 
be noted in the formulation is that the combined model can incorporate the 
disaggregation and urban dynamics processes of the Wilson (1970) model. The 
processes, however, are not specified in the formulation for the concise discussion.
Kim (1979, 1983) proposed a model that had a different perspective but was related to 
the group of the combined models, namely a general equilibrium model between the 
demand for and supply of transport and activity locations. The model could produce 
the endogenously determined zonal travel demands, link congestion costs, and the 
optimal amount of production in efficient densities of land-use.
Min Z  =
i r
where E'  is the unit of a commodity r exported from / and
< (• )  is the unit of costs of an exporting a commodity r from a zone i .
Sheffi (1985, p. 166) suggested an alternative formulation that highlighted an explicit 
representation of a measure of locational attractiveness:
Min Z (v.T) = X j [ “^ W A - I I MJT, (2.21)
a i j
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where Mj is a measure of locational attractiveness. The attractiveness measure could
be either fixed aggregate indices such as the number of houses or some form of 
demand functions. When the formulation incorporates a demand function in the form 
of a gravity model generalised by the Entropy maximisation (Wilson, 1970), the 
structure is identical to that of Evans (1973; 1976) shown in equation (2.17).
Chu (1990) noted that the combined models could not satisfactorily represent the 
locational behaviour in which households had a different level of ‘captivity’. A 
typical example of the different captivity is that the observed interaction patterns are 
represented by both compulsory and discretionary behaviours. Compulsory 
interactions are those made even in the worst conditions. In contrast, discretionary 
interactions are less regular both in time and space. Therefore, the two behaviours 
would require different modelling approaches. The Dogit distribution model (Gaudry 
and Wills, 1979) was integrated to a network model in order to represent the captivity:
r \
T =T 1
exp(M;
1 + 2 X  1 + X °V  Z exP
J  J  J
if f } >  0, then = c»
a
if / , ‘ =0, then 2 > . ( v . ) ^ * c r
(2 .22)
where crtj is a nonnegative parameter that represents the captivity odds of households 
in an origin i whose destination is j .
Households
Captive Free
Social or income group
Captivity
Figure 2-3 Two-stage disaggregation in the Chu model
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The Chu model has a two-stage disaggregation of user groups to represent the 
different captivity. Figure 2-3 shows a conceptual diagram for the disaggregation 
process. In the diagram, the model introduced the second stage disaggregation while 
conventional models normally suggested the first stage only. This complexity results 
from the aggregate nature of the mathematical programming models. In other words, 
the aggregate model requires an extra classification of user groups in order to describe 
the various behaviours of decision-makers. The behaviour, in the end, could be 
successfully represented by incorporating a disaggregate modelling framework.
A multiclass perspective has been incorporated in the combined model (Lam and 
Huang, 1992a; Lam and Huang, 1992b; Nagumey and Dong, 2002b). Conventional 
combined models implicitly assumed that there was only one homogenous user group 
when the models calculated transport costs even though the approaches disaggregated 
households into several classes. Furthermore, the interaction between classes was 
merely implemented by exogenously determined user specific parameters. The 
multiclass framework tackled this crude representation by formulating an explicit 
interaction between household classes. In this framework, a class was defined as a 
group of households that perceived the criteria associated with transport components 
in an identical fashion. In particular, this perspective could represent multimode 
problems that were unlikely to be considered in the conventional combined models. 
Clearly, the multiclass model assumed that the transport impedance of a class 
depended on the flow of its own class as well as on that of other classes. The 
interaction could be asymmetric. In this case, there is no equivalent convex 
mathematical programming formulation for representing the multiclass interaction. 
Instead, Lam and Huang (1992a) incorporated Van Vliet and others’ (1986) 
normalising approach into the existing combined model:
   im I __________
Min z = I  f * . • v : ( 2-23)
a  a k m * 0  P  t j  m
where d ka is the kth fixed cost component on a link a and 
6” , b” are parameters specific to a class m .
Nagumey and Dong (2002b) formulated the same problem as Lam and Huang 
(1992a) using a variational inequality. The variational inequality formulation is more
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general than the normalising counterpart in the sense that the formulation can handle 
the asymmetric interaction between user classes (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980).
where g " (•) is a generalised cost function on a link a for a class m ;
v f  is the optimal volume of a class m on a link a ; and
v* is the optimal link volume vector where v = {vj, • • •, v*; • • •; v", • • •, vj j .
Another extension of the combined models can be found in the study of the
incorporation of endogenous locational costs that are necessary for performing 
activities (Oppenheim, 1993). Oppenheim argued that zonal attractiveness would be a 
function of trip ends; the trip ends themselves would be a function of locational costs. 
Congestion is a typical example of the locational costs. This is because congestion at 
a specific location may create additional travel time. An alternative formulation was 
proposed in which decision-makers were assumed to choose locations so as to 
minimise the sum of stochastic locational costs and deterministic travel costs.
where, dj (•) is a destination cost function.
The Oppenheim model was originally developed for travel demand analyses, but the 
model suggested a useful interpretation for representing the relationship between 
transportation and the location of activities. The locational cost in the Oppenheim 
model, which is determined endogenously, could be directly related to locational 
opportunity costs. This might mean that the model could produce the endogenously 
calculated locational opportunity cost as well as the transport cost, though the 
interaction process between the two factors was not explicit.
(2.24)
m a
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2.3.3. Conclusion
This section has reviewed mathematical programming models that have been applied 
to the research for the interaction between transport and the location of activities. The 
models represent an optimal allocation of households across an area. Hence, the 
primary purpose of this group is to suggest an efficient urban structure. This means 
that the models are linked to find system efficiency such as cost minimisation or 
benefit maximisation. Early models of this type were formulated using linear or non­
linear optimisation programming; later, combined models were developed. The 
combined models integrated a spatial interaction framework with a network model, 
which highlighted the interaction between transport and land-use.
This type of model has a simple mathematical form and does not necessarily account 
for a wide range of empirical properties for a study area. However, the nature of this 
group would not satisfactorily meet the criteria that have been adopted for evaluating 
models in this study. First of all, the models have little consideration for the unique 
characteristics of locations. Like the spatial interaction models, the mathematical 
programming models use broad aggregate measures such as population or the area of 
zones. This means that the models crudely represent locational features. Secondly, the 
models fail to represent the decision-making process of an individual household. 
Although most models in this group disaggregate population into social or income 
groups, the nature of the aggregate model structure means difficulty in addressing the 
behaviour of an individual household. Finally, the mathematical programming models 
show the partial interaction between transport and land-use. The greatest advantage of 
this type would be the representation of interaction between transport and land-use. In 
particular, the combined models produce endogenously determined transport costs 
that are generated by the mutual adjustment process between land-use and transport. 
The representation, however, is partial in the sense that the locational attractiveness is 
assumed to be fixed and the interaction is initiated by transport components only. In 
spite of the partial mechanism, the endogenous transport cost means that the model 
addresses a congestible transport network. This is a distinct contribution of the 
combined model to the studies of land-use transport interactions.
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2.4. Random utility models
2.4.1. Introduction
Random utility models address the relationship between transport and the location of 
activities in terms of the utility-maximising behaviour of a household. This group has 
been one of the most frequently used frameworks for investigating the relationship.
The random utility models functionalise the connection between the characteristics of 
locations and the behaviour of decision-makers. Let C be a feasible choice set for a 
household h . It is assumed that the choice set of each household is well specified 
from a scientific perspective. A household has a utility function in relation to the 
attributes of a location and the characteristics of a household. Not all attributes of a 
location and a household are observed. Hence, a random term is introduced to 
consider the unobserved attributes. As a result, the total utility of any alternative 
location i' g C is expressed by the sum of the observed and unobserved components.
U(i) = Vl +e, (2.26)
where Vf is the system component of an alternative location i and
et is the random component of an alternative location i .
The probability that any alternative location / is chosen by a household is given by 
P(i) = prob[Ul >U,.,Vi'eC\
= prob [ Vi + > MaxfVf + s?), Vf e C, i' * /]
Historical developments of the random utility models for representing the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities are reviewed in the next section. The 
review is considered in terms of theoretical investigations into model formulations 
and practical applications to diverse transportation problems. In the following section, 
the advantages and disadvantages of this group of models are discussed. The 
discussion concludes that the random utility model would not be an appropriate 
framework for representing the interaction between transport and the location of 
activities even though this group has some attractive features.
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2.4.2. Review
In most applications of the random utility model, feasible alternatives have a 
combination of underlying choice dimensions, namely multiple dimensions. Unlike a 
single dimensional problem, the multidimensional cases have difficulty in defining a 
feasible choice set because some elements in the multidimensional choice set are 
logically related. For example, in the choice problem of residence and a travel mode, 
a particular location may not have a transit service. This suggests that there is a 
linkage between the particular location and the private car. Two theoretical 
approaches have been investigated to represent the multidimensional problems, 
namely joint and nested logit models. A joint logit model assumes that an individual 
simultaneously makes a decision concerning the multidimensional problem. In this 
framework, alternatives are supposed to have common observed elements specific to 
each dimension. This suggests that the model does not consider unobserved 
components specific to each dimension. In contrast, a nested logit model assumes that 
a decision is sequentially made incorporating both observed and unobserved 
components; one of the unobserved components is supposed to be negligible. A 
nested logit model is more flexible than a joint logit model in the sense that the model 
opens the possibility of having unobserved components specific to each dimension.
An early application of a joint logit model to represent the interaction between 
transport and the location of activities can be found in the rental residence study of 
Quigley (1976). The model proposed the total 18 alternatives that were a joint set of a 
dwelling type d and a location with characteristics vector z . The utility function was 
expressed by the sum of system and probabilistic elements.
U {d ,z )^V d +V,+Vdl+edl, 'd ( d , z ) e C  (2.28)
where Vd is the common system components of a dwelling type d ;
Vz is the common system components of a location with the vector of 
housing characteristics z ; 
r* is the remaining system components specific to the combination of a
dwelling and a location (d ,z ) ; and 
a random utility component.
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The Quigley model was expressed as a multinomial logit type by assuming the
disturbance term s& distributed IID Gumbel.
« -29>
(d ', z' )
It would be useful to reformulate a joint logit model in terms of marginal and 
conditional probabilities for the subsequent discussion. When a choice problem is 
expressed in terms of a conditional probability, the formulation implicitly assumes 
that the decision-making process of a household is sequential. For example, in the 
study of Quigley (1976), say an individual household is supposed to select a dwelling 
type d  first; subsequently, a residential location is chosen given the dwelling type. 
Then, the probability of the composite alternative (d, z) being chosen is given:
P(d,z)  = P (d ) 'P ( z \d )  (2.30)
The marginal probability P (d ) is calculated by summing each joint probability.
/ > ( ^ )  =  Z P ( ^ ’ z )» V z e C z 
z
y  e x p fo + K .+ r J  (2.31)
.  E e x p ( ^ + F ,+ K A.)
{d',z')
where Cz is the restricted one dimensional choice set of a location.
The probability P(d)  is rewritten as a multinomial logit model adding the term V 'd .
P{d)=  exp( ^  + ^ ) ~ , V rfsC j (2.32)
v '  £ e x p ( r , +v ; ) ’
d'
where V'd = In ^ e x p (Vz +Vdz) and
z
Cd is the restricted dimensional choice set of a dwelling type.
The conditional probability P(z \ d) is calculated combining equations (2.29) with
(2.32). The conditional probability is also expressed by a multinomial logit type with 
the restricted dimensional choice set of a location.
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P (z \d )  = P (d ,z ) /P(d)
= exp 
X e x p ^  + F*.)
(2.33)
Finally, the probability of the composite alternative (z,d)  being chosen can be 
expressed by combining the marginal and conditional probabilities.
<2M )
d' * '
The formulation in equation (2.34) shows a sequential decision-making process. This 
means that a joint logit model can be available to represent a simultaneous as well as a 
sequential decision-making process provided with some modifications. A joint logit 
model, however, is no longer appropriate when an alternative has unobserved 
components specific to each dimension.
When a choice set has unobserved as well as observed elements specific to each 
dimension, a utility function should be extended as follows:
£/(</,*) = F, +FI + F * (2.35)
where ed is the unobserved components of a dwelling unit;
ez is the unobserved components of a location with characteristics z ; and
is the remaining unobserved components.
In particular, a joint logit model is no longer applicable to the situation in which some 
alternatives are correlated. This is because alternatives share common unobserved 
components within the dimension. In this case, the covariance of utility is completely 
dependent on the shared components. A joint logit model cannot represent this 
relationship. For example, in the Quigley model, all other components except a 
location z have no influence on the determination of the covariance of utility.
cov[t/ (d, z) ,U  (d \  z)]
= cov(sd +st +sdt,ed,+st +edi) (2.36)
=  var(<7, )
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A nested logit model is more general and flexible than a joint logit model. A nested 
logit model assumes that one of the dimensions has correlated components but the 
unobserved components of the dimension are negligible. For example, in the Quigley 
model (1976), if residential locations are supposed to have some common components 
and the unobserved components of locations are negligible, namely ez = 0, the utility 
function is reformulated as follows:
[/(</,*) = F,, + FI + F4 + « ,+ «*  (2.37)
The marginal probability for the dwelling type d is calculated if and only if an 
alternative containing d  has the highest utility.
P(d) = p ro^m axf/(d ,z)>m axC /(d ',z), i d '  e C d,d'*d~^ (2.38)
where the term maxU(d,z)  is the utility of the best alternative in Cd .
The formulation in equation (2.38) means that the dwelling type d  is chosen if the 
best alternative with d  is better than without d . It is noted that a choice set is 
restricted into the single dimension, namely from C to Cd .
Since U(d,z) = Vd +Vz +Vdz+sd +€dz, equation (2.38) is rewritten as follows:
prob£ Vd +ed + max (Vt +Vdl+Edl)>Vd.+ed + max (Vz + Vd.t + eA  )] (2.39)
where ' i d ' e C d, d' d .
The term eA is assumed to be distributed as IID Gumbel with parameter pz , then
E [max (F, + )1 = — In £  exp //, (Vt + ) = Vj (2.40)
The combination of equation (2.39) and (2.40) provides
P{d) = prob[Vd + ed + V'd + e'd > Vd. +ed + Fj. +e'd,, d ' e C d,d '* d ]  (2.41)
Equation (2.41) is expressed as a multinomial logit model if the combined disturbance 
£d + ed is assumed to be distributed as IID Gumbel with parameter pd.
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p ( d \  exp ^ ( v<,+vJ) 
Z e x p v A K +v;)
d'
(2.42)
One of the differences between joint and nested logit models is the values of the
parameters fid and . A joint logit model assumes that both values are equal to one. 
In contrast, a nested logit model is flexible in the values.
The random term is supposed to follow IID Gumbel distribution, and then the 
equation (2.43) is expressed as a multinomial logit model.
A nested logit model has two scale parameters, namely pd and fiz. In practice, the
parameters are identified using observed data. Since the value of the scale parameters 
is expressed by the ratio, one of the parameters can be set as one without any affect on 
the result (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1987). In this section, the parameter //z is set as 
one for the comparison with a joint logit model.
Finally, the probability of the composite alternative (z,c/) being chosen can be 
expressed combining the marginal with the conditional probabilities.
The conditional probability P(z \ d) is derived from a similar way to the case of the 
marginal probability.
P ( z \ d )  = p r o b ^ U ( z , d ) > U ( z \ d ) ,  V z ' g C 2, z ' ^ z | d~j
= prob [Vd +Vi + VA + ed +edI>Vd+ V, + VM. +sd + Stt ] (2.43)
= prob[Vt +Vdt+£lk> Vs + V*. +**., Vz' e C „ z ' * z  | d]
£ exP m, ( K + va )
(2.44)
P(z,d)  = P ( d ) P ( z \ d )  = exp fid(Vd + Vj ) exp +VA)
^ e x p / /„ (^ .+ F ;)  X exP ( ^ + ^ )
d'
where Vj = In 2] exp (F, +FA).
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The functional form of the systematic components is an important point that should be 
noted. In most cases, a form of a linear-in-parameter function is adopted for 
computational convenience.
r,=fiv  r*=Pi** (2-46)
where xd , xz, and x^ correspond to the attributes of dwelling types, locations, and
combinations of dwelling types and locations, respectively, and p j , pz , and p^ are 
the vectors of corresponding parameters.
f d is changed into pj and fid into <j  for notational consistency with the preceding 
research, and then the equation (2.45) is rewritten as follows:
P(z,d) = P (d )-P (z \d )
exp(p;^ + crFj) exp(p^,+p^xA) (2.47)
E exP ( P ^  + (7V* ) Z exP(P»'x»' +P*'X* )
d ' z'
where V'd = ln ^ e x p (p ^ ,  +&**)■
Z
The term Vd represents the utility of the best alternative in the subset; hence, the
factor indicates the expected maximum utility of a sub set of alternatives to an 
individual. In this context, the term has been interpreted as a measure of ‘inclusive 
value’ (McFadden, 1978) or ‘accessibility’ (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1979). The value 
of cr is imposed between zero and one. McFadden (1978) interpreted a  as an index 
for the degree of independence of alternatives. Clearly, a nested logit model is 
equivalent to a multinomial logit model if the parameter cr is set as one.
Lerman (1977) implemented both joint and nested logit models with a sample of 177 
skilled single-worker households in Washington DC, USA. The study argued that the 
locational decision of a household is closely related to other choices of housing, car 
ownership, and travel mode to work. A four dimensional choice set called ‘mobility 
bundles’ was proposed and two types of model were estimated, namely constrained 
and unconstrained models. In the constrained model, a joint logit type, a household 
was supposed to simultaneously choose the four-dimensional alternative. In the 
unconstrained model, a nested logit type, a household was assumed to choose three­
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dimensional bundles of housing, car ownership, and travel mode first; subsequently, a 
location was selected supposing locations had shared components. This meant that the 
choice structure was designed by a sequential process. The result, g  -  0.492, showed 
that there was a substantial correlation among the unobserved components within 
locations. The correlation resulted from the use of a census tract that was a group of 
housing units. Therefore, other conditions being equal, a very large tract would have a 
higher probability of being selected than a very small counterpart because the number 
of disaggregate opportunities was greater in the former than the latter.
A similar problem but different modelling approach to the Lerman study can be found 
in the research into the joint choice of a residential location and vehicle availability 
(Sermons and Seredich, 2001). In this study, a large number of alternative residential 
locations were converted into a manageable choice set using a cluster analysis. The 
choice structure of households in this model was assumed to be a simultaneous 
process, namely a joint logit type based on a multinomial logit framework, which the 
authors admitted that the model could be unrealistic. The adopted choice structure, 
however, resulted from unsuccessful attempts at calibrating a sequential decision­
making procedure. A unique characteristic of this model was that the vehicle 
availability and a residential location were endogenously treated.
Anas (1981, 1982) applied the random utility model to the research into a combined 
travel mode and locational choice. In this study, a location choice was supposed as a 
joint function of locational attractiveness and travel modes available in the location. 
Four transport modes, which were car, rail, bus and rapid transit, were considered; 
three categories of data, which were the socio-economic characteristics of a 
household, the physical and economic attributes of a location and a dwelling, and 
variables for the features of a combined mode and location, were used. The data used 
were aggregate. This meant that the model failed to make use of the advantages of the 
disaggregate model. Nevertheless, Anas argued that the aggregate model was more 
adaptable to practical prediction, equilibration, and policy analysis because the model 
had no necessary aggregation step.
As shown in Figure 2-4, the Anas model formulated the three dimensional choice 
structure of households on a location z , a commuting mode m , and a dwelling type
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d . Although the choice dimension in the Anas model was sequential, a nested logit 
type, the utility function was expressed as a modified joint logit framework.
U(*,rn,d)-Vt +Vm +Vmt + emi (2.48)
where V is the system components in the utility function and
z,7w,dare the characteristics of a location, a transport mode, and a dwelling 
type respectively.
mx
Figure 2-4 The choice structure of the Anas model
The probability of an alternative, which was the bundle of z , m and d , being chosen 
was calculated using a series of conditional probabilities.
P(i,m ,d)  = P ( i ) P { m \ z ) P { d \ m i )  
s.t. P(d \mz)  = l/D
where D is the number of dwellings in a location.
The value of P (d \m z ) was assumed to be fixed ratio 1/D, which suggested that
every dwelling was equally chosen. The assumption resulted from the use of the 
aggregate data. The aggregate data meant that the specific dwelling information was 
not available in the model. Thus, the Anas model was, in fact, a two-dimensional
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choice problem. The other probabilities, P(z) and P(m |z ) , were determined 
following the traditional technique of maximum likelihood estimation.
The Anas model was extended into CATLAS (the Chicago Area. Transportation and 
Zand-use Analysis System; 1981-1985) for the cost-benefit analysis of urban transport 
investments in Chicago. In the early nineties, CATLAS was extended into NYSIM 
(the Yew Fork area S/mulation Mo del; 1990-1993), including non-work travel choices 
and commercial real estate markets. NYSIM evaluated the impact of urban transport 
service improvements. Another application of the Anas model was CPHMM (the 
Chicago Prototype //busing Market Model; 1987-1993), which was a dynamic 
prototype model to investigate the effectiveness, efficiency and inter-temporal effect 
of the demand and supply sides of housing market assistance policies aimed at 
improving the welfare of low-income households. After a series of theoretical and 
empirical researches, which were CATLAS, NYSIM and CPHMM, Anas (1994) 
developed a commercial package called METROSIM. METROSIM embodied the 
random utility model with econometrically specified behaviour and a market clearing 
mechanism. METROSIM has seven sub models: basic industry, non-basic industry, 
real estate (residential and commercial), vacant land, household, travel demand for 
commuting and non-work travel, and traffic assignment. These sectors make three 
equilibriums, which were labour market equilibration and job assignment, housing 
market equilibrium, and commercial space equilibrium. The equilibriums are 
achieved by an iterative process adjusting land-use patterns and traffic flows.
The random utility model has been applied to estimate the willingness-to-pay of a 
household for residential attractiveness. Morisugi and Yoshida (1986) defined the 
locational attractiveness of residence as the amount of money that a household 
willingly paid for obtaining a marginal quality of locational attributes. The model 
claimed that existing logit models failed to measure the willingness-to-pay of a 
household in two senses; first, the conventional models excluded the budget and time 
constraints of a household; secondly, the traditional linear-in-parameter function 
produced an independent value from the income level of a household even though the 
budget and time constraints were taken into account. An alternative formulation was 
suggested, which explicitly included the budget and time constraints of a household.
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U(x,z,Q,t,)
st. t,+tc = t - t w=t„ (2.50)
f z  + H ,= y  + HJ
where x is the vector of composite goods with unit price;
z is the vector of housing attributes;
Q is the level of neighbourhood quality;
tl9 tc, t, tw,tH are a household’s leisure time, commuting time, fixed 
total time (24hr), working time, and non-working time, respectively;
H i , Hj are the housing prices in zones i and j  respectively; and
y  is the net income of a household, which is calculated by the annual
income minus the revenue from the rent of the owned house.
Another study that stressed the time and budget constraints of a household was found 
in the Tool for integrated analysis of location and Transport (TILT) model (Eliasson 
and Mattsson, 2000). In this study, a household was assumed to choose a bundle of a 
location, car ownership, and a travel pattern; the travel pattern included trip 
frequencies, destinations, and travel modes specific to trip types. The overall 
mathematical structure of TILT was similar to that of a nested logit model; however, 
an explicit consideration of the time and budget constraints of a decision-maker 
allowed the model to produce inconstant time and cost sensitivities.
Hunt and others (1993) investigated the influence of critical factors determining the 
attractiveness of a residential location. The study comprehensively reviewed previous 
research and reported that the most cited factors for representing this issue were the 
price of residence and accessibility to a workplace. The stated preference data of 
households were surveyed. These data were estimated using a multinomial logit 
model in order to measure the willingness-to-pay of a household. One of the 
interesting findings was that the value of ‘within walking distance of an LRT’ was 
more than eight times the value of ‘travel time to work per hour’.
The random utility model has investigated the combination of the locational choice of 
residence and workplace. Traditionally, workplace locations have been exogenously 
determined in residential location models. Some empirical studies, however, reported
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that the assumption could no longer be supported in a metropolitan area (Hamilton, 
1982; Quigley, 1990). In the long run, residential locations would be a conditional 
function of current workplace locations and vice versa (Abraham and Hunt, 1997).
Anderstig and Mattsson (1991) developed IMREL (integrated A/odel of Residential 
and Employment location), which linked a normative residential location sub model 
(RES) and a predictive employment sub model (EMP), subject to the upper and lower 
bounds on the number of households and workplaces. RES was formulated as a 
sequential choice of residence and a mode to work given a workplace location. RES 
suggested two types of model, namely a post mode choice form E(z) • P(m | z) and a
pre mode choice form P(m)-P(z \ m). The employment location sub model was a
function of accessibility to labour force. EMP reflected the strategic position of an 
employer because an employer was assumed to compensate the commuting cost of the 
employee (Jonsson, 2001). Both models were combined in an iterative way. Later, 
IMREL was reformulated incorporating a network representation (Boyce and 
Mattsson, 1999). The reformulation produced endogenous travel costs in IMREL.
Waddell (1993) discussed the different decision-making patterns of households; some 
households may simultaneously decide their residence and workplace; others may 
sequentially consider the decision. In the sequential cases, some households may 
choose a residence first and then systematically search for a workplace; others may 
consider the reverse; since these possibilities could be site-specific, it is important to 
test all possible cases. Waddell suggested three types of model. The first formulation, 
a joint logit model, assumed a household simultaneously made a decision. In this case, 
an alternative was a bundle of workplace, homeownership, and residence. The other 
two formulations, nested logit models, assumed a household sequentially made a 
decision. Each one has a two or three-level nested structure. The two-level nested 
model was expressed as the product of the marginal probability of a workplace 
location choice P(w) and the conditional probability of the joint choice of
homeownership (tenure) and residence P [(o ,z ) |w ], The three-level nested model
assumed that a household first chose a workplace location E (w ); subsequently a
tenure conditional on the selected workplace P(o \ w) ; and finally a residence
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conditional on the chosen workplace and homeownership P (z | wo). Waddell found
that the choice of residence and workplace was jointly determined. In particular, 
Waddell argued that the spatial dispersion of both residential and workplace locations 
was so related that a cautious approach was necessary in formulating models.
Abraham and Hunt (1997) suggested an alternative formulation for a combined choice 
model of residential and workplace locations considering multiple-worker 
households. The research claimed that a household faces a different dimensional 
choice problem. In other words, a household chooses a residential location for the 
whole household and individual household members select their own workplace and 
travel modes to work. A rational household was supposed to make a compensatory 
decision, which was the best for the entire household even if the decision was not the 
optimum for each household member. An alternative utility function was proposed, 
which represented the trade-off among household members.
[ / = z + S ( ,v/.+ct*ot*) (2-51)heH
where h is an individual household member; the member belongs to a
household H , namely V h e H ; 
wh is the system components of workplaces for a household member h ;
mh is the system components of travel modes to workplaces for a
household member h ; and 
<jh is the inclusive value parameter of age and gender.
In the Abraham and Hunt model, an individual household was assumed to have its 
own nested choice structure regarding age and gender. A household was expected to 
choose a combined sub alternative (z, w) first, and then select a mode m where the
inclusive value parameter cr allowed the mode choice of some household members to 
influence the overall household utility more than that of others.
Most applications of the random utility model in representing the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities have used observed data, namely 
revealed preference data (RP). However, RP has been known to produce biases in 
terms of selecting appropriate variables and generating a choice set. Eamhart (2002)
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suggested an alternative model, which combined RP and SP (Stated Preference) data. 
The research tested three kinds of model: RP only, SP only, and combined RP and SP. 
The study reported that the result of the combined model was more realistic than that 
of non-combined models in terms of the significance of parameters. The SP model 
was also used in estimating values of changes in the negative transport externality 
such as traffic noise and air quality (Wardman and Bristow, 2004).
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2.4.3. Conclusion
Random utility models represent the relationship between transport and the location 
of activities in terms of the utility maximising behaviour of an individual decision­
maker. Early models focused on the theoretical foundation of the framework using a 
joint or a nested logit approach; later, the models were applied to a wide range of 
topics: exploring a residential choice process with aggregate data; estimating 
willingness-to-pay; an explicit consideration of the time and budget constraints of a 
household; investigating the combined choice of residential and workplace locations; 
and using combined stated preference and revealed preference data.
This type of model can be a useful tool to represent the nature of the interaction 
between transport and the location of activities. First of all, the model effectively 
addresses the locational characteristics. A bundle of locational attributes describes the 
utility of a location. Each element in the bundle reflects a distinct feature of a 
location. The random component represents the unobserved characteristics of a 
location. Secondly, this group of models offers a high degree of behavioural validity 
of a household’s decision-making process. In this type, a reasonable household is 
assumed to choose a location that offers the maximum utility. This shows that the 
random utility model naturally describes the relationship between the locational 
features and the decision-making process of a household. Furthermore, the 
disaggregate nature of the model addresses the difference in the taste variation of 
decision-makers. Moreover, the model allows flexible market segmentation by 
classifying households according to their socio-economic characteristics, which can 
be linked with multidimensional decision problems. However, the random utility 
model fails to reflect the interaction between transport and the location of activities. 
Both transport costs and locational attractiveness are determined outside the model. 
There is no explicit interaction process between the two factors.
In addition to the discussion regarding the three criteria, the model suffers from 
difficulty in choice set generation. Any method of grouping alternatives is by its very 
nature somewhat arbitrary. This means that some levels of abstraction in defining 
alternatives are required by assumption or the use of reasonable criteria. Furthermore, 
the aggregation bias is well known to be its critical weakness.
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2.5. Bid-rent models
2.5.1. Introduction
Bid-rent models represent the relationship between transport and the location of 
activities in terms of a bid-auction process of decision-makers for residing at 
locations. The term bid-rent, which was originated from the Alonso (1965) model, is a 
hybrid concept of the bid and the rent with which Alonso explained an urban land-use 
process. The bid describes the behaviour of decision-makers. Various households are 
assumed to bid for locations. Landlords are supposed to sell or rent the location to the 
highest bidder. As a result of this process, the pattern of land-uses and locational 
values are mutually determined. The rent is regarded as the amount of money that the 
occupant pays or would pay to the use of a unit of a location. The term rent is generic, 
covering all kinds of market expressions such as contract rents, sales rents, and the 
costs of ownership. The bid-rent is hypothetical. There is no necessary relationship 
between the bid-rent and the actual rent that is charged for the use of a location. 
Therefore, it should be understood that if the rent of a location were paid, an 
individual would be satisfied to a given degree.
The structure of this type of model adopts a conditional modelling approach:
D (h |z )  (2.52)
where D ()  is the demand function for a location market. The formulation is
interpreted as that for each location with the vector of characteristics z , a household 
type h who pays the highest rent is expected to occupy the location.
Bid-rent models are reviewed in the next section. The models are broadly divided into 
deterministic and stochastic types. While the deterministic bid-rent models produce 
all-or-nothing land-use patterns, the stochastic counterparts create probabilistic 
variations in land-uses. In the following section, the advantages and disadvantages of 
this type of model are discussed. The discussion concludes that this group would not 
meet the three criteria which have been identified in the introductory chapter, even 
though the model suggests some useful insights into the investigation of the 
interaction between transportation and the location of activities.
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2.5.2. Deterministic bid-rent models
The deterministic bid-rent model, which originated with Alonso (1965), understood a 
location was as a featureless plain. This meant that all locations were assumed to be of 
equal quality, namely homogenous. Transport was accessible in all directions. All 
employment and goods and services were available at the city centre only. Municipal 
services and tax rates were uniform throughout the city. Locations were freely bought 
and sold. Both buyers and sellers had perfect knowledge of the market, which meant 
the price was given and was not affected by the decisions of the buyers and sellers.
The Alonso model dealt with the relationship between locational values and land- 
uses. The proposed methodology highlighted the role of households on the operation 
of a location market. In this model, a location market is controlled by a bid-auction 
process; potential users bid for locations; as a result, locations are assigned to the best 
bidder. This means that the patterns of land-uses and locational values are mutually 
determining. This reasoning is distinct, compared with existing approaches. While 
conventional models suppose that locational values are exogenous and households are 
price takers, the bid-rent model posits that locational values are endogenously 
determined and households play an active role to settle locational values.
A modified version of a classical consumer equilibrium theory was proposed using 
the bid-rent indifference curve of a household. While a classical indifference curve 
had a combination of goods without considering locational prices, the bid-rent curve 
consisted of accessibility and locational prices. The model proposed the famous 
‘double decision process’: ‘how large a lot he should purchase and how close to the 
centre of the city he should settle’. This approach was a simplified process with two 
critical factors, though there are many factors that affect urban land-use patterns.
The budget constraint of an individual was assumed to be the additive form:
y  = c,+c,+C' (2.53)
where y  is the income of an individual household and c,, ct , ce are location costs,
commuting costs, and all other expenditure respectively; all other expenditure 
consisted of the total spending on other goods and services including savings
P& +  Pigi+"- + p„g„ (2-54)
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where g, is the quantity of the ith good and /?, is the price of the ith good.
Goods and services were grouped into a composite commodity g for the sake of 
simplicity; the price of the composite good was given by pg. Thus, the term of all 
other expenditure was compactly expressed as pgg .
P
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Figure 2-5 A location cost (a) and a commuting cost (b)
Figure 2-5 shows a conceptual diagram for the function of locational and commuting 
costs in the Alonso model. Location costs were assumed to monotonically decrease 
with the distance from the centre of the city. An individual chose a location with the 
quantity of land q ; thus, the land cost was given by P (d )-q . Commuting costs t(d )  
were assumed to monotonically increase with the distance from the centre of the city.
Finally, the budget constraint of an individual was expressed as follows:
y  = Ptg + P (d )q  + t(d )  (2.55)
where pg, g are the price and the quantity of the composite good respectively; 
d  is the distance from the centre of the city;
P (d) is the price of land at distance d  from the centre of the city;
q is the quantity of land; and
t (</) is the commuting cost to distance d .
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The utility function of an individual consisted of the quantity of land, the composite 
good, and distance, which were mapped through indifference surfaces.
U = U (g ,q ,d )  (2.56)
An indifference curve represented a constant level of satisfaction. In other words, 
given any combination of a location and distance, a small increase in distance 
produced dissatisfaction, and had to be compensated for by a small increase in the 
quantity of a location; in this process, the level of satisfaction remained the same.
dd.
Figure 2-6 A graphical illustration for the solution to the A lonso model
An individual was assumed to maximise utility within the income constraint. This 
process was represented in terms of the discovery of the combination (g ,q ,d)  that
yielded the highest value for U satisfying the budget balance; notice that the 
composite good was held constant g .
Graphically, the process can be illustrated straightforwardly. Figure 2-6 shows the 
illustration. Let an individual locate at dm for whatever reason. Equilibrium occurs at 
the point of tangency between the loci of opportunities and the highest of the
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indifference curves. The combination of q and d  at this point is the most satisfying 
to the individual in the choice set that the decision-maker has. Since the indifference 
surface yields the same satisfaction to an individual, all the combinations of q and d 
will yield the same value of U . This means that an individual pays at various 
distances while deriving a constant level of satisfaction.
The Alonso model assumed that the unit of a location was a homogeneous commodity 
that had a constant value across the market. Hence, in the long run, all locations 
having the same attractiveness would produce equal service. This meant that locations 
with the same attraction could be perfect substitutes regardless of the compensating 
difference between locational characteristics and environmental quality. Obviously, it 
is unlikely that a household is indifferent from a high quality but small-size location 
and a low quality but large-size location.
Rosen (1974) incorporated a hedonic theory into the bid-rent model emphasising the 
inherent heterogeneity of locations. The model stressed that a location is not a 
homogeneous good but a bundle of attributes z = (z,,---,z/) that satisfies the various 
dimensions of a household’s demand (Witte et al., 1979). A hedonic price function 
/ / ( z) was associated with the bundle. The function guides consumer and producer
locational choices regarding the package of characteristics bought and sold. The 
Rosen model represented the maximum amount that a household would willingly pay 
for an alternative location having the bundle z at a given utility, income and taste.
0 = 0 (zl9—,zi\U ,y ,a )  (2.57)
where U is a given fixed utility level;
9 (•) the bid-rent function of a household; and
a  is the vector of taste variations of a household.
At equilibrium, the bid-rent function of a household is tangent to the hedonic price 
function //(•) because the function is the minimum price a household must pay in the 
market. Mathematically, the optimum location in z-plane occurs where the two 
surfaces of //(•) and #(•) are tangential to each other.
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0{z\i'--iz*i \U ,y9a) = H { z )  
where H  (•) is the hedonic price function of a location market.
(2.58)
The offer function represented the minimum unit price that a firm willingly accepted 
for the price of housing bundles that the firm produced at constant profits.
^ = (2.59)
where $ (•) is the offer function of a supplier;
k is the constant profit level;
M  is the level of output of a firm; and
P is the vector of parameters for factor prices and a production function.
At equilibrium, the offer function of a supplier is tangent to the hedonic price function 
since the function / /(z )  is the maximum obtainable price in the market. Profits are 
maximised at tangency between the hedonic price function and the offer function.
H [ z )  = ^ [ z \ ,- -9z]\n ,M 9p )  (2.60)
As discussed above, the market equilibrium occurs at tangency with the hedonic price 
function. Figure 2-7 shows a one-dimensional graphical expression for the market 
equilibrium of the Rosen model (1974) where all other attributes except z,. are held
constant. Let Qd (z) be the market quantity demanded for locations with
characteristics z ; Qs (z) is the market quantity supplied for locations with the same 
attributes z ; the market equilibrium occurs at Qd (z) = Qs ( z ) . Even though the 
market equilibrium can easily be conceptualised, it is not simple to find an actual 
equilibrium. The difficulty is because the quantities of demand and supply, Qd (z)
and Qs ( z ) , depend on the hedonic price function H [z ) . This means that every 
attribute z„ V/ in the hedonic function should also be in equilibrium together with the
market equilibrium. Rosen suggested a two-step approximation procedure to 
overcome the difficulty in finding the double equilibrium. In the first step, the hedonic 
price function / / ( z) is estimated; usually, observed prices are regressed against
59
locational attributes; / / ( z )  denotes the resulting function. In the following step, a set 
of implicit marginal prices is computed regarding the estimated marginal price as the 
observed marginal price, namely dH/dzi = dH/dzt .
Figure 2-7 The market equilibrium of the Rosen model
The Rosen model was distinct, compared with conventional hedonic price approaches. 
The model showed the underlying market mechanism while existing approaches only 
revealed the empirical magnitude of hedonic prices. In the Rosen model, the market 
price of locations was jointly determined by consumers’ evaluating the individual 
services provided and by the offering price of suppliers for each service. Witte et al. 
(1979) successfully applied the Rosen result to investigate the rental housing market 
in non-metropolitan cities in North Carolina, USA. It was demonstrated that the two- 
step procedure satisfactorily estimated both the bid and the offer functions in the 
analysis of an implicit housing market. The model confirmed the common hypothesis 
in which higher status and income households would bid higher for housing quality.
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2.5.3. Stochastic bid-rent models
Deterministic bid-rent models addressed the relationship between transport and the 
location of activities in terms of a bid-auction process. Decision-makers were 
regarded as bidders and competed to reside. In the end, the best bidder occupied a 
location. The deterministic model successfully represented the inherent heterogeneity 
of locations and the decision-making process of individuals. However, the 
deterministic structure produced an extreme all-or-nothing land-use pattern. This 
signifies that a certain unit of a location is populated by a single household type. 
Furthermore, the deterministic nature meant difficulties in representing a number of 
components of locational attributes and the characteristics of households.
Ellickson (1981) suggested a stochastic bid-rent model that represented the direct 
specification and estimation of bid-rents for hedonic components (Gross, 1988). The 
model was a conditional probability approach that could predict that a location having 
the hedonic bundle z would be occupied by a household type h, V/i e h . The 
coefficients in the model represented the bid-rent of a household for each locational 
attribute. Ellickson extended the Rosen formulation adding the component of
transport costs in the budget constraint of a household, though the impedance was
simply assumed to be the fixed distance to the central business district.
Uh(x, z )
*v '  (2.61)
si. p^s. + H (i.)+ t(x) = y
where Uh is the utility function of a household type h ,V h e  h ;
z is a location that is associated with the vector of characteristics; and 
t (•) is a transport cost function.
Like the Rosen approach, a bid-rent function of a household was defined, which 
yielded a certain level of utility Uh:
e  = 0(z;P t,y,U h) (2.62)
where the price vector px was suppressed assuming px was invariant throughout the 
market and the transport cost function t (•) was absorbed in the bid-rent function.
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The deterministic bid-rent function was replaced with a stochastic type supposing no 
household had the same level of perceived income and utility.
sh is a random utility term that represents the difference in tastes and 
income of a household in a group h and unmeasured characteristics of locations.
The probability that a household type h resided at a location z  was given by
The formulation in equation (2.64) shows that a location is most likely occupied by 
the highest bidder. This interpretation is fundamentally the same as the reasoning of 
the Alonso (1965) approach, namely a location is occupied by the best bidder.
The random term eh is supposed as distributed IID Gumbel. Then, the stochastic bid- 
rent function is represented by a multinomial logit form.
The functional form of the Ellickson model is seemingly the same as that of a random 
utility model. The interpretation and the maximisation process, however, are converse 
between the two models. A random utility model predicts that a consumer chooses a
forecasts that a dwelling unit is occupied by a type of consumer, namely P(h | z ) . In
variable is the bid of each household. Therefore, the maximisation process takes place 
across alternative bidders, namely households. In contrast, the observation unit in a 
random utility model is each household that searches locations. In this structure, the 
random variable is the utility of a household. This means that the maximisation 
process takes place across the alternative locations (Lerman, 1985; Martinez, 1992b). 
Although the model interpretation and the maximisation process are the converse of
*=£*(*)+** (2.63)
where 0h (•) is the stochastic bid-rent function of a household type h ,V h e  h  and
P ( h | z )  = prob{0h(z) + eh >0h,(z) + eh,, W e h,  h * h 'J (2.64)
(2.65)
type of a location, namely P ( z | h ) .  In contrast, the stochastic bid-rent model
the Ellickson model, the observation unit is an individual location and the random
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one another, the two approaches may produce the consistent spatial distribution of 
households in a competitive market (Martinez, 1992b).
The Ellickson model has been rigorously applied to various research areas. Lee 
(1982) applied the Ellickson result to the analysis of the intra-urban employment 
location problem. The study converted a production function into a bid-rent function 
for capturing the locational behaviour of manufacturing firms. The model predicted 
the probability of a certain type of firm locating at a site with a specified set of 
attributes. A similar approach was used in the study of investigating the mismatch 
between the locational selection of firms and the goal of revitalising areas, Cincinnati 
USA (Blakley, 1985). Another application of the probabilistic approach was found in 
the research into representing the relationship between the population movement and 
the capitalisation of changes in the public sector (Zorn, 1985).
In the Ellickson formulation, the estimated willingness-to-pay of a household was an 
arbitrary scaling. This was because the model was formulated without considering an 
observed rent. Hence, the willingness-to-pay of a decision-maker could only be 
inferred as the ratio of substitution of various attributes. In other words, the slopes of 
the bid-rent function of attributes were relative to the reference group. Lerman and 
Kern (1983) added the component of rents actually paid by the winning bidder to 
estimate the absolute value of the willingness-to-pay.
prob [~Qh (z) + eh =r* and 6h, ( z )  +  eh, < r*, V/*' e h h’ * hJ (2.66)
where r* is the vector of the price paid by the best bidder; r* =(•••, r*, • • ■).
The term eh was assumed to be distributed IID Gumbel:
p (h ,r '|z ) = / e[ r ' - 4  ( z ) ]  f j  Fe [r* -  §„. ( z ) ]  (2.67)
h'*h
where f £ and Fe are the Gumbel cumulative density and distribution functions
respectively. In this formulation, the parameters of the bid-rent function were fully 
identified. This meant that the absolute value of the bid-rent for a locational attribute 
could be calculated for any type of household.
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Gross (1988) empirically tested the Lerman and Kern modification (1983) with the 
household data from Bogota, Colombia. The model forecast the bid-rent for each 
attribute of a location and the probability of occupancy of a location by each 
household type. The results were compared to those of the Follain and Jimenez (1985) 
that were linked to the hedonic approach. It was concluded that the bid-rent model 
outperformed the hedonic model in terms of forecasting the demand for a location.
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Figure 2-8 The structure of 5-LUT, source: Martinez (1992)
The stochastic bid-rent model has been incorporated into comprehensive land-use 
transport models. Martinez (1992a, 1996) suggested an alternative transport planning 
approach, which combined a bid choice land-use model called MUSSA and a 
transport model called ESTRANUS, namely the J-stage Zand-Use Transport model 
(5-LUT). 5-LUT assumed that consumers were utility (households) or profit 
maximisers (firms). This meant that the locational decision of consumers was made 
by utility or profit maximising constrained to the accessibility level of sites. 5-LUT 
divided the decision chain of consumers into two components, namely mobility and 
location. The two factors were necessarily and mutually dependent. The mobility
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concerned the number of trips in different purposes. The decision represented the trip 
generation process that linked trips with socioeconomic variables. The other decision 
was the location of activities in the space, which was directly related to the land-use 
model. Martinez argued that traditional transport models did not incorporate a land- 
use sub-model assuming that trip makers were either job or residential seekers, i.e. 
either the origin or destination of trips was supposed to be fixed. Even though this 
assumption offered a convenient perspective in modelling locational advantages and 
the expected impact of transport facilities, there was no good evidence to judge which 
end of trips was fixed. Figure 2-8 shows the summary of the process of 5-LUT.
Another interesting application of the stochastic bid-rent model to comprehensive 
land-use transport studies was the Random Utility .Kent Kidding 4^Analysis (RURBAN) 
(Miyamoto et al., 1992; Miyamoto, 1993; Miyamoto and Udomsri, 1996). RURBAN 
combined a random utility model P(z | h) and a bid-rent model P(h | z) for the
quantitative forecasting of land-use changes. RURBAN interpreted a bid-rent model 
as a locational supply model from the viewpoint of an imaginary landlord; a landlord 
was defined as a current owner that paid higher rent than any other household. 
RURBAN was a model for finding general equilibrium between demand and supply 
of locations. In the supply model, a bid-rent type, households were regarded as 
random variables that were classified according to socio-economic characteristics. In 
the demand model, a random utility type, land was segmented into locations that were 
regarded as discrete options for households. RURBAN sought to find equilibrium 
between the supply and demand, namely P (z  | h) = P(h  | z ) . This framework may
offer a unified methodology that could overcome the problem of the partial 
equilibrium approach in random utility and bid-rent models. Random utility models 
estimate that each type of household is distributed in proportion to the probabilities 
with which a location provides the group the highest utility where the value of the 
location, rent, is given. In contrast, the location share in bid-rent models is 
proportional to the probabilities that each household type bids the highest rent at 
location where the level of utility of a household is given (Lerman, 1985; Martinez, 
1992b; Miyamoto, 1993). The rents of all locations and the level of utilities of all 
household types are indispensable. This means that the partial equilibrium approach 
of the random utility and the bid-rent models may produce undesirable results.
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2.5.4. Conclusion
In this section, bid-rent models, which have been applied in representing the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities, have been reviewed. The 
bid-rent models address the interaction of decision-makers that seek to occupy 
locations in terms of a bid-auction process. Starting from Alonso’s (1965) the unique 
trade-off modelling approach, the model has been improved associating a hedonic 
theory and a stochastic perspective. Recently, the stochastic bid-rent model has been 
incorporated into comprehensive land-use transport interaction models.
This type of model offers an important insight into investigating the nature of the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities. First of all, the bid-rent 
model effectively represents the unique characteristics of locations by incorporating a 
hedonic theory. In this framework, a location is regarded as globally heterogeneous 
but composed of aggregate homogeneous components. Each homogeneous element is 
assumed to be a divisible good that differentiates the bundle of locational 
characteristics. Thus, hedonic-based bid-rent models satisfactorily overcome the 
difficulty of addressing the nature of homogeneity and indivisibility of locations. 
Secondly, the model has a reasonable framework in describing the behaviour of the 
decision-making process of households. The bidding mechanism of this group has 
dual advantages: bidding is directly connected to the willingness-to-pay of an 
individual household; the process rationally represents the interaction between 
households. Furthermore, the model produces the mutually determined pattern of 
land-uses and locational values. This is because the best bidder that pays the highest 
rent is assumed to reside at a location. Hence, the highest rent at locations can be 
understood as representing locational values and the best bidder is supposed to be an 
occupant at locations; note that the users and the value of locations are mutually 
determined. However, it is not easy to establish the explicit interaction between 
transport and land-use. In most applications of the bid-rent models, transport is merely 
formulated as one of the components in the budget constraint of a decision-maker. 
Namely, transport components are represented crudely in this framework.
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2.6. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed models that represent the relationship between transport 
and the location of activities. Four major fields of models were identified: spatial 
interaction models, mathematical programming models, random utility models, and 
bid-rent models. The characteristics of the groups are summarised in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1 Summary of the characteristics of existing models
Model Locational characteristics Decision-making process Interaction
Spatial1 Aggregate measure Crude Not explicit
Math2 Aggregate measure Crude Partial
Random3 The utility of attributes Utility maximisation Not explicit
Bid-Rent41 o . The price of attributes Bidding & utility maximisation Not explicitSpatial Interaction Models Random Utility Models
2 Mathematical Programming Models 4 Bid-Rent Models
Each group of models has advantages and disadvantages. The spatial interaction 
models have the dual advantages of being conceptually simple and a comprehensive 
nature; however, the models fail to address the unique characteristics of locations and 
the decision-making process of a household due to the aggregate structure; 
furthermore, the models crudely represent the interaction between transport and land- 
use. The mathematical programming models have a simple mathematical form linked 
to system efficiency; however, the aggregate nature of the model structure means 
difficulty in representing the systematic properties of locations and the behavioural 
context of a decision-maker; on the other hand, combined models in this group 
highlight the interaction between transport and land-use, though the representation is 
partial. The random utility models consider the unique characteristics of locations 
using a bundle of components; the models offer a high degree of behavioural validity; 
however, the process of the interaction between transport and the location of activities 
is not explicit in this framework. Bid-rent models incorporate a hedonic theory to 
represent the nature of heterogeneity and indivisibility of locations; the bidding 
mechanism successfully describes the decision-making process; however, it is not 
easy to establish the explicit interaction between transport and land-use.
Even though each group of models has a unique mathematical structure, interpretation 
of the model outcome between the groups would be interrelated. For example, the 
spatial interaction model and the random utility model would suggest equivalent
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results at the aggregate level (Anas, 1983); the Herbert-Stevens model could yield an 
analogous solution to Alonso’s bid-rent model (Herbert an Stevens, 1960) provided 
that a planner has full information on a location market; the random utility model and 
the bid-rent model may produce an identical market equilibrium in a perfectly 
competitive market (Martinez, 1992b). These connections do not mean that the groups 
of models agree on the responses of the model output. In fact, some studies on 
comparative responses between different models have reported that the results of 
models would be diverse even though their collective responses were consistent 
(Wegener et al., 1991; Mackett, 1991b; Chattopadhyay, 1998). Hence, it would be 
reasonable to think that the groups of existing models are supplementary rather than 
opposing each other. However, it should be borne in mind that none of the existing 
models, either independently or collectively, could satisfactorily meet the three 
criteria, which have been proposed for the nature of the relationship between transport 
and the location of activities. A desirable framework should suggest a sound theory 
representing the locational characteristics, an appropriate perspective on the behaviour 
of households, and systematic implementation of the interactions between land-use 
and transportation. As an alternative framework, this research explores a new 
approach called a bid-rent network equilibrium model.
68
3. A Bid-rent Network Equilibrium Model
3.1. Introduction
In the introductory chapter, the three criteria that were regarded as the essential nature 
of the relationship between transport and the location of activities were proposed. The 
criteria were the locational characteristics, the decision-making process of a 
household, and the interaction between transport and land-use. In the literature 
review, existing models were classified into four categories in terms of their 
mathematical structure. The review examined whether the groups would meet the 
criteria suggested, but none of the existing groups of models could satisfactorily 
represent the nature of the interaction between transport and the location of activities.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop an alternative framework that will be called 
a bid-rent network equilibrium model for investigating the relationship between 
transport and the location of activities. The model is designed to meet the three 
criteria. In the first place, the unique features of locations are represented using a 
hedonic price theory. The methodology is known to be a useful framework for 
investigating commodities that are globally heterogeneous but consist of 
homogeneous sub-components. Secondly, the model describes the interrelations 
between decisions within a household and those between households. Modelling a 
compensatory decision of households will be the primary task for addressing the 
former, and a non-cooperative competition for the latter. Finally, the interaction 
between transport and land-use is represented by means of a mutual adjustment 
process between transport costs and locational benefits. A systematic connection 
between the three components is embedded in a bi-level mathematical programme.
A conceptual basis for the model is shown in the next section. The basis is considered 
using a set of criteria that has been suggested for the nature of the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities. Subsequently, the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model is derived based on game theory and a bidding mechanism. In the 
following section, the model extension to a multiclass representation, which is helpful 
to address inter-class interactions, is considered. Finally, conclusions are presented.
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3.2. Conceptual basis o f the model
3.2.1. Characteristics of locations
In this study, locations are regarded as commodities that can be consumed. This 
assumption may suggest that ordinary economic frameworks can be used in the 
analysis of locations. In traditional market investigations, products are supposed to 
embody divisible characteristics that together create a homogeneous utility of the 
goods. This means that two similar products represent no difference in utility rather 
than means that the two commodities show exactly the same physical features. 
Consumers are assumed to purchase the group of characteristics in goods even though 
suppliers and consumers would not effectively recognise the attributes of the products 
in trade. The bundle of components consumed is used as input that is transformed into 
utility. Thus, the level of utility of goods depends on the quantity of the characteristics 
embodied. This process shows that the conventional economic methodologies require 
two basic assumptions with regard to the features of the goods, namely homogeneity 
and divisibility. The characteristics of locations, however, violate the two 
requirements. Indeed, a location is a heterogeneous commodity. There is substantial 
variation in the structural features, the lot sizes, the transport connections, the quality 
of local public services, the characteristics of the neighbourhood, and others 
(Ellickson, 1981). In addition to its heterogeneous nature, a location is an indivisible 
product. There are observations on spending on locations, but imprecise references to 
which components are purchased. Furthermore, there is no direct information on the 
prices of the components embodied in commodities. Thus, the process of production, 
exchange and consumption of each attribute is implicit. These unique characteristics 
require an alternative approach. This is mainly because locations are not characterised 
or approximated by a single price, but represented by a range of prices. The prices 
depend on the quality of the characteristics that locations contain; note that the prices 
of goods in the usual economic models depend on the quantity of sub-components.
One of the benchmarks that govern the distinct features of locations is a hedonic price 
theory. The methodology provides a framework for identifying the structure of prices 
for the attributes that are embodied in products; then, analyses for demands for goods 
proceed using the prices of sub-components. In this price model, commodities are
70
assumed to be globally heterogeneous but are supposed to be composed of aggregate 
homogeneous attributes. The commodities may not have common prices, but the 
components are presumed to have at least common price structures. Hence, this 
approach can be a useful tool to overcome the difficulty in representing the unique 
nature of locations, namely heterogeneity and indivisibility.
The hedonic price model has been rigorously applied to the studies of the relationship 
between transport and land-use. Most of the applications have investigated the effects 
of intrinsic factors in land-use and transport components that determine property 
values. Three representative directions of research can be enumerated for this branch. 
In the first place, studies have examined the impact of transport components on the 
changes in property values. In this group, transport represents either hardware or 
software in the transport system. In other words, studies have assessed locational 
premiums associated with accessibility that is considered by either supplies of 
physical infrastructure or traditional measures for accessibility such as travel time, 
travel distance, and others (Palmquist, 1982; Al-Mosaind et al., 1993; Lewis- 
Workman and Brod, 1997; Chen et al., 1998; Jia and Wachs, 1999; Bowes and 
Ihlanfeldt, 2001; Strand and Vagnes, 2001; Vadali and Sohn, 2001; Weinberger, 
2001; Cervero and Duncan, 2002; Srour et al., 2002; Vadali, 2002). The second trend 
has explored the relationship between the locational value and zonal circumstances. 
This group includes the interaction between locational prices and either macro factors 
of the urban spatial system in terms of its size (Jud, 1980; Brasington, 2001) and 
relative property locations in the system (Archer et al., 1996; Brasington, 2002) or 
micro locational attributes for the contribution to the locational value (Hughes and 
Turnbull, 1996; Mills and Simenauer, 1996; Sivitanidou, 1996; Kockelman, 1997; 
Clapp and Giaccotto, 1998; Downes and Zabel, 2002; Ioannides, 2003). Finally, the 
third group has dealt with the influences of both transport and locational factors on the 
property value (Haider and Miller, 2000; Bae et al., 2003).
The effect of externality is another important application of the hedonic price model 
to transport studies. This branch is related to the strategy for sustainable developments 
in terms of monetising environmental effects such as noise and emission. In other 
words, this group seeks to internalise external goods, namely to measure real social
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costs (Buseck, 1985; Johnson and Button, 1997; Morrell and Lu, 2000a; Morrell and 
Lu, 2000b; Lu and Morrell, 2001; Nijland et al., 2003).
The hedonic theory adopted in this study represents locations by means of a vector of 
objectively measured sub-components
z = (•••,z ,v ) ,  V /e /  (3.1)
where z, is the amount of the ith characteristic that differentiates the commodities.
Each z, is treated as a good. This means that households place either positive or 
negative marginal values on the component z; . It is assumed that locations are
completely described by the numerical value of the vector of the locational attributes. 
This value is supposed to offer households distinct packages of locational 
characteristics and an equivalent utility for locations. There could be many alternative 
packages because locations have a large number of differentiable attributes.
Each location has a market price so that the location reveals a level of utility
0(z) = ^(---,z„—;a) (3.2)
where 0(>) is a hedonic price function and
a  is the vector of parameters for the attributes embodied in a location.
The hedonic price model represents the unique characteristics of locations using a 
function between locational values and the vector of sub-components. In this 
framework, consumptions of different locations are represented in which each 
household purchases a unit of a location with a different amount of the hedonic 
bundle embodied. Hence, prices for locations ultimately depend on the quantity of the 
attributes. This means that analyses for locations that are restructured by the hedonic 
theory can incorporate conventional style economic methodologies: note that the 
hedonic price model successfully translates the demand determination of locations by 
the quality of sub-components into by the quantity of sub-attributes. The conversion 
shows that the hedonic price model is a useful tool to overcome the difficulty in 
representing the nature of heterogeneity and indivisibility of locations.
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For a systematic investigation into the location market, some assumptions are noted:
1. A location market is perfectly competitive. The assumption means that a 
location is freely bought and sold. This reflects that there are sufficient 
numbers of suppliers and consumers for locations. Thus, a single household 
and landowner add no weight to the market. Both the demand and supply sides 
have perfect information on the market. Reasonable consumers and suppliers 
try to maximise utility and revenue respectively. They are only constrained by 
the level of income and the price of the resulting bundle of attributes.
2. There are no better alternative locations outside a study area. No household 
outside a study area can bid higher than households inside. The bidding 
mechanism will be discussed in the next section.
3. There is no explicit supply model in this study; instead, the concept of the 
‘imaginary landlord’ (Miyamoto, 1993) is adopted. In this framework, every 
location is assumed to be owned by its imaginary landlord. When a landlord is 
an actual user, the landlord is regarded as paying higher rent than any other 
potential competitor. Imaginary landlords are supposed to supply the location 
to the maximum bidder. In this case, a hedonic price plays a role as a guide for 
the locational trade between consumers and suppliers.
4. A location could consist of a number of distinct sub-areas. The characteristics 
of the sub-areas are not necessarily the same within the whole location. In this 
case, a location is presumed to reveal a representative attractiveness. Thus, a 
household is supposed to perceive an average attraction from the location.
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3.2.2. Decision-making process of households
An individual household is a decision-making unit for the selection of a residential 
location. A fundamental perspective for the decision-making issue in this study is that 
the process is determined in the course of competition for locations. Game theory, 
combined with a bidding mechanism, is used to represent the process.
Consider a group of households M  = {•••,//,•••} in an area. Some of them are
supposed to consider moving their residence. Thus, the decision-makers consist of 
two distinct subgroups, namely the locating households and the fixed households. The 
term ‘fixed’ does not mean that the group does not travel but means that the decision­
makers do not changes the locations of their activities. Each household is assumed to 
be rational so that a household is expected to maximise its utility by owning or 
consuming the hedonic bundle of a location.
Definition 1. A rational household chooses an outcome that maximises its 
utility when it faces a decision problem.
This study presumes that there are sufficient numbers of households that compete for 
locations in the system. The sufficiency means that the competition for locations can 
belong to the group of n-player games if households are regarded as gamers. In the n- 
person competition, some players may make a coalition to maximise their payoffs. 
Households, however, are not likely to make a coalition in the process of deciding a 
residential location. This study assumes that there is no pre-play communication 
between agents, which means that the game is conducted non-cooperatively. Thus, 
each household is supposed to maximise its utility without collaborating with others 
even though the collaboration would produce a higher level of satisfaction.
Definition 2. Non-cooperation is defined as a situation in which no pre-play 
communication is allowed between households.
Since the game has been assumed to be non-cooperative, interactions between agents 
play an important role to determine the payoffs of an individual player. This is 
fundamentally consistent with the assumption of the payoff determination in game 
theory. In the theory, the action of a player is supposed to depend on actions available
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to each agent, the preference of each agent on outcomes, and the speculation of each 
player about the circumstances of the other gamers with respect to which actions are 
available to the other players, how the other players rank outcomes, and the belief of 
the player about the beliefs of the other gamers. Because of this complex situation, a 
player requires a strategy to win the competition.
Definition 3. A strategy is a complete contingent-plan determining which 
action a player takes at each information set in which an agent is to move.
A strategy can be either a pure or a mixed type. A player is assumed to have a finite 
set of alternative strategies. When a player knows exactly what strategies the other 
gamers take, the agent is expected to choose one definite strategy that can offer the 
maximum payoff. This case is referred to an agent playing a pure strategy game. 
However, in many cases, a player may not able to exactly guess the action of the other 
agents. In this case, it is reasonable to suppose that a player takes a mixed strategy 
combining pure strategies with a probability distribution over a set of strategies.
S« = Z  ° tS* = <Vl + " ' + :> VH  S M  (3 -3)
k
thwhere sk is the k pure strategy of a player H ;
<rk is the non-negative real number satisfying <jk > 0, ^ ( J k = 1; and
k
SH is a mixed strategy of a player H  ; a strategy profile of players is 
defined as the vector of a mixed strategy of an individual player S = (••*, ,•••).
Each household normally consists of several members. The residential location may 
affect their patterns of economic activities. Therefore, the decision to select a 
residential location would be a compromise that considers the locational requirements 
of all its members. Nevertheless, most conventional approaches have traced the 
decision-making process of one household member only. In particular, a head’s 
decision for a workplace location has been dominantly selected in the analyses for this 
problem. In this framework, the trade-off faced between intra-members could not be 
treated. Some recent research has suggested an alternative formulation (Waddell, 
1993; Jara-Diaz and Martinez, 1999). In these models, a household was presumed to 
choose its residential location considering a representative individual’s primary
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location of activity. Subsequently, the other members in the household would choose 
their locations of activities constrained by the predetermined residential location. This 
heuristic approach, however, could not satisfactorily represent the systematic strategy- 
making process of a household. This study assumes that a strategy for competing 
residential locations is made in a family council considering the trade-off between 
intra-members’ locations of economic activities. Therefore, a reasonable household is 
supposed to seek the best decision for the entirety, namely a compensatory decision, 
even if it is not necessarily the optimum for each household member.
This study has assumed that households that join the competition for locations are 
constrained by their level of income and the hedonic price for the bundle of attributes 
in locations. It has been also supposed that suppliers of locations offer their properties 
to a household that willingly pays a higher rent than any other household. These 
assumptions mean that households that participate in the game for locations face a fair 
competition. Hence, no household has a more dominant situation than other 
households. The non-dominance suggests that a household is presumed to make the 
best response considering the possible strategies of other households.
Definition 4. For any player H in the system, a mixed strategy is the best
response to the mixed strategies o f the other households S_H if  and only if
UH (•) is the payofffunction o f households in the competition for locations.
Once a strategy has been made within a household, the household competes for 
locations against the other households. The competition is complex because there are 
many potential competitors as well as alternative locations. In order to represent this 
complexity, the bidding mechanism (Alonso, 1965) is adopted. In this approach, an 
individual household is regarded as a utility-maximiser. Thus, a household is 
supposed to search the possible payoffs of alternative locations, and then consume a 
location that offers the maximum utility. Since potential competitors exist, the 
location chosen is not always occupied by the household. The uncertainty leads to the 
process of bidding. A competitor bids for the location consecutively changing their 
strategy and the amount of the bid. The modifications are affected by those of the 
other competitors. This causes a candidate to make the best response to the strategies
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of the other households. In the end, the highest bidder occupies a given location. This 
situation is similar to n-person non-cooperative games under the best response 
strategy; note that the mutual reaction of players is basically non-cooperative and 
decision-makers are supposed to make an optimal response relative to each other. In 
this n-player non-cooperative game, the Nash equilibrium can be defined:
Definition 5. A strategy profile S* = ( • • • , is the Nash equilibrium in 
the n-player non-cooperative game for locations &(•) i f  and only i f  the best 
strategy o f a household §>*H, V/7 e M  is the optimal response to the best 
strategies o f the others S*_H, ^6 , §*_H ) > 0 , S*_H) J , V // e M .
No household has an incentive to deviate from the Nash equilibrium because its 
bidding strategy represents its optimal response to its perception about the best 
strategies of the other households. Nash (1951) proved the existence of equilibrium 
states for any finite non-cooperative game under the mixed-strategy.
Theorem 1. Every finite non-cooperative game has an equilibrium point.
Proof See Nash (1951).
The Nash equilibrium allows for a competitive equilibrium in the system. It has been 
shown that all households take the best strategy in the competition, which implies that 
optimal locations are assigned to all households. This is in line with the assumptions 
in this study regarding the location market and the behaviour of households. In every 
perfectly competitive market, social welfare is known to be maximised, which is 
accomplished by the utility-maximising behaviour of the economic agents in supply 
and demand. Thus, the Nash equilibrium defined is compatible with the assumptions 
for the design of the bid-rent network equilibrium model.
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3.2.3. Interaction between transport and land-use
In general, it is widely accepted that there is a two-way interaction between transport 
and land-use. Land-use influences travel demands and patterns. The impact of 
transport on land-use is represented by changes in the level of the accessibility of 
locations, which in turn affects changes in the location of activities. The location of 
activities has a cyclical relationship with transport because activities generate travel 
demands and change travel patterns. Transport and land-use keep exchanging mutual 
responses with each other. Thus, analyses on transport problems without a proper 
understanding on the reciprocal relationship cannot be desirable. Nevertheless, 
conventional approaches have not satisfactorily represented the mutual relationship. 
In travel demand analyses, locational factors have been considered as parameters that 
have no explicit feedback with travellers’ transport choices. Studies in urban 
economics have formulated transport impedance as a mere component in budget 
constraints of decision-makers. These crude representations are apart from a realistic 
specification of the two-way interaction between transport and land-use.
The interaction is more complex at a micro level. Consider a time period for the 
process of the interaction between transport and land-use. A household is expected to 
make diverse choices during the period in terms of transport and the location of 
activities, which is known as a choice bundle. The choice bundle includes various 
components such as residence, workplace, the locations of shopping and leisure, car 
ownership, transport modes, and others. All the decisions in the choice bundle are 
entangled. A decision chain denotes this relationship. The decision chain is so chaotic 
that it is difficult to investigate the magnitude of interactions between components and 
their directions. Hence, every short-term decision of households should be examined 
when the problem of combined transport and the location of activities is considered. 
This task is normally referred to as an analysis of urban dynamics. The analysis of 
urban dynamics requires extensive research into how and when households make 
these decisions and how current conditions and future opportunities influence the 
decision-makings. This would be possible theoretically (Abraham and Hunt, 1997).
There have been several attempts to investigate urban dynamics. The first branch is 
static modelling approaches. This methodology does not explicitly represent urban
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dynamics. The static model simulates a single point in time. Hence, the group 
attempts to predict the urban structure for certain variables, taking other variables as 
given. Most early-stage models for the relationship between transport and land-use 
belong to this category. It is obvious that static models are restrictive to representing 
the urban system in a realistic way. In contrast, quasi-dynamic approaches would be 
attractive for addressing urban dynamics. The methodology runs for a series of time 
periods in which changes in transport and land-use are represented by means of 
successive short-term forecasts. In other words, quasi-dynamic models simplify an 
entire time period into discrete sub-intervals and simulate some of the relationships 
within the models responding to variables from the previous time period. Hence, the 
models use the results from the latest forecast as a baseline for each subsequent 
projection. These discrete multiperiod dynamics attempt to address the evolution of 
the urban system. Finally, open-ended approaches are found in some discussions 
(Hunt and Simmonds, 1993; Wegener, 1994). The framework emphasises constant 
readjustment in both land-use and transport. The open-ended approach admits that the 
adjustment could converge towards equilibrium, but argues that the process is limited. 
This is mainly because physical infrastructure in terms of building stocks and 
transport system do not instantaneously change. This leads to delays and lags for the 
adjustment between transport and land-use. Thus, the open-ended methodology 
regards the urban structure as one which continuously changes but which would never 
reach equilibrium. This framework is conceptual rather than practical. Thus, it is 
difficult to find practical examples that are associated with the open-ended approach. 
To sum up, the static modelling approach would be simple, but can be regarded as one 
extreme in the sense that the framework does not explicitly represent urban dynamics. 
The open-ended approach may be another extreme since the methodology emphasises 
too much detail for the real world. In contrast, quasi-dynamics would be acceptable 
for representing urban dynamics as an approximation even though the approach does 
not completely describe the real dynamics between transport and land-use. In fact, 
real dynamics could be represented in a conceptual framework. In this context, this 
study adopts a similar approach to quasi-dynamics for modelling urban dynamics.
The approach of quasi-dynamics implicitly assumes that the urban system tends 
towards a stable equilibrium at a macro level. The methodology also supposes that the 
macro level equilibrium should accompany a micro level equilibrium. This requires
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for this study that households make choices in a reasonable manner. In other words, a 
household decides one element at a time in the choice bundle, taking into account the 
current and potential future circumstances of the others (Watterson, 1994). Thus, the 
time period in this study is regarded as sufficient to allow all households to complete 
their decisions. In this process, the interaction between transport and land-use is 
represented in terms of the mutual adjustment between transport impedance and 
locational attractiveness. This process is considered in the course of competition for 
locations. As a result of the n-player non-cooperative bidding game for locations, the 
residential structure with respect to transport costs and locational benefits is changed. 
A reasonable household is expected to modify its strategy in such a way as to make 
the best response to other households. The adjusted strategies of households in turn 
affect changes in transport impedance and locational attractiveness. The adjustment 
process continues until no household has an incentive to modify its strategy. This state 
can be referred to as a micro level equilibrium. Even though the micro level 
equilibrium can be defined in a conceptual framework for the model, it is difficult to 
find the micro equilibrium in practice because there are many potential players in the 
system. Furthermore, not all households consider moving residence. The problem is 
even more difficult when the model treats the order of household locating.
As an alternative, an equivalent bi-level formulation is proposed for an approximate 
macroscopic solution to this problem. A bi-level mathematical programme is a special 
case of multilevel optimisation programmes. The multilevel optimisation problems 
can be defined as mathematical programmes that have a subset of variables 
constrained to be the solution of a given optimisation problem parameterised by 
remaining variables. When these problems have two levels, they are referred to as a 
bi-level mathematical programme. The programme, which seemed to first appear in 
Bracken and McGill (1973)’s study, has been applied to many areas. This popular 
application is mainly because the flexible structure of bi-level programmes can 
systematically represent multilevel decision-makings. In particular, the behavioural 
interpretation that is motivated by game theory has attracted attention. Four major 
fields of application can be enumerated in the literature, namely transportation studies, 
management, general planning, and engineering design (for a comprehensive review, 
see Vicente and Calamai, 1994; Yang and Bell, 1998; Yang and Bell, 2001).
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It should be noted that the following discussion does not explicitly deal with quasi- 
dynamics. This is because implementing the dynamics requires an investigation into 
changes in the urban system in both exogenous and endogenous factors; the two 
factors were described at Chapter Two, Literature Review. In particular, the process 
of the relocation of economic activities should be considered. In fact, the task is 
beyond the scope of this study. Urban dynamics could be represented in a framework 
of comprehensive land-use transport models, which is left for future study.
The proposed formulation consists of finding a solution to the upper level
Max(x,y) F{x,y)
sX. g(x,y)>  0
where for each value of x , y  is the solution to the lower level
Min(y) Y(x,y)
sX. h(x,y)<0
where F, f  are the objective functions of the upper and the lower levels;
x , y  are decision variables of the upper and lower levels respectively; and
g, h are the constraints of the upper and the lower levels respectively.
(3.4)
(3.5)
Impedance
Location Decision
Transport Decision
Demand
Attractiveness
Figure 3-1 A conceptual diagram for the operation of the bid-rent network equilibrium model
Figure 3-1 shows a conceptual diagram for the operation of the proposed formulation. 
The formulation represents a game involving the newly locating households and those 
with fixed locations, as discussed in the previous section. The first group is assumed 
to maximise utility in selecting locations for residence. This process is formulated in 
the upper level. The behaviour is represented by the decision-makers’ consumption of
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the hedonic bundles at various locations. The process produces dynamic changes in 
locational attractiveness and demands. At the lower level, all households choose their 
routes by minimising transport costs. The level considers all households who are 
either locators or non-locators. This is because the locators also contribute the 
determination of travel time in the network. For the inclusion of both groups, the 
locators are not assumed to move their residence in the lower level. This is because 
the current residence is supposed to offer the maximum utility to the locating 
households. Hence, both the locating and non-locating decision-makers are 
locationally fixed at the lower level. The goal of the lower level decision-makers is 
the minimisation of transport impedance in spatial interactions. A minimisation of net 
interaction impedance which is defined as a difference between travel time and 
locational attraction is the objective of the behaviour of the second group. The 
minimisation framework addresses a congestible network component as a realistic 
specification, which determines transport impedance between locations. It is 
emphasised that the functional relationship between the decision variables of the 
upper and lower levels establishes endogenously-determined transport impedance and 
locational attraction, which is one of the unique features of the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model.
It is useful to note that the overall purpose of this model is to represent changes in 
urban structure invoked by household locating. The locating behaviour is specified 
with respect to the utility maximisation of households in selecting residential 
locations. The optimisation problem requires an equilibrium transport solution from 
the lower level. Of course, the lower level also requires the solution of the upper level 
in the form of locational attractiveness. However, the transport solution is not the 
ultimate target that the proposed model wants to find. Thus, it can be regarded that the 
overall structure of the model has a form of bi-level optimisation programmes rather 
than combined equilibrium models that can be found in some existing approaches.
This formulation translates the n-person non-cooperative competition for locations 
into a duopolistic Cournot game; the game of the many-to-many competition is 
replaced by that of the one-to-one case, namely the game between the groups of 
locators and non-locators. It was demonstrated that one-to-one games formulated in a 
bi-level mathematical programme offer a macroscopic solution to n-player games
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when the number of gamers involved is large (Bell and Cassir, 2002). This means that 
the formulation suggests a macroscopic solution to the locational competition since 
the number of households has been assumed to be sufficient. In this duopolistic 
Cournot game, the Nash equilibrium is redefined as follows:
Definition 6. A strategy profile §* = is the Nash equilibrium in the
duopolistic Cournot game for locations #(•) i f  and only if  
0 (S ',S‘)£<?(§,S ') aH rf0 (s\S ‘) £ 0 ( s \ s )  where S' and S’ are the 
strategy profiles o f the locating and the fixed households respectively.
The Nash equilibrium of the duopolistic Cournot competition successfully 
reformulates that of the n-player non-cooperative game. The reformulation, however, 
implicitly assumes that a single representative player for each group can explain the 
diverse behaviour of households within the specific groups. The restriction can be 
mitigated by disaggregating households into several classes that are assumed to show 
homogeneous decision-making process. The modification converts the duopolistic 
Cournot game into an oligopolistic Cournot competition for locations.
Definition 7. A strategy profile o f household classes in the system 
§* = ( '" ,§ 1 ," ') , V/w <= M  is the Nash equilibrium o f the oligopolistic Cournot
game for locations #(•) i f  and only ifS*m is the best response o f a household
class m to the optimal strategies o f the other classes S*m = (•••, , S*m+l ,•••),
namely 0 (S ^ S lm)> 0 (S m)S:„), V m cM .
Some applications of the Cournot game to transport studies can be found in the 
literature (Kita, 1999; Bell, 2000; Yang et al., 2001; Bell and Cassir, 2002). Many 
studies, however, have adopted the framework of the Stackelberg game; for 
comprehensive reviews of the application, see Yang and Bell (1998,2001). It is useful 
to distinguish the Cournot game from the Stackelberg game for a clearer specification 
of the model formulation. There are similarities and dissimilarities between the two 
games. Both games deal with small numbers of gamers and investigate quantity 
competitions. In these games, no player has a dominant strategy; hence, the best- 
response analysis can be applied to investigate the behaviour of decision-makers. The 
main difference between the two games is observed in the order of gamers’ actions.
83
While the Cournot game assumes that all players act simultaneously, the Stackelberg 
game supposes a sequential decision-making process. In the Stackelberg game, one 
player acts before the others. The first mover is referred to as a leader and the others 
are denoted as followers; for this reason, the Stackelberg game is referred to as a 
leader-follower game. Therefore, the leader has more information than the followers 
whilst players in the Cournot game have the same degree of information. For further 
discussion about the two games, see Appendix I-Fundamentals of Game Theory.
The difference between the Cournot game and the Stackelberg game is clearer from a 
mathematical viewpoint. In general bi-level mathematical programmes, for each value 
of the upper level variable x , the constraints of the lower level define the constraint 
set of the lower level problem Q (x ):
Q(x) = {y:^(x,y)<0} (3.6)
The set of solutions for the lower level problem W (x) is given by minimising the 
lower level function /  (•) for all the values in Q(x) of the lower level variable y :
W (x) = \ y : y  e arg min { f ( x ,y ) \y e C l  (x)}] (3.7)
Given these definitions, the bi-level problem can be reformulated as follows:
Max(x,y) F (x ,y )
sJ. g(x,;y)<0 (3.8)
y e W  (x)
where the feasible set {(x,iy ):g (x ,iy )> 0 ,<y eff(x)}  of the bi-level mathematical
programme is called the induced or inducible region. The induced region is usually 
nonconvex, which means that the bi-level programme may have multiple solutions.
The Cournot game seeks to find a mutually consistent solution. Most solution-find
mechanisms in this group solve the problem by successively alternating levels,
exchanging solutions with each other. Thus, the formulation can be regarded as 
effectively representing the mutual adjustment process in terms of an iterative 
modification of transport impedance and locational attractiveness.
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Max(x,y) F (x ,y )
sJ. y e fV (x )  (3.9)
x e W  (y )
where W (y) = [ \ :x e a rg  min and Q (<y) = {x:g(x ,^)>0}.
In contrast, the formulation of the Stackelberg game explicitly represents the leader- 
follower structure. The upper level normally suggests the leader’s problem, and the 
lower level addresses that of the follower.
Max(x,y) F(x,W  (x 
sjt. y e W (x)
The Stackelberg formulation shows two distinct features. First, the model solves the 
follower’s problem with the solution to the leader’s problem given, which describes 
the first-mover advantage. Secondly, the formulation calculates the leader’s problem 
without fixing the follower’s decision variable, which represents the follower’s 
reaction. These two mechanisms are the unique characteristics of the Stackelberg 
game; for further discussion about the characteristics, see Appendix I-Fundamentals 
of Game Theory. The Stackelberg formulation has been popularly used for 
investigating network design problems; see Yang and Bell (1998, 2001). For further 
mathematical comparison between the two formulations, see Heydecker (1986).
)) (3.10)
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3.2.4. Discussion
This section has described the conceptual basis for the development of the bid-rent 
network equilibrium model. The discussion proceeded in relation to the three criteria 
for the nature of the interaction between transport and the location of activities. First, 
the unique characteristics of locations were represented by means of incorporating a 
hedonic price theory. The approach was expected to overcome the difficulty in 
representing the heterogeneity and the indivisibility of locations. Secondly, a game 
theoretical framework, associated with a bidding mechanism, was adopted for 
modelling the decision-making process of households. The methodology proposed 
was thought to satisfactorily represent the decision-making process not only within a 
household but also between households. Finally, a mutual adjustment process was 
used for addressing the interaction between transport and land-use. The process 
produces endogenously-determined transport impedance and locational attractiveness. 
The three components were embodied in a bi-level mathematical programme. The 
programme in the final formulation suggested an approximate oligopolistic solution to 
the n-player non-cooperative game. The systematic connection between the theories 
on the relationship between transport and the location of activities and the 
methodologies for the practical modelling would offer little doubt the model, which 
will be developed in the next section, could be an alternative framework for the 
analysis of the interaction between transport and the location of activities.
It is worth noting the disagreement between the design of the model and location 
markets in the real world. This study has assumed that the location market is perfectly 
competitive; there are no regulations in trades of locations; there exist sufficient 
numbers of suppliers and consumers; the two agents in demand and supply have 
perfect information on the market. In general, the level of social welfare is maximised 
in a perfectly competitive market. This means that the model represents a competitive 
equilibrium, which allows for optimal locations for all households. The allocation is 
in line with the Nash equilibrium defined. The real world, however, does not always 
reflect the situation designed in the model. There exists a lot of friction for households 
in moving residence. This is mainly because locations are usually traded in private 
markets that involve diverse uncertain factors. Information on the market is anything 
but perfect and is costly to obtain. Government may impose regulations on the market.
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Thus, the residential structure in the real world is not necessarily optimal for 
households. Even though this study will incorporate a stochastic component for 
mitigating the disagreement, the difference between the model outcome and the real 
urban structure is unlikely to be completely resolved. Nevertheless, it should be borne 
in mind that a modelling is a means of describing general trends. This means that a 
modelling would not represent all related aspects. The process inevitably requires 
some assumptions. The assumption of this study in terms of a competitive location 
market would be acceptable for representing the relationship between transport and 
the location of activities. This is because a system exhibits its general trend in a 
macroscopic scale when the number of agents involved is large (Fujita, 1989, p. 2). 
This is one of the reasons why this study adopts the bi-level formulation that suggests 
an oligopolistic approximation. Another important point is that over realistic 
considerations in modelling do not necessarily create better outcomes. Specifications 
of much detail might have an advantageous position in describing structures for the 
real world. This process, however, inevitably involves errors in terms of the 
measurement of related factors and their functional relationship. Furthermore, the 
specification requires significant resources in terms of money and time.
87
3.3. The model
3.3.1. Introduction
This section presents the process for developing a new model of the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities, namely a bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. The model systematically represents the three criteria of the nature 
for this relationship. The criteria involve the unique characteristics of locations, the 
composite decision-making process of households, and the interaction between 
transport and land-use. The fundamental assumption for the modelling is that this 
issue can be understood in the course of competition for locations. As discussed in the 
previous section, this competition is equivalent to an n-player non-cooperative game. 
Since the Nash equilibrium can be defined in this type of competition, the resulting 
model is expected to suggest equilibrium locations that are optimal for households. 
The optimal locations eventually represent an efficient urban structure in a study area.
A general framework for the model of the relationship between transport and the 
location of activities is explored in the next section. The framework is considered in 
terms of competition for residential locations, which results in an equivalent n-player 
non-cooperative game. In the following two sections, two components in the general 
framework are specified, namely transport and location decisions. The transport 
decision is a model for investigating the behaviour of non-locators. The behaviour is 
represented using a framework of a minimisation of net interaction impedance. A 
hedonic-based random bid-rent model is suggested for the description of the 
behaviour of locators. The locating behaviour is discussed by means of representing 
the locational decision of households. Subsequently, a bi-level mathematical 
programme that combines the two components is considered. The formulation is 
regarded as an oligopolistic approximation to the n-person non-cooperative game. The 
resulting model produces endogenously determined transport impedance and 
locational attractiveness, which are regarded as a unique feature of the bid-rent 
network equilibrium model. Finally, some concluding remarks in terms of a model 
extension are presented. The extension deals with an incorporation of a multiclass 
framework, which establishes a multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model.
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3.3.2. General framework
In this section, a general framework for modelling the relationship between transport 
and the location of activities is considered. As discussed in the section on the 
conceptual basis for the model, the process of the interaction is investigated in terms 
of competition for locations. An n-player non-cooperative game is the resulting 
formulation for the general framework of this relationship.
Consider a study area. The study area is presumed to have sufficiently large numbers 
of households and residential locations. The sufficiency suggests that a continuous 
modelling approach can be feasible for representing the relationship. The continuous 
framework can produce an approximating solution to this problem even though the 
nature of households and locations are obviously discrete. Some of the households are 
assumed to consider moving their residence during a time period that is appropriate 
for this process; the time period is specific to the study area. Hence, the households 
are classified into two distinct decision-making groups, namely the locating 
households and the fixed households. The households in each group are sub-divided 
into distinctive classes w ,V /» cM  whose behaviour is supposed to be homogenous 
in the context of the interaction between transport and the location of activities.
As discussed in the conceptual basis of the model, an individual household in the 
locating group maximises payoffs in the selection of a residential location. This 
process is conducted non-cooperatively, which causes competition for locations. The 
payoffs of a household in the competition can be represented by means of a joint 
function of private goods, locational attractiveness, and transport costs.
where U (•) is the utility function of a household in the competition for locations; 
g is the vector of private goods, namely g = (•••, g ,,•••), V/ e ./;
(pr is the value of a location r ; the value is functionalised with the 
hedonic vector z ; z = ( ...,z;, ...), V/ e / ;  
i #  is the minimum transport cost of a household H  that belongs to a 
household class m, V/w c  M  ; the cost is calculated summing the
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minimum transport cost of each members between a residential 
location r and their activity locations s , namely ur° -  ^  w" ; and
heH
p is the vector of parameters that is associated with the private goods g , 
the locational value <pr , and the transport impedance u™.
Some additional clarification is given for the notation. First, the transport impedance 
in the utility function is represented with respect to monetary costs in order to be 
compatible with the locational attractiveness and the private goods. For the 
consistency, a parameter that converts the transport costs into monetary costs is 
needed. In this study, the transport costs are specified without the parameter assuming 
the costs are specified in the equivalent monetary costs. This setting is for notational 
simplicity. Secondly, the transport costs are represented as the impedance between a 
household’s single residential location r and its members’ locations of primary 
activities s ; cr denotes the set of destinations chosen by the household members 
{5(A)}, V/j g H . This is related to the modelling assumption about the compensatory
decision; a household is assumed to seek the best decision for its entirety even though 
the decision is not necessarily the optimum for the individual household members; for 
further discussion about the compensatory decision, see the section on the conceptual 
basis of the model. The primary activity is defined as regular spatial interactions that 
can include journeys to workplace, shopping, school, and other purposes. The location 
of primary activity is fixed in this study. Thus, the notation rs could also be denoted 
as r | s , which means a residential location r conditional on the primary activity 
location s . Similar rules are applied to the following equations. One more point 
should be mentioned is that a household is supposed to require a positive amount of 
the private goods, the locational value, and the transport costs. This means that the 
three components are essential in describing the behaviour of households in this 
competition. Thus, the utility function is defined with positive values of the three 
attributes. The positive values, however, do not mean that all the components produce 
a positive marginal utility. In fact, the greater the transport cost, the less the level of 
utility. This is a reason why the parameter vector is specified for the components. 
Thus, the parameter for the transport cost is expected to be negative values.
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The budget constraint of an individual household is expressed as an additive function:
Y ,P ig i+ t{ * \r ) + H uh =y>< (3. i2)
j  heH
where p} is the price of a private commodity gj ;
<j> (z | r ) is a hedonic price function for a residential location r ; and 
yH is the income of a household H .
The budget constraint shows that all income is used for the consumption of the three 
components, which implies that this formulation does not consider the savings of 
households. Another interesting point in the budget constraint is that the transport cost 
is considered for the total cost of all household members rather than just the cost for 
one member. Again, this is related to the hypothesis of the compensatory decision.
With the utility function and the budget constraint, a general formulation is given for 
the relationship between transport and residential location. The formulation is 
represented in terms of the utility maximisation of a household with respect to the 
private goods, the locational value, and the transport impedance.
Z ^ s / + ^ (z i,') + Z “” =y« (3-13)
j  heH
gj > 0,(pr > 0, u” > 0, z, > 0, Vh,i,j,r,s
It is assumed that the market for the private goods is perfectly competitive, which 
means that the private goods and their price are invariant throughout the market. Thus, 
the component can be suppressed and the model can be reformulated more compactly 
with respect to the locational attractiveness and the transport cost:
MaxUZ„{<p',u'°;p)
sJ. 0(z \ r ) + £ u ?  =y„ (3.14)
heH
(pr > 0, «" > 0, zt > 0, "ih9i,r,s
The general formulation for the n-player non-cooperative competition consists of two 
decision variables, which are the transport cost and the locational attraction. The 
formulation shows that the issue is a composite decision-making process involving the
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two components. The structure of the general formulation seems to allow for the 
application of classical optimisation approaches to find an equilibrium. The 
approaches, however, would not be feasible straightforwardly in an attempt to find a 
micro level equilibrium. The difficulty is mainly because there are many potential 
competitors and alternative locations in the competition. Furthermore, two distinct 
behaviours of households are captured in this problem. As discussed in the section on 
the conceptual basis of the model, households are either locators or non-locators. The 
behaviour of each group is clearly differentiated in the context of this relationship. 
The locators face the decision regarding moving their residence. On the other hand, 
the non-locators are only interested in minimising transport impedance. Thus, the 
formulation is divided into two sub-components, namely a transport decision which 
represents the decision-making process of non-locators, and a location decision which 
refers to the behaviour of locators. It should be noted that the transport decision 
considers all households that contribute the determination of transport costs in the 
system. Thus, both the locating and non-locating households are included, but the 
transport decision is denoted as the problem of non-locators. This is because 
households are not assumed to change residence in representing the transport 
decision, even though the problem includes the locating group. The two components 
are combined using a bi-level mathematical programme. This formulation is 
equivalent to an oligopolistic Cournot game for approximating the n-person non- 
cooperative competition for locations. The resulting formulation is regarded as 
overcoming the difficulty in investigating the distinct behaviour of locators and non­
locators, and representing a micro level equilibrium in an acceptable manner.
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3.3.3. Transport decision: the problem of non-locators
The transport decision addresses the behaviour of non-locators in the competition for 
residential locations. The discussion traces the composite decision-making process of 
households for maximising locational benefits and minimising transport costs. The 
resulting formulation is an equivalent minimisation of the net interaction impedance. 
The minimisation establishes the lower level of the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model. This section begins with a preliminary description on a network 
representation. Subsequently, the transport decision is explored.
Consider a mathematical network G = (N, A) where N  represents a set of nodes and
A denotes a set of directed links. Let n e N  be an individual node and a e A be an 
individual link in the network. Let R, R c :N  denote a set of origin centroids at which 
flows are generated and S ,S c zN  a set of destination centroids at which flows are 
terminated. The origin and destination nodes are not mutually exclusive, namely 
R n S  * 0  . This means that some nodes can serve as origins and destinations.
In the network, there are nonnegative demands for travel Q = [# " : Vr e R ,Vs  e s ]  
where qrs denotes the flow of spatial interactions between an origin-destination pair 
r and s . The OD flow includes both the locating travellers q rs and the locationally 
fixed decision-makers qrs, thus qrs -  q rs + qrs . It is also noted that the spatial 
interactions are represented by the unit of household members, which allows the 
members travel to their primary activity locations; note that the destination is 
represented as s rather than a ; the primary activities have been defined as regular 
spatial interactions in this study. Again, the multiple destinations of a household are 
related to the modelling assumption about the compensatory decision. One spatial 
interaction flow is represented as one vehicle in the network during a peak period, 
presuming one vehicle is occupied by one household member only. Because of this 
assumption of vehicle occupancy, transport costs could be unsatisfactorily calculated. 
The impedance, however, is expected to reveal a general transport cost structure in a 
large area under a long-term perspective with which this model deals.
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Table 3-1 Summary of the notation
N a set of nodes
A a set of links (arcs)
R a set of origin nodes; R czN
S a set of destination nodes; S c zN
<r the flow of spatial interactions between an origin-destination pair r and s ,
V> e R, Vs e S ;
p r s a set of paths connecting r and s , Vr e R ,Vs e S ;
f? the flow on a path p  connecting an origin-destination pair r and s , Vp e Prs;
< the transport cost on a path p  between an origin-destination pair r and s ;
the flow on a link a ,  V a e A ;  v = (•••,
t. the transport cost on a link a ; t =
5l an indicator variable: S™ = 1, if a link a is on a path p , and 0 otherwise
The demands are distributed among allowable paths p  e Pn . Let f ” be the flow on a 
path p  connecting an OD pair r and s . The conservation equation between the path 
flow and the flow of spatial interactions is given by
(3.15)
P
where a nonnegative path flow that satisfies the conservation equation is feasible and 
a feasible flow pattern is defined as the family of an individual feasible flow,
o. = [ / ” :VpeP", V re* .  VseS,  >0].
Given a path flow f ” , a volume on a link a is given by
v*=E/;-<y;, vasii (3.i6)
p
where 5™ is an indicator factor: = 1, if a link a is on a path p , and 0 otherwise.
Let ta be the transport cost of each link a . It is assumed that the cost ta is the 
function of a link volume va . In other words, the link cost is flow-dependent.
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‘* =‘a(v*)> V a e A (3.17)
The transport cost on a path p  is the sum of the cost of links that form the path
V p e P " , Vr e /?, V ie S  (3.18)
a
The functions of transport impedance ta (•) are set to C = [ffl (va) : V<z e A j . Finally,
the general transport network combines the directed mathematical network G , the 
travel demand Q, and the transport cost function C , namely N = [G,£>,C].
It has been assumed that the location of the economic activity of each traveller is 
known and fixed. It has been also assumed that the decision-makers in the transport 
decision are locationally fixed. This means that the origin of each trip-maker is fixed. 
Therefore, the origin-destination matrix is known in the transport decision. Given the 
OD matrix, the network behaviour of the trip-makers determines the equilibrium path
flow { f p *}. The path flow is used to calculate transport impedance between an OD
pair {r,5}, which is required at the upper level to represent the locating behaviour of 
households that is an ultimate target of the bid-rent network equilibrium model.
For representing the decision of non-locators, this study explicitly deals with two 
network performance indices of locational benefits and transport costs. Households 
might be assumed to choose residential locations considering the locational 
attractiveness only. This means that the factor of travel time does not affect the 
decision of households regarding the location of activities. This is far from a realistic 
network representation. Another approach might assume that households choose the 
residence that could minimise transport impedance without explicit consideration of 
the locational factor. This branch is self-contradictory because the framework 
addresses the decision on residential locations without representing the residential 
attractiveness. Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that a household seeks a 
composite goal that has the two components, namely choosing a location with the 
highest attractiveness while requiring the least transport cost. The decision, therefore,
95
can be understood to be the result of a trade-off between locational attractiveness and 
transport impedance (Alonso, 1965; Sheffi, 1985, p. 165).
Each residential location r is associated with locational attractiveness (pr , which 
reflects an activity opportunity available there. It has been presumed that households 
do not change residence in the transport decision. It has been also supposed that the 
current residence offers the highest attractiveness for households. The value of the 
locational attraction is calculated from the maximum bid-rent, which is derived from 
the willingness-to-pay of households; a derivation detailed for this factor will be 
discussed in the next section. The maximum bid-rent is interpreted as the unit prices 
that are normally used in urban economics for addressing the attractiveness of 
locations; a practical example of this interpretation is found in Chapter Five, Case 
Studies. In the transport decision, the attractiveness is associated with the value of 
travel time in order to be compatible with the network travel times.
A net interaction impedance for representing the composite decision is defined as the 
difference between transport costs and locational attractiveness:
c; - r \  (3.19)
where the locational factor (pr is specified in the same unit of transport costs, as the 
transport impedance is specified in the equivalent monetary unit in the utility function. 
These settings have been suggested for notational convenience.
The definition of the net interaction impedance suggests a clear representation 
concerning the behaviour of non-locators. In this framework, each household is 
supposed to choose the location with the lowest net interaction impedance. In other 
words, locations are chosen so that the difference between transport impedance and
locational attractiveness „rs —rCD ~<P is minimised. Thus, at equilibrium, all locations
chosen have the same net interaction impedance which is equal to or less than that of 
the other locations which have not been chosen. Even though this definition is 
conceptually feasible, there could be time inconsistency between the two components. 
This is because trip frequency is normally observed over a shorter term than a rental 
period. To tackle this problem, this study assumes that transport costs are an average
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value that is perceived during the rental period. Based on these definitions and 
assumptions, the equilibrium condition can be defined as follows:
V s if / ;* > 0 , V r,j
>77" if / ; s*=0, Vr,5
where 77" is the minimal net interaction impedance and
f p * is the equilibrium path flow.
r r r tCP ~<P (3.20)
A formulation using variational inequality is suggested to represent the equilibrium 
condition. In the first place, a path cost function is extended:
*7= s7 { f ? > p ' h ' L t. '% - ? >  v P’r’s (3-21)
a
where the extended cost function crp (•) is link-flow dependent since the cost ta (•) 
has been assumed to be the function of link flows.
The minimisation of the net interaction impedance can be formulated by finding the 
vector of an equilibrium path flow, namely j f p * j , V/p" e Q :
rs p
sJ.  W = E [M ax£/£„(•)] Vr ^
Vr,s
P
r; ^  0 vP,r,s
where Q is the set of feasible solutions, namely Q = [ f p : V /7  e Prs, Vt* e R, e .S']
and E^MaxU (•)] means the maximum expected bid-rent that is determined at the
upper level; the detail is discussed in the next section. The equilibrium flow found is 
used to evaluate travel time between each OD pair. The travel cost is required at the 
upper level to represent the behaviour of locators.
The variational inequality shows that, for a given equilibrium flow, any deviations 
from the equilibrium cannot reduce the net interaction impedance. In other words, no 
trip-maker would be tempted to reduce his impedance changing his path because no 
alternative route could offer lower costs; this is consistent with the Nash equilibrium.
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Another point to be noted in the formulation is that every formulation of a path-based 
variational inequality can be converted into that of a link-based counterpart (Smith, 
1979). A path-based formulation, however, is adopted in this study mainly because a 
path-based model is more general than a link-based formulation. The two 
formulations are equivalent if and only if transport costs are assumed to be additive 
and path costs consist of a set of link travel times only (Bliemer, 2001).
The general condition of the existence and uniqueness of a solution to the problem of 
variational inequality has been established (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980). Here, 
more efficient versions of the conditions are provided. The variational inequality has 
at least one solution provided that the set of feasible path flows is non-empty (see Bell 
and Iida, 1997, pp. 86-89). The variational inequality has a unique equilibrium 
solution in terms of link flows when the Jacobian of the link cost functions with 
respect to link flows are positive definite (see also Bell and Iida, 1997, pp. 86-89).
Even though there is a unique vector of equilibrium link flows, there are many 
feasible path flow vectors in general. Thus, it is difficult to be define the vector of 
equilibrium path flows uniquely in the formulation; note that the formulation is path- 
flow based. However, this property implies no difficulty in defining a unique value of 
the net interaction impedance that is the key modelling hypothesis for representing the 
transport decisions of non-locators. This is because the unique path costs can be 
defined, though there are many candidate vectors of equilibrium path flows.
To sum up, this section has discussed the decision of non-locators in the interaction 
between transport and the location of activities. The minimisation of the net 
interaction impedance is an equivalent resulting framework. The variational inequality 
formulation satisfactorily represents the Nash equilibrium, which is regarded as a 
successful modelling of the transport decision in the competition for locations.
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3.3.4. Location decision: the problem of locators
In this section, the behaviour of locators, which is the counterpart to the model for 
non-locators, is considered. The locating behaviour is represented in terms of the 
locational decision of households in the competition for residence. A hedonic-based 
random bid-rent model is suggested for the formulation, which establishes the upper 
level of the bid-rent network equilibrium model. This framework is regarded as an 
oligopolistic approximation to the n-player non-cooperative game.
In the section on the general framework, a household is assumed to consist of several 
members. Each member is allowed to have his or her own primary activity location. 
This economic activity location of each household member is assumed to be known 
and fixed. Thus, a destination demand constraint is required.
Z Z 2 X = 5 S (3.23)
h r m
where Ds is the total number of demands attracted to a primary activity location s .
The general formulation of this competition has been suggested in terms of the utility 
maximisation of locators. The solution to this problem can be represented using an 
indirect utility function following standard economic methodologies.
Max t /£ „  [<pr, ur° , y„ -  <j> (z | r) -  u™'; p)
st. u f  = Y c ; { h - f f ,< p r) VH,r,s  (3.24)
heH
fp > 0, q>r > 0, ur° > 0, z, > 0 n o ­
where u™* is the minimal transport cost of a household. The impedance has been
endogenously determined in the transport decision. As noted in the previous section, 
the transport cost is specified in the equivalent monetary unit.
The indirect utility function would suggest a connection between the behaviour of a 
household and the locational characteristics. Specifically, the formulation links the 
utility maximising behaviour of a household with the locational value, which is 
determined by the hedonic bundle z . The linkage, however, is indirect because the 
hedonic bundle z  affects the decision-making process via the hedonic price function 
^(•). For an explicit representation between the two components, the bid-rent of a
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household is defined as a function of the locational characteristics z ; this yields a 
certain level of utility U° (Alonso, 1965; Rosen, 1974).
0„{z\r;U°) (3.25)
where 0H{‘) is the bid-rent function of a household with respect to the hedonic 
attributes of residential characteristics z .
The bid-rent function substitutes the hedonic price function to address the explicit 
linkage between the behaviour of a household and the locational properties.
M a x (<pr,u’°,y„ - e „ ( z \ r ) ~ u ' f ;p) = U°
si. = I > 7 ( A ; / ; \ r )  'i H ’r’s (3-26>
heH
/ "  > 0, (pr > 0, w" > 0, zt > 0 V/f,/,/?,r,(7
The bid-rent function is interpreted as the willingness-to-pay function of a household 
on the locational characteristics. The interpretation is because the function 0H (•) is
represented in terms of the hedonic vector z . The level of utility U° is monotonic 
with the net income of a household (yH- 0 H (•) -  w ). Thus, the bid-rent function 
can be inverted with the utility function of a household.
0„ (z I r) = MoxUrHatm {(pr ,u”  ,y„
si. u f  = Y Jcr;(h-,f;‘\ ^ )  VH,r,s  (3.27)
heH
f f  > 0,<pr > 0, > 0, z, > 0 V //,/,p,r,G
This formulation is similar to that of Alonso-Rosen’s deterministic bid-rent function. 
The formulation represents the inherent heterogeneity as well as the indivisibility of 
locations. The model also describes the decision-making process of a household. 
Furthermore, the framework systematically connects the unique characteristics of 
locations and the behaviour of a household. The deterministic model, however, 
produces an extreme all-or-nothing land-use pattern; an entire unit of a location is 
populated by a single household class, which is unrealistic. The deterministic problem 
can be mitigated incorporating a stochastic framework. The converting process is 
straightforward. None of the households have the same perceived net income
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[yH ~ uh * ) ’ No households value the utility level U° to the same degree. Hence, the 
two factors can be substituted by a stochastic component (Ellickson, 1981).
0„ (z I r) = MaxU” m {<pr,u'° ;f)
= M ax[FrH°m {<p\ . # )  + « £ . ]  (3.28)
s.t. <pr > 0, u™ > 0, zt > 0 V/f,/,r,cr 
where is a system component in the utility function; and
£„em is a probabilistic component that explains an individual household’s 
different perception on the net income and the utility level.
In principle, various functional forms can be considered to represent the hedonic- 
based stochastic bid-rent model. A particularly interesting model type is a discrete 
choice framework. This methodology presumes that the random component £™em is
distributed as IID Gumbel. Then, the formulation for the locational competition of 
households can be expressed by a multinomial logit formula.
P r" (m |z) = Pr(U” m * ) , V mc M
exp[pr r ; ; m (p f,» y )]  (3.29)
Z exp[pr^ L  (« /.« « )]
m*
where the parameter vector can be estimated using the standard maximum-likelihood 
technique; the procedure is presented in the next chapter, Solution Algorithm.
The multinomial logit representation suggests the probability that a location with the 
hedonic bundle z is occupied by a household class m . This probability is used to 
calculate the spatial interaction flows of the locating households.
q rs =Prrs( ) x D s (3.30)
where the demands together with the flows of non-locating households qr\  Vr,s
constitute the origin-destination matrix {#"} that is required at the lower level.
The supply side of locations has been assumed to offer a location to the household 
that pays the highest rent. Thus, this formulation produces mutually determined 
patterns of locational share and locational value. The mutual determination is because
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the bidder who pays the highest rent would reside at a location. The formulation can 
be regarded as an oligopolistic approximation to the n-player competition for 
residential locations. This is because the multinomial logit framework can be 
interpreted as a representation of a class-to-class behaviour rather than that of an 
individual-to-individual. In addition, the behaviour of classes is supposed to take the 
optimal reaction to each other non-cooperatively. This means that the framework of 
the best response can be applied to analyse this competition. Thus, the resulting 
formulation can be regarded as equivalent to an oligopolistic Cournot game; for more 
discussion about the Cournot game, see Appendix I-Fundamentals of Game Theory.
In this formulation, the expected maximum rent is directly calculated by the highest 
bid, which is determined by the willingness-to-pay of households. In this study, the 
maximum bid-rent is understood as unit price that is normally interpreted as a zonal 
attraction measure in urban economics. Thus, the highest bid is interpreted as 
locational attractiveness. The value can be calculated by a logsum formula:
r  = e [Mwc U'H\ m (•)] = ln £ e x p [ |f  (•)] (3.31)
m*
where none of households perceive a location to have the same value. A household is 
assumed to place an individual valuation on locations, namely [(pr =q>r/y # ), Vr .
It is useful to note that the multinomial logit representation of the hedonic-based 
random bid-rent model seems to be identical to the structure of a random utility 
model. However, the interpretation and maximisation processes are converse between 
the two models. Figure 3-2 shows a conceptual comparison between random utility 
and stochastic bid-rent models. In a random utility model, a household is assumed to 
compare locations and choose one specific location that offers the maximum utility. 
Therefore, the maximisation process takes place across alternative locations. In 
contrast, a bid-rent model is interpreted as representing a location with characteristics 
z being occupied by a household class m , V/w <z M  that bids the highest rent for the 
location. In other words, a bid-rent model suggests that a location is populated by the 
bidder who is willing to pay a higher rent than any other household class. Therefore, 
the maximisation process takes places across household classes.
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<A bid-rent model> <A random utility model>
Figure 3-2 A conceptual comparison between bid-rent and random utility models
Even though the difference in terms of the model interpretation and the maximisation 
process between random utility and traditional probabilistic bid-rent models is 
obvious, the two models would produce a consistent residential structure in a perfectly 
competitive market (Martinez, 1992b). This means that a well specified class structure 
in a random utility model would suggest a similar outcome to a conventional 
stochastic bid-rent model. The mutual similarity, however, would not happen in the 
bid-rent network equilibrium model. This is because the model explicitly internalises 
the congestible network and systematically functionalises the network performance 
indices of transport impedance and locational attractiveness. Thus, the two network 
performance indicators, which identify the urban structure, are endogenous in the bid- 
rent network equilibrium model. In contrast, as stated in Chapter Two, transport costs 
are exogenous in random utility and bid-rent models, though locational benefits might 
be endogenous; there is no explicit interaction process between the transport 
impedance and the locational attractiveness in the two conventional approaches.
In summary, this section has discussed the problem of locators, which has been 
represented in terms of the locational decision of households in the competition for 
residential locations. The hedonic-based random bid-rent function has been suggested 
for describing the nature of the competition. The function represents the relationship 
between the decision-making process of households and the unique characteristics of 
locations. The resulting formulation is equivalent to an oligopolistic Cournot game.
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3.3.5. Formulation
In the previous sections, the frameworks for representing the behaviour of locators 
and non-locators were discussed. The model for non-locators was explored in terms of 
the composite decision-making process for minimising transport impedance and 
maximising locational attractiveness. The minimisation of the net interaction 
impedance was suggested for addressing the behaviour of non-locators. The model for 
locators was investigated using the hedonic-based random bid-rent function. This 
formulation systematically described the relationship between the characteristics of 
locations and the decision-making process of households. The resulting formulation 
was understood as equivalent to an oligopolistic Cournot competition.
One of the fundamental assumptions of this model is that the location of primary 
activities of each household member is known. This means that the total level of 
demand attracted to each economic activity location is known and fixed. Hence, in 
representing locating behaviour, the issue was which residential location a household 
would choose. In other words, the target was to find the demand at the origin of their 
work trip. In contrast, since decision-makers in the lower level were locationally fixed,
the origin-destination flows {^"J, Vr e R ,Vs e S  are known. Thus, the issue was to 
find equilibrium travel time between locations that is required at the upper level.
In this section, a bi-level structure, combining the models for the behaviour of locators 
and non-locators, is proposed, namely the bid-rent network equilibrium model. Let 
Prrs (•) be the share of the total number of locating households between a residential
location r and a primary activity location s , Vr e R,Vs e S ; 0 < Prrs (•) < 1 and
^ i V s(-) = l . Let z be the hedonic vector of locational characteristics, thus
r
z = (••*,z;,•••), V / e /  and U™em be the utility function of a household H  in the 
competition for locations, namely =U™Bm((pr,u™ p) . Let Ds be the total
number of household members attracted at an economic activity location s ; each 
member h belongs to a locating household H , namely V h e H .
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Prn,(m \z)  = Pr(U"„>  ) Vm<zM
st. <p' = v rly„  V/-
vn,r,s (3.32)
h e H
Vi
h  r  m
/ "  > 0,<pr > 0,ur" > 0,z, > 0 VH,i, p,r,cr 
where ur° is obtained by finding the equilibrium flow V frps* e Q using an
origin-destination matrix that is calculated as follows: {#"} = \qrs + Prrs ( )x I f  J
rs p
st. P  = E{MaxU” m) Vr
! / ; = ? "  Vr.f
p
V/?,r,5
where Q is the set of feasible solutions, namely Q = [ f ” : V/7 e Pr\  Vr e R, Vs e S  ]
and qrs is the fixed number of trips between an origin-destination pair {r,s) 
generated by the non-locating decision-makers.
The upper level represents the behaviour of the locating households in terms of the 
bidding process of decision-makers. This is directly connected to the willingness-to- 
pay of the households for residential locations. The willingness-to-pay is used to 
determine the locational attractiveness (pr . This level also determines the probability 
of the spatial demand of locators between an OD pair {r,^}, namely Prrs (•). The 
probability is used to update the origin-destination matrix j#" j that is required at the
lower level. The formulation in the lower level explicitly considers the two network 
performance indices of locational attractiveness and transport impedance. The lower 
level evaluates the transport cost between locations, which is used at the upper level.
The functional relationship between the two components in the bi-level structure 
produces endogenously determined transport costs and locational benefits. The 
endogenous factors are a unique feature of the bid-rent network equilibrium model. 
Discussion for the endogenous solutions can be found in the literature. In urban
105
reconomics, some studies have specified transport components as an endogenous 
factor that contributes to the determination of urban land-use (see Fujita (1989) and 
references therein). This group has regarded traffic congestion as an important 
negative externality in the system and extended the traditional trade-off modelling 
approach between transport and housing by explicitly specifying commuting costs as 
an endogenous factor. The studies in urban economics have claimed that transport 
costs depend on the amount of land used for the space of transport infrastructure, and 
argued that congestion charges as a format of location tax would be recommendable 
for an efficient allocation of land. Even though this approach might offer a useful 
insight into the treatment of transport costs as a realistic specification, the framework 
would not be desirable. This is mainly because the methodology suggested does not 
deal with the behaviour of traffic flow. Specifically, the approach does not consider 
the complex relationship between traffic flow and transport impedance. On the other 
hand, the combined model, which is a mathematical programming model, emphasises 
flow-dependent transport costs. As discussed in the review of existing models, the 
group has integrated traffic assignment models into spatial interaction frameworks for 
a realistic network representation. The combined model eventually produces 
endogenously determined transport costs. This approach, however, is partial because 
the locational attractiveness, which is the counterpart to transport impedance, is 
assumed to be exogenous. Random utility models may suggest an endogenously 
determined locational attractiveness in the format of accessibility (see Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1987, pp. 300-304). The expected maximum utility, which is an output from 
the modelling approach of this group, may be interpreted as a measure for locational 
benefits. Random bid-rent models also suggest a measure of the locational 
attractiveness. The expected maximum bid-rent in this group offers significant 
insights into understanding the attractiveness; this study has incorporated the 
component for determining the locational attractiveness. The two approaches, 
however, are partial for evaluating the endogenous network performance indices. This 
is mainly because the transport cost in these groups is assumed to be exogenous. 
Some comprehensive land-use transport interaction models such as LILT (Mackett, 
1983), ITLUP (Putman, 1983, 1991), and METROSIM (Anas, 1994) have suggested 
an integrated framework to determine the two network performance indicators. The 
stability, however, is crudely achieved iterating extensive sub-components until the 
models converge. This means that the approach requires large amount of time in the
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adjustment and, more critically, the two indicators could be unstable. Another critical 
problem is that the models could be inoperational. This is because the sub-models 
demand huge quantity of data and systematic model operation processes such as 
parameter estimation, model calibration, and model validation. Thus, the extensive 
models would not be attractive for representing the endogenous determination.
To sum up, the existing approaches for dealing with the endogenous network 
performance indices are either partial or crude. In contrast, the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model is attractive in two senses: first, the two indicators in the proposed 
model are endogenously determined in a single unified framework, which addresses a 
stable equilibrium; secondly, the model suggests a systematic functional relationship 
between transport impedance and locational attractiveness requiring reasonable 
resources. These characteristics would mean that the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model could be a desirable modelling approach for producing the endogenous indices.
Another important point that should be noted in the issue of the endogenous solutions 
is a connection with a multiple period adjustment in the competition. As a result of the 
non-cooperative bidding game, the residential structure with respect to transport costs 
and locational benefits would change. A reasonable household would modify its 
strategy in such a way as to make the best response to the decisions of the other 
households. The adjusted strategy of households in turn affects transport impedance 
and locational attractiveness. This process continues until no household has an 
incentive to modify its strategy. The bi-level formulation represents this process in 
terms of a mutual adjustment between transport costs and locational attraction. This 
process, in the end, produces the endogenous network performance indices.
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3.3.6. Discussion
This section has discussed the process for the development of the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. The process was considered in terms of the n-player non- 
cooperative game of households. The goal of the framework was to represent the three 
structural nature of the relationship between transport and the location of activities, 
and was to find the Nash equilibrium, which was understood as suggesting optimal 
locations for households. The group of the optimal locations eventually represented an 
efficient urban structure. Two distinct behaviours, which were the travel behaviour of 
all households and the locational behaviour of households those changing residence 
over the time period, were identified in the process of the competition. The behaviour 
of non-locators was represented using the minimisation of the net interaction 
impedance. The hedonic-based random bid-rent function was suggested for describing 
the behaviour of locators. The two components were combined in a bi-level 
programme. The formulation was interpreted as an oligopolistic Cournot game that 
was an approximation to the n-player non-cooperative competition. The resulting 
formulation was expected to produce endogenously determined transport impedance 
and locational attractiveness. The characteristics were regarded as an important 
contribution of this model to the studies of land-use transport interactions.
The bid-rent network equilibrium model shows a crucial unsatisfactory aspect. In the 
process of formulating the model, there were two implicit assumptions. First, 
transport costs were evaluated presuming that there was only one type of household. 
In other words, there was no explicit consideration of a class-specific behaviour in the 
lower level, even though households were divided into several classes at the upper 
level. This caused difficulties in representing the different behaviour of households in 
the transport decision. The difficulties meant that inter-class interactions would not be 
considered. The other assumption was the use of a single criterion for classifying 
households. In many cases, the single index would not classify households into 
distinct sub-groups. A more realistic representation can be implemented using 
multidimensional measures. The two assumptions can be mitigated by incorporating a 
multiclass framework. The extension will be considered in the next section.
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3.4. A multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model
3.4.1. Introduction
As discussed at the end of the previous section, the lower level in the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model unsatisfactorily represents the diverse transport behaviour of 
households. The restriction results from the implicit assumption in which households 
show an identical decision-making process in the context of the transport behaviour. 
This section mitigates the limitation incorporating a multiclass framework, which 
explores a multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model. The multiclass model 
integrates the existing framework of non-locators with a multiclass methodology that 
addresses interclass transport interactions. The combination produces an extended 
model of the multiclass transport decision. The multiclass transport decision is 
combined with the locational decision of households, which establishes the multiclass 
bid-rent network equilibrium model. The resulting formulation is understood as a 
seamless oligopolistic Cournot game for occupying residential locations.
3.4.2. Multiclass interactions
The behaviour of households is too diverse to assume that all households share a 
common decision-making rule concerning transport choices. In other words, the 
assumption that all users on the same network show an identical decision-making 
process for the transport decision is over-simplified. The assumption is far from a 
realistic network representation. This suggests a need for an alternative methodology 
that can mitigate the restriction of the identical behaviour. The approach adopted in 
this study to overcome the limitation is a framework of multiple user classes. The 
multiclass approach represents the behaviour of a number of different users allowing 
interactions within a user class as well as between classes (Dafermos, 1971; Van Vliet 
et al., 1986). In particular, the inter-class interactions should be considered for a 
realistic network specification. The interpretation of the framework for this study is 
that households are divided into several distinct classes, each of which has an 
individual strategy. The strategy contributes to its own and to the other classes’ 
transport decision. In other words, a class has a specific transport cost function. The 
function contributes to its own and to the other classes’ transport impedance.
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Table 3-2 Example of criteria for the classification of user classes
Studies Criteria Stratification (e.g.)
Van Vliet et al. (1986) Vehicle type 
Route choice criterion 
Network restriction
Car / Heavy vehicle 
Distance / Travel time 
Ordinary / Bus-only lane
High / Middle / Low 
High / Middle / Low 
One / A few / Frequently 
Cautious / Rushed / Ruthless
Ran and Boyce (1994) Income
Age
Route Diversion Willingness 
Driving Behaviour_______
A diverse combination of rules for the classification of user groups can be considered. 
Table 3-2 shows an example of the rules for specifying household classes. Van Vliet 
and others (1986) suggested three criteria of vehicle type, route choice criterion, and 
network restriction for the stratification of travellers. Ran and Boyce (1994, p. 249) 
proposed income, age, route diversion willingness, and driving behaviour as the 
criteria. In many studies, a mode-specific factor has been widely used for the grouping 
because transport modes would be the most distinguishable index for classifying the 
behaviour of network users regarding transport choices (Bliemer, 2001).
A desirable criterion would be the factor that can reasonably represent the nature of 
transport and the location of activities classifying households into distinct groups. In 
this study, two criteria are considered, namely the level of income and modes to travel. 
The factor income is regarded as a representative component to address the socio­
economic characteristics of households. The bidding behaviour of households would 
be differentiated according to the level of income. In addition, the degree of income 
would produce a considerable gap between the perception from households to 
locational attractiveness and transport costs. The second criterion, transport modes, 
represents a physical restriction in the transport decision of households. The factor can 
involve various vehicle types and network restrictions such as bus-only lanes. Either 
income or mode can be used to classify households, which is referred to as a single 
dimensional criterion, namely or Cm. Both factors, if necessary, can be integrated
to identify user classes, which are referred to as a bi-dimensional criterion < C .
110
3.4.3. Transport decision: the problem of non-locators
This section presents an extension of the transport decision in the single class bid-rent 
network equilibrium model to that of the multiclass counterpart incorporating a 
multiclass framework. The resulting formulation represents the multiclass behaviour 
of non-locators in the transport decision. This behaviour is interpreted as analogous to 
an oligopolistic Cournot game. The discussion of the extension is heavily dependent 
on the studies of Dafermos (1971, 1972) and Netter (1972).
The single class transport network, which was suggested in the previous section, 
consisted of the directed mathematical network G , the set of travel demands Q , and 
the set of transport cost functions C ; they were represented as a scalar. In contrast, a 
multiclass network is represented by an m-dimensional vector of single class 
networks. The conceptual diagram for the multiclass network is shown in Figure 3-3.
Class m
Class 2
Class 1
(A multiclass network)(A singleclass network)
Figure 3-3 A conceptual diagram for the multiclass network
Let G = [A ^,^;M ] denote a m-dimensional mathematical network where N
represents a set of m-dimensional nodes, A a set of m-dimensional links, and M  a set 
of user classes. Every class m, Vm <z M  is associated with its own individual copy of
a network, see Figure 3-3. Thus, the network G is the union of m identical single 
class networks. Let R, R c : N  denote a set of m-dimensional origin nodes, S, S  c  N
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a set of m-dimensional destination nodes, and Prs a set of m-dimensional paths 
between an origin-destination pair r and s . There are nonnegative demands for travel
Q = \jlm :V m cM , V r e R, Vs e S  ] in the network G . Like the single class model,
the demands include both the locating and the non-locating households. It is also 
noted that the spatial interactions are represented by the unit of household members.
Let v" be the flow of a class m on a link a ,V a e A .  The multiclass link volumes are
V . V «  (3.34)
Let f pm be the flow of a class m on a path p, \fp e Prs that connects an origin- 
destination pair {r,s}. The vector of multiclass path flows is given by
7 ;  = { - J ^ - ) , y p , r , s  (3.35)
The flow of a class m on a link a is equal to the sum of the flows of the class on the 
paths that contain the link.
v ;= E /; :^ ; ; ,v a ,m  (3.36)
p
where 5 rasp is an indicator, namely 5™ = 1, if a link a is on a path p , and 0 otherwise.
The spatial interaction flow of a class m for an origin-destination pair r and s is 
equal to the sum of the flows of the class m on paths that connects the OD pair.
f lC - E - C  C3-3?)
P
A nonnegative path flow that satisfies the conservation equation between the path 
flow and the spatial interaction demand is feasible and a feasible flow pattern Q is 
defined by a family of individual feasible path flows:
n = [/,"  : Vp G P ’,Vm c M , V r e  R, \/s s  S ] (3.38)
The travel demands Q are associated with transport costs. Let t™ be the transport cost 
of a user class m on a link a . The m-dimensional vector of link cost functions is
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5 = ( £ . - . C ) . v « (3.39)
It is assumed that the transport cost on a link a depends on the flow of the link a :
5 = S (v .) .V «  (3.40)
This study considers complete inter-class interactions on a link a . This suggests that 
the transport cost function can be rewritten as follows:
: (3-41)
C = C ( v : , - , v ; ) , v a
where the re-specified link cost function clearly shows that each class has an 
individual transport cost function and the cost function contributes to its own and the 
other classes’ transport impedance, which is compatible with the definition of the 
inter-class interaction in this study.
The functions of the transport impedance are set, C = [f” (va): V/w <z M,
Finally, the multiclass network is defined as combining the multiclass directed
mathematical network G , the multiclass travel demand Q , and the multiclass
transport cost function C , namely N = [G ,(?,C ].
The cost function in the multiclass network N requires a significant number of 
parameters that are specific to the decision-making rule for each user class. In the 
Dafermos example (1972), the number of parameters was 35 in the only two-class 
seven-link network. It would be almost impossible to specify all necessary parameters 
in a large-scale network. Alternatively, the normalising approach can be used (Van 
Vliet et al., 1986; Lam and Huang, 1992a; Lam and Huang, 1992b).
C  = C ( v I ,- ,v ; )  = h>"-/.(v.), Va,m (3.42)
where wm is a weighting factor for a user class m . The factor wm is normally 
associated with the value of travel time for the user class m .
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The normalised transport cost function shows that a class m has its own link cost 
function and the function contributes its own and the other classes’ transport 
impedance, which is in line with the assumption of the multiclass formulation.
In the normalising approach, the path cost of a class between {r, 5} is given by
(3.43)
a
where the equation shows again that path costs are determined by a joint function of 
the load of its own class and those of the remaining classes. In other words, the cost 
crspm is dependent on the flow of its own class as well as those of the other classes.
In this study, travellers have been assumed to explicitly consider the two network 
performance indicators of transport impedance and locational attractiveness in the 
transport decision. In other words, trip-makers have been supposed to seek a location 
that satisfies the composite goal of minimising travel time and maximising locational 
attraction. The net interaction impedance has been provided to represent the explicit 
consideration of the composite speculation. The multiclass version is provided:
0-44)
where (pTm is class specific locational attractiveness of a residence r . As noted in the 
single class model, the value is represented in the unit of transport cost.
An extension of the equilibrium condition of the single class model to that of the 
multiclass counterpart is straightforward.
Definition 8. A feasible flow f pf  is a user optimal i f  for each OD pair {r,s} 
and class m , there is a quantity 7 7 "  that satisfies the following properties:
- V m  i f  f n m  > 0 ,  V / ? 7 , r , J* m J  pm  ?  J  ^  45)jrs  —rCpm-<Pm i n :  if / . r  =°» Vm,r,s' pm
where 77" is a minimal net interaction impedance for a user class m and f p * 
is an equilibrium path flow o f a class m .
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rThe multiclass equilibrium condition suggests that all locations chosen by each class 
m have the same net interaction impedance. The impedance is at least the same as 
those of the other alternatives that are not chosen. This condition is represented by 
minimising the difference between class specific transport costs and locational 
benefits, namely crpm - (prm , Vm c l / .  A formulation using a variational inequality is
proposed to represent the minimisation. Preliminarily, a path cost function is extended 
incorporating a multiclass component.
c = c  (/;:■?: ) = l c  - K  (3.46)
a
where the path-based multiclass cost function cpm (•) is flow-dependent because the 
link cost t™ has been assumed to be flow-dependent.
The link cost function in the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model was also 
flow-dependent. Thus, it is useful to clarify the characteristics of the link cost 
functions between the two models. Both functions are a separable type, which means 
that the two cost functions consider no interactions between links. In other words, the 
cost of a link solely depends on the volume of the link. The multiclass model allows 
the diverse combinations of class-specific flows on a link. Hence, the link cost 
depends on the vector of the link flows of user classes. This means that there are 
interactions between the classes on the network. These interactions might be 
symmetric. However, the symmetry condition is very restrictive because the condition 
requires that the impact of a class to the other classes on a link should be the same as 
those of the other classes. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the link cost function is 
an asymmetric type, which this study adopts. When the cost function is asymmetric, 
there are no known equivalent minimisation programmes. A variational inequality can 
be used as an alternative formulation. A variational inequality formulation is more 
general than an optimisation programme because the framework can flexibly handle 
the asymmetric interaction between classes (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980).
The minimisation of the net interaction impedance for the multiclass bid-rent network 
equilibrium model is formulated using a variational inequality, which finds j f p * J ,
V /" e n  where «  = [ / "  ■ .V peP ",V m cM , V r e R ,  V s sS ]  :
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Vm rs p
fa  = E [MaxUZ„ (■)] Vm’r
Z / ; : = ? :  vm ,r,s
p
/ " * 0  \/m ,p ,r,s
The formulation represents the Nash equilibrium; no household class can save 
resources in terms of the net interaction impedance by deviating from the equilibrium
flow {f rps* J . This suggests that no class has an incentive to alter its strategy to win the
competition. The Nash equilibrium inferred addresses an oligopolistic competition of 
households. In other words, the formulation satisfactorily describes the class-to-class 
game. In fact, there was an inconsistency in terms of a game theoretical interpretation 
in the single class model. The overall formulation of the single class model has 
represented the oligopolistic Cournot game. The lower level model, however, has 
suggested the many-to-many competition even though the group-to-group game has 
been considered in the upper level. The inconsistency is successfully resolved in the 
multiclass model. The formulation clearly represents the class-to-class competition, 
namely an oligopolistic game. Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium can be 
systematically defined. Hence, the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model can 
be regarded as a seamless analogy to the oligopolistic Cournot game.
Braess and Koch (1979) showed that multiclass models have at least one solution 
when the link cost function is continuous and monotone. The general condition for the 
existence of solutions has been established by Smith (1979, 1981, 1983a). Here, a 
compact version analogous to the case of the single class model is given. The 
variational inequality has at least one solution provided that the set of multiclass 
feasible path flows is non-empty (see Bell and Iida, 1997, pp. 86-89).
The uniqueness condition of a solution for the total link flow case has been suggested 
(Van Vliet et al., 1986; Nagumey, 2000; Nagumey and Dong, 2002a; Nagumey and 
Dong, 2002b). In this theorem, the total link flow pattern va, \fa induced by the
weighted sum of the link flow patterns of each user class v“ , \fa,m  is unique if the
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link cost function is separable and strictly monotone. However, this condition is self­
contradictory in the sense that the theorem assumes a class-independent cost function 
even though the definition of the multiclass problem requires interactions between 
user classes, namely a class-dependent cost function (Watling, 1996).
Dafermos (1980) tried to establish the general uniqueness condition assuming 
strongly monotone link cost functions. The strong monotony condition is satisfied if 
and only if the Jacobian matrix is positive definite (Dafermos, 1980). This condition 
implies that the inter-class interaction is weak. In other words, the dominant factor 
that determines the link cost of each class is its own flow, although the transport 
impedance depends on the entire flows of all the classes. However, this is not always 
applicable in most situations. Thus, the multiclass model could have multiple 
solutions in terms of the vector of equilibrium link flows; inevitably, the vector of 
equilibrium path flows as well. As noted in the single class model, this property does 
not mean that the multiclass net interaction impedance cannot be defined. An 
appropriate solution algorithm could offer an equilibrium flow patterns; this issue is 
presented in Chapter Four, Solution Algorithm.
In summary, this section has discussed the transport decision of non-locators 
incorporating a multiclass framework. The resulting formulation satisfactorily 
represents diverse class specific behaviour as well as the inter-class interaction. The 
formulation has been understood as equivalent to an oligopolistic Cournot game in the 
transport decision. This satisfies the consistency in terms of the game theoretical 
interpretation for the formulation of the bid-rent network equilibrium model.
117
r3.4.4. Formulation
In the previous two sections, the conceptual framework for representing the inter-class 
interaction and the incorporation of the multiclass approach to the transport decision 
were considered. In this section, a resulting formulation is provided combining the 
improved transport decision and the locational decision of households, namely the 
multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model. Let Prrs (•) be the share of the total 
number of locating households between a residential location r and a primary activity 
location s , Vr e R, Vs e S ; 0 < Prn (•) < 1 and ^  Prrs (•) = 1. Let Ur^ m be the utility
r
function of a household H , U™€m = UrH*m(v r \p ) . Let Dsm be the class-specific 
total number of household members attracted at an economic activity location. 
Pr"(m\z)  = Pr(U” m>U';em,) VmczM
s-t- <p'=fa/yH Vr
<  = 'L~cl { h’C ’V ')  W , r , S (3.48)
h e H
E 2 > : = 5 :  v « .a
h  r
f r;m>^(pr > W Z  >0,2, >0 V//,/,w,/7, n o ­
where uT° is obtained by finding the equilibrium flow {f p * J , e Q using an
origin-destination matrix that is calculated as follows: {#"J = -I-Prrs (*)x Dsm}
m rs p
s j - K=E{M axU '°,m) Vm,r
E/>™ = ^ ' Vm,r,s
P
/ " S O  Vm ,p,r,s
where Cl = \ f j ^ : V p e  P™ ,\/m  c  M, Vr e R, Vs € s i  is the set of feasible solutions.
The hedonic-based random bid-rent model in the upper level shows a slight difference 
from the formulation of the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model. The 
equilibrium path flow in the multiclass model has been represented for the class
specific solution {f p *} rather than the overall equilibrium solution {//**} as it does 
in the single class model. This difference suggests that the multiclass model considers
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rthe class specific transport impedance when the model represents the behaviour of 
locators. The lower level has been significantly improved. The changes have been 
invoked by the incorporation of the multiclass approach. The embodiment makes the 
model address the interaction between household classes in the transport decision. 
The overall changes in terms of the multiclass framework have been smoothly 
combined in the bi-level formulation. This suggests a consistency with the single class 
model in representing the nature of the relationship between transport and the location 
of activities. It is reminded that the nature has involved the three criteria of the unique 
characteristics of locations, the decision-making process of households, and the 
interaction between transport and land-use. The systematic connection between the 
components produces the endogenous network performance indices of transport 
impedance and locational attractiveness. The endogenous solutions have been 
regarded as a unique feature of this model. A further important point that should be 
noted in the formulation is a game theoretical interpretation. Even though the single 
class model has discussed the behaviour of households in the context of the 
oligopolistic Cournot game, the lower level has represented the n-player competition 
implicitly assuming that the behaviour of travellers would be identical in the transport 
decision. The incorporation of the multiclass approach in the multiclass bid-rent 
network equilibrium model successfully describes the competition of the oligopoly in 
the lower level. This suggests a seamless oligopolistic Cournot representation of the 
multiclass model in each level as well as in the overall formulation.
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r3.4.5. Discussion
In this section, the extension of the bid-rent network equilibrium model to the 
multiclass perspective has been discussed. The multiclass approach was understood as 
a useful framework for representing the interaction between household classes in the 
transport decision. The framework was embodied in the model of non-locators. The 
resulting formulation suggested an equivalent oligopolistic Cournot game.
The multiclass framework incorporated in this section dealt with the interaction 
between user classes on the same link only. However, the transport cost on a link 
might be affected by the flows on other links as well. This means that transport costs 
might be a function of entire network factors involving different classes and overall 
network circumstances (Nagumey and Dong, 2002a). An extension of the model 
incorporating the inter-class and inter-link interactions is straightforward. A slight 
modification to the link cost function could address the dual interactions.
Let v be the matrix of class-link flows
v =
(  1 m
v l>- •>v i
1
(3.50)
The transport cost on a link a of a class m is given by
C = C ( v ) ,  Va,m (3.51)
The subsequent derivation of the model with the dual interactions is identical to that 
of the single-interaction multiclass model. In a theoretical context, the extension 
would not be a difficult quest. A slight modification to the link cost function would 
enable the model to represent the interactions. The improvement, however, would not 
be an easy task practically. This is because the extension requires a comprehensive 
reference that specifies the relationship between user classes and network components. 
This inevitably accompanies a site-specific survey. In particular, when a large-sized 
network is considered, this would be merely theoretically applicable.
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r3.5. Conclusion
The bid-rent network equilibrium model has been developed in this chapter. The 
model was designed to represent the three nature of the relationship between transport 
and the location of activities. First of all, the hedonic interpretation of the model 
reasonably recognised the characteristics of heterogeneity and indivisibility of 
locations. Secondly, the composite decision-making process of households, which 
meant interactions between decisions within a household and those between 
households, was represented using a game theoretical framework, accompanied by a 
bidding mechanism. Finally, a mutual adjustment process addressed the interaction 
between transport and land-use. The process produced the endogenous network 
performance indicators of transport impedance and locational attractiveness.
The process of developing the model was considered in the context of competition for 
locations. The two household groups, which were locators and non-locators, were 
identified. The behaviour of locators was considered using the hedonic-based random 
bid-rent model. The minimisation of the net interaction impedance was provided for 
representing the behaviour of non-locators. The two components were embodied in a 
bi-level programme. The formulation was interpreted as equivalent to an oligopolistic 
Cournot game. The Nash equilibrium for this game was defined. The bid-rent network 
equilibrium model was improved incorporating a multiclass framework. The extended 
formulation systematically represented inter-class interactions. The resulting model 
was understood as a seamless oligopolistic competition of the Cournot game.
In conclusion, the bid-rent network equilibrium model developed in this chapter 
satisfactorily represents the three structural nature of the relationship between 
transport and the location of activities. The systematic connection between the 
theories for the conceptual basis and the methodologies for the practical modelling 
would mean that the model could be an alternative framework for representing this 
problem. There is little doubt that the bid-rent network equilibrium model is useful for 
investigating the interaction between transport and the location of activities.
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r4. Solution Algorithm
4.1. Introduction
This chapter proposes an appropriate solution algorithm for the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. The model was formulated using a bi-level programme. Solving 
the bi-level model, however, is not a simple task. The difficulty results from the 
intrinsic characteristics of the programme (Friesz et al., 1990). First, the programme is 
inherently non-convex because of the implicit functional relationship between the 
decision variables of the upper and lower levels. The non-convexity means that 
finding the global solution would be difficult. Secondly, the model requires an 
intensive computational process. Each level of the programme demands an 
incomplete (or complete) solution at the other level when the level updates a solution. 
This intermediate solution is required many times until convergence is achieved, 
which causes a huge computational effort. Thus, the solution-finding process for the 
optimisation problem has long been considered an important yet complicated and 
challenging quest (Yang and Bell, 2001). The two unhelpful characteristics are also 
found in the proposed formulation of the bid-rent network equilibrium model. Thus, 
the goal of the solution algorithm for the model, which will be suggested in this 
chapter, is to produce a good solution rather than a unique answer.
In the first section, a review on the existing solution algorithms for bi-level 
mathematical programmes is considered. The algorithms are classified into 
deterministic and stochastic types. The deterministic algorithm is subdivided into 
responsive and iterative algorithms. In the subsequent section, a solution algorithm for 
the bid-rent network equilibrium model is proposed. This study adopts the iterative 
algorithm to find a mutually consistent solution that represents the Nash equilibrium; 
note that the proposed model intends to address the Nash equilibrium. Specifically, a 
heuristic routine combines a path-based algorithm for solving the lower level and the 
Newton-Raphson procedure for estimating parameters at the upper level. In the 
following section, simple numerical examples that illustrate the operation of the bid- 
rent network equilibrium model are suggested. Some results from the solution 
algorithm are discussed. In the final section, concluding remarks are presented.
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4.2. Existing algorithms 
4.2.1. Introduction
As discussed in the introductory section of this chapter, bi-level mathematical 
programmes have two unhelpful features in finding a solution: first, the non-convex 
structure of the programmes suggests difficulties in identifying a global solution; 
secondly, the programme requires a significant computational process. These two 
properties have motivated existing approaches to investigate heuristic algorithms that 
normally use an alternative improvement strategy (Yang and Bell, 1998). In other 
words, the heuristic algorithms calculate a solution updating the problem of the upper 
and lower levels alternately. Thus, the process consists of a successive alternation 
between the levels exchanging solutions with each other.
Heuristic algorithms are designed to find an acceptable answer for typical problems in 
a reasonable computation time (Rutenbar, 1989). The heuristics, however, have no 
guarantee producing an optimum solution. Therefore, the goal of the heuristic 
algorithms focuses on identifying a reasonable solution rather than a unique one. This 
suggests that the algorithms attempt to perturb some existing sub-optimal solutions in 
the direction of a better solution. The process continues until no further improvements 
are obtained, at which point the procedure terminates (Boyce and Mattsson, 1999).
In this section, existing solution-finding mechanisms for bi-level mathematical 
programmes are examined. The algorithms are classified into deterministic and 
stochastic types. While the deterministic algorithm produces the same solution every 
time the algorithm runs, the stochastic type generates different answers. The 
deterministic algorithm can be sub-grouped into iterative and responsive types in 
terms of a game theoretical context. When an algorithm focuses on finding a mutually 
consistent solution, which suggests the Nash equilibrium, the algorithm is referred to 
as an iterative type. In contrast, a responsive algorithm, which suggests the 
Stackelberg equilibrium, highlights a leader-follower structure. Finally, the existing 
types of algorithms are compared. The comparison concludes that no solution 
algorithm guarantees producing a global solution in an efficient computation process.
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4.2.2. Iterative algorithms
Iterative algorithms produce a mutually consistent solution, which is equivalent to the 
Nash equilibrium. As discussed in the chapter for the model development, the Nash 
equilibrium could be defined in every n-player non-cooperative game. A particularly 
interesting type of n-player non-cooperative games in transport studies is the Cournot 
game. The game is originally a framework to analyse duopoly or oligopoly. This 
means that small numbers of gamers who have conflicts of interests are considered. 
Each gamer is assumed to maximise his or her profits simultaneously. In this process, 
an individual gamer is supposed to follow the best strategy in response to every other 
player since no player has a dominant situation. At equilibrium, no player has an 
incentive to deviate from the equilibrium because their strategy is the best response to 
their belief about the strategies of the other players.
where T(-) is the payoff function of players;
§* is the optimal strategy of a player i ; and
§1, is the optimal strategy profile of all players except i , namely
The process of the iterative algorithm is analogous to the play rule of the Cournot 
game. The successive exchange of solutions between levels in the algorithm describes 
the rule of the best response of players in the game. The Nash equilibrium in the 
Cournot game is represented by a mutually consistent solution in the algorithm.
Implementations of the iterative algorithm are simple and straightforward. The 
algorithm solves the upper level problem while holding fixed the decision variables of 
the lower level, and then solves the lower level problem while holding fixed the 
decision variables of the upper level. This process continues until the problem 
converges in equilibrium (Bell and Iida, 1997). The general procedure of the iterative 
algorithm can be summarised as follows:
Step 0. Initialise the upper level solution |x° J ; set k=0
(4.1)
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Step 1. Find the lower level solution jy*J with {x*}
Step 2. Determine the upper level solution {x*+1J with |y* J
Step 3. I f  there is an improvement o f a solution, then set k=k+l and go to 'Step 1 
otherwise, stop the procedure.
The iterative algorithm has been applied to various research areas. In particular, the 
algorithm has been popularly used in studies for investigations into the relationship 
between signal settings and network flows. In this question, the route choice of 
drivers is regarded as a function of network design parameters. For example, Allsop 
(1974) emphasised that a realistic approach to a signal setting was to find a design 
parameter that considered the network behaviour of drivers. This was represented by 
means of combining a problem of a traffic signal setting with a travel demand model. 
The ultimate purpose of the research was to find the influence of signal settings on 
traffic patterns. In other words, the model investigated how traffic controls influenced 
travel costs and traffic flows. For a solution procedure, the iterative algorithm was 
suggested. The process calculated alternately between the signal setting and the travel 
demand until the problem converged in equilibrium. This result was applied to a 
signal-controlled network for demonstrating different signal timings would induce 
different routings (Allsop and Charlesworth, 1977). The algorithm produced two 
mutually consistent solutions which could be interpreted as network users had no 
incentive to change their route, and a planner had no reason to altar the design 
parameter; these were consistent with the Nash equilibrium. However, since the 
system designer was expected to act, taking into account the responses of the network 
users, the solutions found could not satisfactorily represent the behaviour of the two 
agents. This was because the solution of one problem only took into account the 
solution of the other in the previous iteration. Furthermore, the two different solutions 
signified the difficulty of the iterative algorithm in finding a global solution.
A similar procedure was used in SATURN (the .Simulation and Assignment of Traffic 
in Urban /toad Network) model (Bolland et al., 1979; Hall et al., 1980). SATURN, 
which had two phases of simulation and assignment steps, was a simulation tool for 
traffic management schemes. The two phases were connected by an iterative loop; the 
simulation phase calculated the parameters of the flow-delay curve given the traffic
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pattern, and then the assignment phase recalculated route flows and costs using the 
flow-delay function which was given by the simulation phase. These iterations 
continued until an equilibrium was obtained. The ENETS (Equilibrium JVEJWork 
traffic Signal setting) model (Cantarella et al., 1991) was another similar example of 
the application of the iterative algorithm in the problem of the combination between 
the signal setting and the traffic routing. In ENETS, the model of the traffic signal 
setting consisted of two steps: first, the capacity maximisation of green timing and 
scheduling at a single junction; second, the delay minimisation of signal coordination. 
ENETS highlighted the effect between changes in the control strategy and the 
redistribution of flows in the entire network.
Other interesting applications of the iterative algorithm can be found in the literature. 
For example, the algorithm was used to calibrate the parameters of road capacity 
function in Korea (Suh et al., 1990). Suh and others claimed that the widely used US 
BPR (Bureau of Public Roads) parameters might not be appropriate in other areas 
because of their unique transport environments. A bi-level programming model was 
suggested to calibrate the parameters suitable for Korean highway circumstances. The 
model combined a least square measurement between the observed and estimated link 
flows with a user optimal assignment model. Boyce and Mattsson (1999) formulated a 
bi-level framework of the housing supply, which was one of the sub models of 
IMREL (integrated Model of Residential and Employment location). In the upper 
level, the problem was to find housing supply patterns. This was represented by 
maximising the welfare of workers. In the lower level, the aggregate behaviour of 
employee was investigated given the locational pattern of jobs and housing types. The 
usual iterative procedure was proposed to calculate a solution. An interesting variation 
of the iterative algorithm is the Equilibrium Decomposed Optimisation (EDO) 
technique (Suwansirikul et al., 1987). The approach decomposes an objective function 
at each link, and then simultaneously solves the function using a one-dimensional 
search routine such as Fibonacci, Golden Section, and Bisection. The usual iterative 
procedure between the upper and lower levels is used to update the solution.
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4.2.3. Responsive algorithms
Responsive algorithms suggest a solution that would be equivalent to the Stackelberg 
equilibrium which is one of the Nash type equilibriums; see Appendix I. It would be 
useful to distinguish the Stackelberg game from the Cournot game. There are 
similarities and dissimilarities between the two games. Both games deal with small 
numbers of gamers, namely a duopoly and an oligopoly. In these games, no player has 
a dominant strategy. The non-dominance means that the framework of the best- 
response analysis can be applied to investigate the behaviour of decision-makers in 
these games. The main difference between the two games is observed in the order of 
gamers’ actions. While the Cournot game assumes that all players act simultaneously, 
the Stackelberg game assumes a sequential decision-making process. In other words, 
in the Stackelberg game, one player acts before the others. The first mover is referred 
to as a leader. The others are denoted as followers. For this reason, the Stackelberg 
game is referred to as a leader-follower game. The leader begins the game by 
announcing its decision. The followers execute their policies after the decision of the 
first mover. The leader tries to maximise its profit taking the reasonable reaction of 
the followers into account. In contrast, the followers simply react to the leader’s 
choice, namely the best response to the leader’s decision. Therefore, the leader has an 
advantage, which is referred to as the first-mover advantage. Mathematically, the 
equilibrium state of the Stackelberg game can be expressed as follows:
Y(s;,®(s:,is;))2:r(s„o(s:,is,))
and (4.2)
y (s;,®(s:,is:))>y (s:,®(s j s :))
where i is the leader and ® (•) is the response function of the followers.
As stated above, the responsive algorithm produces an analogous solution to the 
Stackelberg equilibrium. This suggests that the algorithm would represent the leader- 
follower structure. In this framework, a traffic agency is normally set to be the leader 
and the group of network users are regarded as the followers. The algorithm explicitly 
represents the two distinct characteristics of the Stackelberg game. First, the first- 
mover advantage is considered by solving the problem of the followers given the 
solution to the problem of the leader. Secondly, the reaction of the followers is
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rrepresented in the algorithm calculating the problem of the leader without fixing the 
decision variable of the followers. The first characteristic is also found in the iterative 
algorithm, but the second is a unique feature of this type of algorithm. A step for 
evaluating the reaction factor has been introduced to represent the second 
characteristic in the responsive algorithm.
Step 0. Initialise the upper level solution |x°J; set k=0.
Step 1. Find the lower level solution jy*J with jx* J 
Step 2. Calculate the reaction factor at jy*J 
Step 3. Determine the upper level solution jx*+1 J with
Step 4. I f  there is an improvement in the solution, then set k=k+l and go to ‘Step 1 
otherwise, terminate the procedure.
This group of algorithms can be divided in terms of the way the reaction factor is 
evaluated. Three procedures are found in the literature, namely the Zink Usage 
Proportion-Pased (LUPB) and the Sensitivity ^ nalysis-Pased (SAB) algorithms.
The LUPB algorithm explicitly considers the reaction factor. The algorithm evaluates 
the reaction factor using a path flow solution to the lower level problem.
X  1 f r s  c rs  
/  j  J  p  9 ^  ap
® " = ^ ----------  V a e A y r e R , V s e S  (4.3)
xrs
where ®" is the link usage proportion on a link a of an OD pair r and s ;
f ” is the flow on a path p  connecting an OD pair r and s ;
x" is the decision variable of the upper level; and
5” is an indicator; S" = 1, if a link a is on a path p , and 0 otherwise.
The reaction factor is used to predict the changes in an equilibrium flow, which is 
interpreted as the reaction of the followers. This suggests that the LUPB algorithm 
would satisfactorily capture the leader-follower structure. The equilibrium flow, 
however, is not uniquely determined because a path-flow solution is not normally
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runique. The algorithm has been applied to some areas: a design of ramp metering 
(Yang et al., 1994) and OD matrix estimation (Yang et al., 1992; Yang, 1995).
The SAB algorithm uses a sensitivity analysis in evaluating the reaction factor. The 
sensitivity analysis is a way of calculating a new approximate solution by means of 
parameter perturbations at a current solution. The perturbations may occur 
simultaneously across the parameters. Thus, the information on the sensitivity 
analysis can be used to test the stability of a solution as well as the degree of 
sensitivity of a particular factor. The direct application of the sensitivity analysis to 
the investigation of the network equilibrium is infeasible because the equilibrium path 
flow is not uniquely determined. Tobin and Friesz (1988) developed an alternative 
approach to overcome the problem, namely the approach o f the restricted problem. 
The restricted approach would be described as follows: first, select a particular path 
flow solution, which is referred to as an extreme point; then, calculate the derivative 
of the extreme point with respect to the perturbation in parameters; lastly, transform 
the derivative of the path flow to that of the link flow. Tobin and Friesz (1988) proved 
that the derivative of the link flow is independent of the extreme point chosen. This 
means that the derivative information of the restricted problem can be regarded as 
equivalent to that of the original problem. This technique, however, is not feasible 
when the number of origin-destination pairs exceeds that of links, as most real 
networks do. This is because the Tobin and Friesz approach is based on complicated 
matrix calculation, and so the Hessian of the objective function with respect to the 
vector of path flows, which is essential for implementing the sensitivity analysis, is 
not invertible when the number of paths in the link-path incidence matrix exceeds the 
number of links. Therefore, this approach cannot be used in most practical-sized 
networks (Bell and Iida, 1997, pp. 95-100; Patriksson, 2004).
o -f -p .r -R i  (4-4>
where s is the vector of the parameters of perturbation and
J  is the Jacobian matrix of the lower level problem.
The SAB algorithm could represent changes in link flows more accurately than the 
LUPB algorithm because the SAB algorithm uses the derivative information in 
evaluating the reaction factor. There have been several applications of the sensitivity
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analysis for developing solution algorithms outside transport studies. De Silva (1978) 
suggested the SAB algorithm for a model of US crude oil production. Friesz and 
others (1988) implemented the SAB algorithm for the spatial location problem. Since 
then, many transport applications of the SAB algorithm can be found in the literature: 
ramp metering on urban freeway networks (Yang et al., 1994; Yang and Yagar, 
1994); a traffic signal setting (Yang and Yagar, 1995); an optimal congestion pricing 
(Yang and Lam, 1996; Yang and Bell, 1997); a reserve capacity approach to a signal 
control (Wong and Yang, 1997; Ziyou and Yifan, 2002); a trip table estimation 
(Yang, 1995); determining an optimal speed detector density (Chan and Lam, 2002); 
and a transit network design problem (Gao et al., 2003).
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4.2.4. Stochastic algorithms
In the previous sections, deterministic algorithms were considered. The deterministic 
algorithms were classified in terms of a game theoretical context. When algorithms 
suggest a mutually consistent solution, the algorithms were denoted as the iterative 
algorithm. In contrast, the responsive algorithm represented the leader-follower 
structure of the Stackelberg game. This section deals with stochastic algorithms. 
Whilst the deterministic algorithms produce the same answers every time the 
algorithms run, the stochastic algorithms offer different solutions at each run. This is 
because the stochastic algorithms use a probabilistic transition rule when solutions are 
improved. Fundamentally, this group belongs to local search methods. The stochastic 
rule, however, allows the algorithms to search more points in the dominion of 
solutions than the deterministic counterparts. This characteristic may reduce the 
possibility of being trapped in local optima, which may increase the possibility of 
finding the global optimum. In this section, two representative stochastic algorithms 
are reviewed, namely the simulated annealing algorithm and the genetic algorithm.
The simulated annealing algorithm is a technique for solving combinatorial 
optimisation problems. The procedure of this approach is analogous to that of the 
statistical mechanics of annealing in solids (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). In physics, a 
material that is at high temperature is a highly disordered state. This material is not 
very useful because the material can be easily defective. In contrast, as the 
temperature cools down, a material becomes an ordered state. If the cooling is done 
too quickly, the material is damaged or broken; whereas, a moderate control in 
cooling transforms a material into a solid body. Annealing is a procedure that coerces 
a material into a low energy state. In this process, a material is heated to a high-energy 
state that actively allows atomic rearrangements. Then, the material is carefully 
cooled until the material is converted into a solid body.
The procedure of the simulated annealing algorithm is similar to the process of the 
controlled cooling operation in physics. The algorithm seeks to transform a poorly 
disordered solution into a desirably ordered answer. The transformation is achieved 
by means of a perturbation towards better as well as worse configurations. The 
perturbation allows the algorithm to jump from the dominion in the direction of local
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rsolutions, which potentially enables the algorithm to take a more promising path 
towards the global optimum. The procedure can be summarised as follows:
Step 0. Initialise a solution |x°,y° J ; set k=0.
Step 1. Simulated annealing.
Step 1.1. Find thermal equilibrium.
Step 1.2. Cooling schedule.
Step 2. I f  a solution satisfies stopping criteria, then terminate the procedure; 
otherwise, set k=k+l and go to ‘Step 1 ’.
In finding thermal equilibrium, the Metropolis rule (1953) is usually adopted. The 
procedure generates a random perturbation near to a current temperature that 
represents a solution. The perturbation enables a particle to move towards a new 
location in a feasible region. Then, the step evaluates the resulting changes in energy. 
If the energy decreases, the new configuration is accepted as a new starting point for 
the next move. If the energy increases, the Boltzman distribution is applied. The 
Boltzman distribution would make the algorithm move towards a worse solution, 
which might enable the procedure to jump towards the global optimum. Finally, the 
algorithm checks whether the energy satisfies the thermal equilibrium. In practice, 
where few improvements across several successive temperatures are observed, the 
point is regarded as the thermal equilibrium. The process is summarised as follows:
For k=l to K
/* generate a random perturbation */
x* = x*_1 + Ax
Tjf | x* -  x*_11<0 then
/* accept a better solution */
rjinew _
Elself | x* -  x*"11>0 then
/* apply the Boltzman distribution */
/* calculate an acceptance probability */ 
P = exp(-1 x* -  x*-11 / T)
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r/* generate a random value Rin  [0,1] */
I f  P> R then
/* accept a worse solution */
rpnew _
Else
/* no improvement in temperature */
rpnew   r£ o ld
End I f
End I f
Next
In the cooling schedule step, the algorithm moderates the acceptance of worse 
solutions. In physics, the energy of a material sometimes jumps to a higher state even 
though the transition is controlled by a current temperature. The higher the energy that 
a material has, the more the material jumps to a higher temperature. The step of the 
cooling schedule represents this process by successively lowering the temperature. At 
the initial stage, most worse solutions are accepted because the temperature is high. In 
this stage, the procedure of the algorithm is similar to that of a random search method. 
As the temperature cools, fewer worse solutions are allowed. At the coldest 
temperature, very few disruptions are permitted. In practice, a simple parameter is 
multiplied to a current solution in order to reduce temperature:
T = rT™ (4.5)
where r is a cooling parameter whose value is between zero and one.
The simulated annealing algorithm has been applied to wide areas of research: a 
vehicle routing (Robuste et al., 1990); a network design problem (Friesz et al., 1992; 
Meng and Yang, 2002; Drezner and Wesolowsky, 2003); an assignment of aircrew to 
planned rotations (Lucic and Teodorovic, 1999); and determining berth times and 
positions of containerships (Kim and Moon, 2003).
The genetic algorithm is an analogous approach to the processes of natural selection 
and survival of the fittest in the evolution of species. Figure 4-1 shows a conceptual 
diagram for genetic representation in the algorithm. In this diagram, decision
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variables, which are denoted as substrings, consist of a series of genes that are 
normally encoded in binary digits as zero or one. The collection of the decision 
variables forms a string, which is a solution at this generation. A string is updated at 
every generation, imitating an evolutionary process in biology. Three typical 
operators are applied in this process, namely reproduction, cross-over and mutation.
□00000000000000000
6 substrings
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Figure 4-1 A genetic representation, source: Liu and Mahmassani (2000).
Step 0. Initialise a solution |x ° ,y ° |; set k=0.
Step 1. Evolutionary procedure.
Step 1.1. Reproduction.
Step 1.2. Cross-over.
Step 1.3. Mutation.
Step 2. I f  a solution satisfies the stopping criteria, then terminate the procedure; 
otherwise set k=k+l and go to ‘Step 1 ’.
An individual decision variable is evaluated in terms of its fitness to the objective 
function. The variables that satisfy the predetermined fitness criteria are copied to the 
next generation; this process is called reproduction. The reproduction step signifies 
that fitter variables have a higher probability of contributing to the generation of 
offspring. This procedure is analogous to the law of dominance in biology. The 
recessive variables are randomly mated to improve the fitness to the objective 
function; cross-over denotes this process. Finally, the step of the mutation generates 
random perturbations in the decision variables. This process may enable a solution to 
jump out from local optima towards the whole search space.
The genetic algorithm has recently been applied to several research areas: finding a 
global maximum likelihood estimate (Liu and Mahmassani, 2000); a study for parking
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guidance and information systems (Thompson et al., 2001); a network design problem 
(Lo et al., 2001; Bielli et al., 2002; Drezner and Wesolowsky, 2003; Abu-Lebdeh and 
Benekohal, 2003; Ceylan and Bell, 2004); optimising highway alignment (Jong and 
Schonfeld, 2003); a multi-item inventory problem (Chan et al., 2003); and a berth 
allocation considering service priority (Imai et al., 2003).
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r4.2.5. Discussion
Existing solution algorithms for bi-level models adopt heuristics. The algorithms 
solve the problems by alternating the upper and lower levels. In this section, the 
algorithms have been classified into the deterministic and stochastic types. The 
probabilistic algorithms suggest different answers every time the algorithms run, 
whilst the deterministic algorithms offer the same answer when the algorithms 
calculate solutions. The deterministic algorithms have been subdivided into the 
iterative and responsive algorithms in terms of their game theoretical context. While 
the iterative algorithms represent the mutual consistency between the levels, the 
responsive algorithms consider the first-mover advantage and the reaction of the 
followers. The characteristics of each type of algorithm are summarised in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 The characteristics of the existing algorithms
The deterministic algorithm 
Iterative types Responsive types
The stochastic algorithm
Equilibrium Nash Stackelberg N/A
Computation time Reasonable Reasonable Very demanding
Convergence Not always Not always Not always
Solution Local optima Local optima Potentially global
The deterministic algorithm possesses a number of attractive characteristics. Two 
principal components can be selected. First, the algorithm provides a reasonable 
framework to analyse the behaviour of decision-makers. The algorithm can represent 
not only the simultaneous competition but also the leader-follower structure. 
Secondly, the algorithm is relatively simple in form and convenient to represent. A 
successive alternating procedure is easily implemented, not demanding too much 
computational requirement. However, it was proved that the algorithm might not 
converge (Marcotte, 1981). Even though the algorithm converges, the solution found 
may not be unique. This is because bi-level programmes are inherently non-convex. 
Empirical studies, however, have reported that a local solution is likely to be a global 
answer when the objective function of the upper level is strongly convex with respect 
to both the decision variables of the upper and lower levels (Yang and Bell, 1998).
The stochastic algorithm would be attractive since the technique might offer a 
superior solution to the deterministic counterpart. This group, however, has similar
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problems to that of the deterministic type owing to the non-convex nature of bi-level 
programmes. The probabilistic algorithm requires even more computation time than 
the deterministic algorithm. This is because the stochastic type searches wide areas in 
the solution dominion than the deterministic algorithm. Furthermore, there is no 
guarantee of convergence of the algorithm. Moreover, it is difficult to interpret the 
behavioural context of decision-makers in this category.
To sum up, there is no efficient solution algorithm that guarantees producing a global 
optimum. The challenge to develop a global search algorithm for bi-level programmes 
is still open. In fact, the quest is beyond the scope of this study. In the next section, 
the solution algorithm for the bid-rent network equilibrium models will be considered 
within the framework of the existing solution-finding approaches.
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4.3. The solution algorithm
In the previous section, it was concluded that no existing types of algorithms 
suggested a global solution with computational efficiency. The difficulty was 
understood in the context of the non-convex nature of bi-level mathematical 
programmes. As noted at the end of the previous section, developing a new algorithm 
is beyond the scope of this study. In this section, a reasonable solution algorithm is 
proposed for the bid-rent network equilibrium model. This study decided to adopt the 
iterative algorithm as a solution-finding technique for the model. There are several 
reasons for the decision. First of all, the iterative algorithm can reasonably represent 
the behaviour of decision-makers in the relationship between transport and the 
location of activities. The behavioural context in terms of the best response of 
households from the framework of the Cournot game is consistent with the procedure 
of the iterative algorithm. Secondly, the simple form of the algorithm is attractive to 
implement. The procedure for the successive alternations between the levels is easily 
visualised. Finally, the iterative algorithm produces an acceptable solution in a 
reasonable computation time. In particular, the mutually consistent solution from the 
algorithm is compatible with the definition of the Nash equilibrium that the proposed 
model intends to find. The solution algorithm suggested is summarised as follows:
Step 0. Initialise a feasible solution and j f f f  J ; set k=0.
Step 1. Find the lower level solution j f j ^ k J with .
Step 2. Solve the upper level problem with {//**} •
Step 3. I f  the stopping criterion is met, then terminate the procedure; i f  not, set k= 
k+1 and go to ‘Step 1
The algorithm requires two sets of components for the initial solution. One set of the 
solution comprises the matrix of the initial flow of spatial interactions between 
locations and the incipient locational attractiveness. The initial transport impedance 
between zones represents the other component of the solution. Since the procedure of 
the solution algorithm proposed in this study is fundamentally heuristic, a good model 
outcome would be dependent on a good initial solution. This is because the heuristics 
would be trapped at the dominion of local optima. This would suggest that the initial
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solution would determine the performance of the solution algorithm for the bid-rent 
network equilibrium model. Hence, a choice of the initial solution would be important 
to obtain a good result of the model run. Further discussions on this issue and a 
practical selection for the initial solution are considered in Chapter Five, Case Studies.
At ‘Step 1’, the lower level represents the minimisation of the net interaction 
impedance, which has explicitly considered the two indicators for the level of service 
in the network meaning locational attractiveness and transport impedance. The lower 
level has described the decision of non-locators in the process of the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities. The resulting formulation, which has 
used a variational inequality, has represented the Nash equilibrium.
There are a number of algorithms in the literature for the numerical solution to ‘Step 
1’. Most algorithms adopt an iterative approach where the algorithms start from an 
initial feasible solution and then modify and improve the solution. One possible way 
to classify the techniques is by the level of aggregation for storing the solution at each 
iteration, namely link-based and path-based algorithms (Bar-Gera, 2002). The link- 
based or the aggregate algorithm stores the total link flows of all origin-destination 
pairs. This group is known to require relatively modest memory, but the convergence 
rate is slow because of so-called the zigzag problem. First proposed by LeBlanc and 
others (1975) using the Frank-Wolfe (1956) procedure, which had been originally 
suggested for solving non-linear optimisation programmes, there have been many 
variants (Evans, 1976; Fukushima, 1984; LeBlanc et al., 1985; Lupi, 1986). The 
simplicial decomposition routine (Lawphongpanich and Hearn, 1984; Hearn et al., 
1987; Larsson and Patriksson, 1992; Lee, 1995) may be understood to be its most 
general version. The path-based or the disaggregate algorithm stores the flow for each 
OD pair in its own set of routes. This group requires a large computer memory but is 
known to achieve better solutions. The main feature of this algorithm is the flow shift 
method from high cost routes to low cost routes until convergence is obtained 
(Dafermos and Sparrow, 1969; Schittenhelm, 1990; Jayakrishnan et al., 1994).
In principle, either type of algorithm can be used to represent ‘Step 1’. However, the 
path-based algorithm is adopted here for several reasons. First, the path-based 
algorithm more realistically represents the behavioural context of the transport
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decision of households than the link-based counterpart. A household is expected to 
compare possible net interaction costs. The costs are determined by the difference 
between the route cost and the locational attractiveness. Secondly, the path-based 
algorithm is a general approach. The link-based algorithm is equivalent to the path- 
based algorithm if and only if transport costs are assumed to be additive and link 
travel times consist of route costs only (Bliemer, 2001; Bliemer and Bovy, 2003). In 
contrast, the path-based algorithm can flexibly incorporate various cost components 
besides the link travel time. Finally, the path-based algorithm is easy to implement 
and achieves a better solution (Nagumey, 1984; Jayakrishnan et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, the algorithm provides direct convergence information during the 
execution of the algorithm; the cost and flow of paths at each iteration can be 
monitored as to whether they satisfy the convergence measure (Schittenhelm, 1990).
The path-based algorithm requires a route enumeration in priori. The advantage of the 
path enumeration is that no additional computation for finding paths is necessary 
during the execution of the algorithm. This is because alternative routes are computed 
in advance and stored together with the network. On the other hand, the paths listed 
could be too large to handle in terms of memory requirements and computation time 
(Bliemer, 2001). This problem, however, has become less problematic owing to a 
drastic improvement of computerising devices.
In fact, enumerating all acyclic routes would guarantee to identify all possible 
alternatives of decision-makers. The all path generation, however, is impractical for a 
large network because the number of routes grows rapidly with the size of a network. 
Furthermore, empirical surveys have reported that network users are likely to use only 
a few routes (Bliemer, 2001). In this context, a subset of all possible paths can be 
selected as a sufficient choice set for travellers. In this case, rules should be used to 
decide which routes are included and excluded. Several methods can be considered. 
The k shortest path algorithm (Shier, 1974) produces routes that require smaller 
transport costs. This technique, however, is likely to drop significant alternative paths 
because the number of k is arbitrarily determined. The multi-criteria approach (Ben- 
Akiva et al., 1984; Battista et al., 1995; Dial, 1996) incorporates a set of factors when 
the approach selects feasible routes. This approach requires a considerable field 
survey to identify network specific parameters as well as the behaviour of network
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users. In contrast, the network restriction approach (Dial, 1971) is attractive. The Dial 
algorithm heuristically eliminates unreasonable paths. In this technique, a reasonable 
path is defined as a set of links that lead away from the origin and toward the 
destination. Two principal advantages of the restriction approach would be noted as 
follows: first, this technique requires no additional information to specify reasonable 
paths; secondly, the heuristics are consistent with the behaviour of network users in 
the sense that a reasonable user is unlikely to take the more expensive link. Some 
studies have incorporated a penalty factor into the Dial algorithm to reduce the use of 
overlapping paths (Cascetta et al., 1996; Russo and Vitetta, 2003). This approach, 
however, requires an additional procedure to estimate the penalty factor.
Since the solution algorithm for this study has incorporated the route-based routine, a 
rule for the path enumeration should be decided. This study assumes that all 
reasonable paths form the alternative routes of network users. This is represented by 
means of combining the Dial algorithm (1971) and an all path enumeration technique. 
The process has two stages: first, the Dial algorithm reduces a network eliminating 
unreasonable links; then, the technique of an all path generation searches all feasible 
paths in the restricted network by a topological order. The procedure is summarised as 
follows: let o(r) be the travel time from an origin node to a node r along a minimum
travel time path and d (s)  be the travel time from a node s to a destination node 
along a minimum path; then, the two-stage procedure is given by
Step 1. Compute a minimum travel time from an origin node to all other nodes.
Step 2. Compute a minimum travel time from each node to a destination node.
Step 2. For each link (r,s) compute the link likelihood L (r ,s) , where
l = if 0 (r ) < 0(j)  and d {r)> d (s )  (4 6)
[ 0 otherwise
Step 4. Reduce a network eliminating links whose link likelihood is zero.
Step 5. Enumerate all possible paths using the reduced network.
Even though the number of alternative paths is considerably reduced in the restricted 
network, the enumerated routes would be too many to handle. In particular, handling
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all enumerated alternatives would be intractable in a large-sized network with which 
land-use transport studies normally deal. This is because the number of reasonable 
paths grows exponentially with the size of the network. Furthermore, the number of 
paths used at equilibrium is quite small relative to the total number of alternatives. To 
tackle this problem, the column generation algorithm (Leventhal et al., 1973) is 
incorporated. The algorithm does not carry all enumerated paths during the sequence 
of calculations. The technique generates and drops routes whenever necessary. The 
procedure of the column generation algorithm can be described as follows:
Step 0. Start with any subset o f paths ; set k=0.
Step 1. Generate a column if  a minimum cost path found outside the subset o f used 
paths at iteration k ; P”* = P”*~' u  { p £  }.
Step 2. Drop a column i f  a path carries no flows at iteration k ; P™* = P^ik~' -  1 p 'fk 1 
Step 3. I f  convergence is obtained, then stop; otherwise go to ‘Step 1
In summary, this section has discussed some components that compose the procedure 
of the solution algorithm for the lower level of the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model. The Dial algorithm (1971) is used to reduce a network. The all path generation 
technique identifies the alternative routes of network users within the restricted 
network. The path-based algorithm is used to find a network equilibrium. In this 
process, the column generation technique (Leventhal et al., 1973) helps to execute an 
efficient calculation. This procedure can be summarised as follows:
Step 1. [The lower level] Find the lower level solution j f rps'k J with {qrs,k ,(pr,k J .
Step 1.0. Enumerate all reasonable paths between an OD pair {r,s}.
Step 1.1. For each OD pair {r,s}, perform an all-or-nothing assignment 
which yields initial path flows { / / ’°} and costs {c",0J .
Step 1.2. For each OD pair, repeat the following steps:
Step 1.2.1. Update the memory route set, i.e. drop paths that carry no 
flows PqS ; generate columns i f  a minimum cost path p™^  is 
found outside the memory route set.
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Step 1.2.2. Find a minimum cost path p " n and a maximum cost 
path p™^  in the memory route set.
Step 1.2.3. Transfer flows from a maximum cost path to a minimum 
cost path in order to equilibrate between /?”in and p™^.
Step 1.3. Convergence Test. I f  convergence is obtained, then terminate the 
procedure; i f  not, go to ‘Step 1.2’.
The proposed algorithm is not feasible to solve the multiclass bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. As discussed in Chapter Three, the multiclass model considers the 
asymmetric interactions between user classes. Solution algorithms in the literature for 
this issue usually replace the original asymmetric structure with the augmented 
symmetric problem iteratively. Two typical approaches can be considered, namely the 
projection method and the relaxation (diagonalisation) technique. In general, the 
projection approach solves a sequence of linear symmetric problems at iteration 
(Dafermos, 1980; Nagumey, 2000; Nagumey and Dong, 2002a; Nagumey and Dong, 
2002b). The relaxation algorithm solves a sequence of non-linear symmetric problems 
(Dafermos, 1982b; Mahmassani and Mouskos, 1988). Intuitively, the relaxation 
algorithm is likely to produce a better solution than the projection routine. This is 
because the relaxation algorithm calculates the exact solution at iteration whilst the 
projection technique calculates an approximate solution. Comparative studies have 
confirmed this expectation: the relaxation algorithm outperformed the projection 
method in terms of convergence (Fisk and Nguyen, 1982); both algorithms produced 
the same output using a linear travel cost function, but the relaxation algorithm 
showed a significant better performance when highly non-linear cost functions were 
used (Nagumey, 1984). For this reason, the relaxation technique was used as a 
solution-finding method for the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model.
The relaxation algorithm requires one more outer loop that describes a class-specific 
behaviour. This is addressed by solving the following variational inequality:
where f m is the vector of the fixed path flow of household classes except a class m .
(4.7)
m  r s  p
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Convergence of the relaxation algorithm was proved under the condition that the 
Jacobian of the link-travel-time function is positive definite (Dafermos, 1982b). If the 
algorithm converges, the solution found would be the equilibrium flow pattern 
(Sheffi, 1985, p. 217). Convergence of the relaxation algorithm may be achieved even 
though the sufficient condition of Dafermos is violated (Heydecker, 1983; 
Mahmassani and Mouskos, 1988). However, the strong assumptions for the condition 
of convergence would suggest that the problems would have multiple local optima.
At ‘Step 2’, the model describes the locational decision of households in the 
competition for residence. The hedonic-based random bid-rent function has been 
suggested for representing the behaviour of locators. The function has been discussed 
to successfully suggest the relationship between the decision-making process of 
households and the unique characteristics of locations. The resulting formulation has 
been understood as an equivalent to the oligopolistic Cournot game for locations.
The parameters in the bid-rent function can be estimated by the maximum likelihood 
procedure. A conventional assumption is that the system component of the utility 
function V£m (•) is linear in unknown parameters p , namely V™em (•) = $TV™em (•).
The log likelihood function is given by as follows:
LL= Y 1 >: {Prr ;:„ Q }-in £ ex p {p rr;:,„,(.)} (4.8)
where r is a distinct observation unit of a residential location and
S ' is an indicator variable; the value is either one or zero.iw  "
Provided the data w^ejw}, Vw c M  are not multicollinear, they will satisfy a full-
rank condition. The condition guarantees that the Hessian is negative
definite. Then, the log likelihood function is strictly concave and the parameter vector 
that satisfies dLL/dp = 0 is a unique solution (McFadden, 1973).
Many iterative methods exist that begin with a starting value {p°J and find a point 
that is close to the maximum. Here, the standard Newton-Raphson method is adopted.
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The technique is a gradient method that uses a linear approximation of the Taylor 
series. The procedure of ‘Step T  is summarised as follows:
Step 2. [The upper level] Solve the upper level problem with j f f j f  J.
Step 2.0. Estimate the parameter {p} with the maximum likelihood procedure. 
Step 2.0.1. Choose an initial value o f the parameters |p °  j .
Step 2.0.2. Solve the following linear function
P ‘+1 =  P* -  [ v 2i i  ( p ‘ ) ] " ' VLL (p * ) (4.9)
Step 2.0.3. I f  convergence is attained, then terminate the step; i f  not, 
goto ‘Step 2.0.1’.
Step 2.1. Update the demand matrix.
Step 2.1.1. For each OD pair {r,s}, update the class-specific spatial 
interaction flow o f household members o f locators using
C *+1 = & >  p r rsM1 ( m Iz ) (4-10)
where Dsm = E E  h™, Vm,s and Prs (•) is the probability o f
h r
the spatial interaction between an OD pair {r,s}.
Step 2.1.2. For each location r,m, update the locational attractiveness 
using a logsum formula, (prmk+x = In £  exp[ p 7’,*+1F ^ m- (•)] •
m*
Step 2.1.3. Set the demand matrix where qr* = qrf  +qrf .
At ‘Step 3’, the stopping criterion is checked. Some rules for the termination can be 
considered. A preferable criterion would be a measure that can represent behavioural 
or economic meanings of the bid-rent network equilibrium model rather than mere 
mathematical constructs. In this study, the relative difference between two 
consecutive values of the maximum bid-rent from iterations is adopted as the 
criterion. This is because the model focuses on the spatial changes by the bid-auction 
process of households. The bidding is expected to change the maximum rent for each 
location. The maximum rent is interpreted as a measure for locational attraction. The
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ichanges in the attractiveness invoke the behavioural variance of households, which 
eventually changes the urban structure in terms of spatial demands and zonal density.
- = — !: ---------------------------- ;  < K  (4.11)
<Pm
m r
where k  is a predetermined constant for the termination of the algorithm.
In summary, this section has suggested the solution algorithm for the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. The path-based routine finds the equilibrium solution of the lower 
level. In the upper level, the Newton-Raphson procedure is used to estimate the 
parameters of the hedonic-based stochastic bid-rent function. The two procedures are 
incorporated in the heuristic process, which solves the proposed bi-level model. This 
algorithm is expected to produce a mutually consistent solution that is compatible 
with the Nash equilibrium which the developed model wants to find.
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4.4. Numerical examples
The following simple numerical examples illustrate the operation of the bid-rent 
network equilibrium model. This is considered in terms of a selfish game of 
households for residing at locations. The competition represents the nature of the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities. Three principal data are 
required for the simulation. The data are the representation of transport network, the 
matrix of locational values, and the spatial interactions of trip-makers.
Link 1
Link 3 Link 5
Link 6Link 4
Link 2
Figure 4-2 A network for the numerical examples (Bell and Iida, 1997)
Table 4-2 Link capacity (unit: veh/min)
Link Capacity Link Capacity
1 30.0 4 20.0
2 30.0 5 20.0
3 20.0 6 20.0
Table 4-3 Path specification
Path A set of links Path A set of links
p(D (I) P(5) (2,6)
P(2) (3,2,6) P(6) (4,1)
p(3) (15) P(7) (2)
P(4) (3,2) P(8) (4,1,5)
Figure 4-2 shows the example network (Bell and Iida, 1997, p. 153). The network 
consists of four nodes and six links. Specific information of link capacity is 
summarised in Table 4-2. The network has eight distinct acyclic paths whose 
references are shown in Table 4-3, and four origin-destination pairs. The link cost 
functions, which are shown in Table 4-4, are defined as having the form of US BPR 
(1964) type. The base model has a single value of travel time across household 
classes, i.e. w = 1.12. The multiclass model I associates with class specific parameters
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to the cost functions, namely wm' =1.12 and w”2 =2.03 (Lam and Huang, 1992b). 
The cost functions for the bi-dimensional multiclass model are specified in terms of 
decision-makers’ modes of travel (Kim, 1997), where t and c denote transits and cars 
respectively. This model also associates with the same value of travel time as the 
multiclass model I, namely w '=1.12 and wc = 2.03. These weighting factors are 
required for the compatible representation between the upper and the lower levels, as 
discussed in Chapter Three. This is because the two decision variables, which are 
transport impedance and locational attractiveness, are specified in a different unit.
Table 4-4 Link cost functions
Model
The bid-rent network equilibrium model
The single dimensional multiclass bid-rent 
network equilibrium model (Multiclass I)*
The bi-dimensional multiclass bid-rent network 
equilibrium model (Multiclass II)**
Cost function
L =80
r  = -80
f ( \ 4 \
1 + 0.15 Va
r
V \  a J
f ( \  tf 4 \
1 + 0.15 Va
V I c J y
tc = 80
/I =75
1 + 0.15 V + 1 .5 v '
1 + 0.29 v!+1.5v '
.3.33 \
*Lam and Huang (1992b)
**Kim (1997)
The initial locational attractiveness is assumed to be [20.0,40.0]r . The value is
represented as unit prices. The initial spatial distribution, which is shown in Table 4-5, 
consists of two classes of households, namely m1 and m2. Both groups are assumed 
to be almost evenly distributed and 20% of them are supposed to consider moving 
residence. ml is defined as a lower income group in the base and single dimensional
models. On the other hand, m2 is defined as a group of households that are higher-
income travellers. In these models, the level of income is assumed to be a sufficient 
factor that can distinctly classify decision-makers and all trip-makers are supposed to 
use cars for travels. In the multiclass II model, mx is identified as a lower-income and
transit-using group, and m2 is specified as a higher-income and car-using group.
148
Table 4-5 OD demand
OD pair Demand OD pair Demand
mi m2 mi m2
A-C 25 25 B-C 24 26
A-D 26 24 B-D 25 25
The original data in the Bell and Iida example are designed for analyses of travel 
demands. Thus, trips are considered to be demands for the locations of activities given 
the residences that are referred to as origins. It was decided to convert the data of 
travel demands into those of spatial interactions appropriate to the purpose of this 
study. Thus, this study interprets the OD data conversely to the existing setting. In 
other words, the OD data are interpreted as households’ choice of residential locations 
given the primary activity locations, which are virtually regarded as origins. The Bell 
and Iida example has the aggregate OD data that is required at the lower level, but 
there are no disaggregate data representing locators. The locating data are used at the 
upper level to represent the changes in urban structure, which is the primary purpose 
that the proposed model tries to address. In this numerical example, the data for 
locating households are generated by the inverse transform method (Law and Kelton, 
1991, pp. 462-521). This method requires a predetermined distribution function that is 
appropriate for generating variables. In this simulation, the Gumbel distribution is 
considered for the hedonic-based random bid-rent model. For description detailed for 
the inverse transform method, see Appendix II.
The procedure for the solution algorithm was coded in Visual Basic 6.0 on a Dell 
Optiplex GX240 personal computer using Intel® Pentium® IV CPU 1.80GHz. The 
algorithm adopts the stopping criterion as the changes in the absolute value of the 
maximum bid-rents across locations at two successive iterations. Specifically, the 
algorithm stops when the relative difference between two successive maximum bid- 
rents is less than 10'5. In the lower level, the calculation terminates when the gap 
value in terms of mean excess costs per a trip-maker is less than 10*5. In the upper 
level loop, the convergence measure is that the proportional changes in the functional 
value of log-likelihood is less than 10'5.
Tables 4-6, 4-7, and 4-8 show the results of model runs. The term ‘before’ means the 
initial settings in terms of the spatial distribution of households and the level of
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service in the network. The term ‘after’ represents the changes in the urban structure 
with respect to the household allocations and the network performance indicators. 
These outputs are understood in this study to result from the selfish locational 
competition of decision-makers. However, it should not be interpreted as an 
equilibrium urban structure. To address the equilibrium, an economic relocation 
model is required; this issue is beyond the scope of the study.
Figure 4-3 shows the convergence of the algorithm. The base model required eight, 
the multiclass model I eleven, and the second multiclass model ten iterations 
respectively for obtaining the convergence. The bid-rent network equilibrium model 
showed a slight oscillation while all the models smoothly converged.
Multiclass I MulticlassB ase
n 25
20  -
-5 -1
Iteration
Figure 4-3 Convergence o f  the algorithm
Table 4-6 shows the results of the bid-rent network equilibrium model and the 
resulting network performance indicators of transport impedance and locational 
attractiveness. The changes in the indices show that location C is more attractive than 
location D. Location C is cheaper in the cost and higher in the attraction than location 
D. The changes in the indices have caused that households have bid more rent for 
location C than location D. This has created more people have converged at location 
C. One of the interesting results is that the lower income group is more sensitive than 
the higher income group in locating residence. A relatively large number of mx
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changes residence, but m2 do not. This is because the perceived locational 
attractiveness and interaction costs of m2 are lower than those of ml .
The results of the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model I are summarised in 
Table 4-7, and the second multiclass model is in Table 4-8. In both cases, ml moved
to the location D and m2 converged to the location C. These outcomes could be
explained as follows: even though there have been some changes in the net interaction 
impedance, the relative difference of the value between locations is not very great; on 
the other hand, the locational attractiveness has been considerably changed; these two 
asymmetric trends has driven the lower income group ml converged in cheaper
location D, and the higher income group m2 converged in expensive location C.
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Table 4-6 Results of the bid-rent network equilibrium model
OD pair Spatial distribution Impedance Attractiveness
before
mt m2
after
mi m2
before after before after
A-C 25 25 30.0 26.2 166.9 144.2 20.0 26.6
A-D 26 24 21.0 22.8 177.1 157.1 40.0 12.5
B-C 24 26 26.3 26.4 177.1 142.4 20.0 26.8
B-D 25 25 22.7 24.6 166.9 158.9 40.0 12.5
Table 4-7 Results of the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model I
OD pair Spatial distribution Impedance Attractiveness
before after before after before after
mi m2 mi m2 mi m2 mi m2
A-C 25 25 22.9 27.5 166.9 302.5 164.2 316.3 20.0 19.5
A-D 26 24 28.1 21.5 177.1 320.9 180.5 341.7 40.0 15.7
B-C 24 26 24.0 26.5 177.1 320.9 176.3 337.5 20.0 19.5
B-D 25 25 25.0 24.5 166.9 302.5 168.9 320.5 40.0 15.7
Table 4-8 Results of the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model II
OD pair Spatial distribution Impedance Attractiveness
before after before after before after
mi m2 mi m2 mi m2 mi m2
A-C 25 25 23.4 27.5 163.3 306.5 164.6 337.7 20.0 19.2
A-D 26 24 27.6 21.5 166.1 309.1 171.7 344.5 40.0 15.8
B-C 24 26 23.5 26.6 166.1 309.1 167.7 340.5 20.0 19.2
B-D 25 25 25.5 24.4 163.3 306.5 168.5 341.7 40.0 15.8
152
4.5. Conclusion
This chapter has proposed the iterative algorithm for the solution-finding technique of 
the bid-rent network equilibrium model. The heuristic algorithm combined the path- 
based routine for calculating the equilibrium solution to the lower level with the 
Newton-Raphson procedure for estimating the parameters of the hedonic-based 
random bid-rent function in the upper level. The solution algorithm was successfully 
implemented in the numerical examples, which were designed to illustrate the 
operation of the bid-rent network equilibrium model.
The solution algorithm has some attractive advantages. Fist of all, the algorithm 
reasonably represents the behaviour of decision-makers in the game for occupying 
locations. The successive alternations between the levels, exchanging a solution of 
each level, are analogous to the best responsive competition of households for 
locations. Furthermore, the resulting mutually consistent solution of the algorithm is 
compatible with the definition of the Nash equilibrium, which has been suggested for 
representing the behaviour of households. Secondly, the solution algorithm is simple 
in form and relatively easy to implement. These characteristics enable the solution 
algorithm to be visualised. Furthermore, the flexible structure of the algorithm allows 
incorporation of appropriate subroutines for the levels. Finally, the algorithm requires 
reasonable computation resources. In other words, the heuristic method produces an 
acceptable solution in a reasonable calculation time. The solution found, however, 
would be local optima because of the non-convexity of the bi-level structure.
The quest to find the global optimum in bi-level programmes is a continuous 
challenge. The inherent non-convexity of the programmes requires considerable 
computation time. The solution, which could be one of the local optima, is the even 
worse disadvantage of bi-level programmes. As discussed in the section on the review 
of existing solution algorithms, no existing algorithm suggests the global optimum in 
a reasonable computation time. Developing an efficient solution algorithm that 
guarantees the global optimum is still an open challenge in transport studies.
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5. Case Studies
5.1. Introduction
This chapter deals with an application of the bid-rent network equilibrium model to a 
real network. The chapter describes the process of simulations for the application and 
discusses the results of the model runs from the application. The objective of the case 
study is to demonstrate the ability of the bid-rent network equilibrium model to 
represent the relationship between transport and the location of activities, and to 
explore policy implications of the model involving various transport issues.
The city of Ansan in Korea was chosen as a study area. There were several reasons for 
the selection. More than anything else, the size of the city was attractive. Ansan is a 
medium-sized city that is not very difficult to represent but would show interesting 
aspects with respect to interactions between land-use and transport. Another important 
reason was data availability. One of the major considerations in the use of models was 
operational. This meant that applications of models should be designed to consider the 
data available. The city government of Ansan conducted a transport master plan with 
a comprehensive survey in 1998. Hence, the base year of the simulation was set at the 
same year as used in the master plan. The simulation in this study tried to maximise 
the use of the data surveyed and to test the bid-rent network equilibrium model as far 
as the data were available. Nevertheless, the travel mode based multiclass bid-rent 
network equilibrium model could not be tested because of the lack of essential data. 
Thus, the case study could not represent changes in the behaviour of households and 
variations in urban structure generated by a multimodal transport system.
In the next section, a brief introduction to the city of Ansan is presented. The 
introduction is followed by a description of the data that were used in the application. 
In the subsequent section, a design for the simulation is considered. This study 
adopted the same strategy for testing the bid-rent network equilibrium model as used 
in the study of ISGLUTI (Webster et al., 1988) and the research of MASTER 
(Mackett, 1992; 1993a). Hence, the model was applied in the base and the policy runs. 
The results of the simulation of the model are presented in the next three sections. The 
outcomes of each run are obtained in terms of the spatial distribution of households,
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which are discussed against the class-specific behaviour of the decision-makers. The 
behaviour is demonstrated using the network performance indicators of transportation 
costs and locational benefits. Then, comparisons between the results o f the runs are 
considered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
M l 00
Ansan
Railway
Figure 5-1 The study area-the city of Ansan
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5.2. The study area
The city of Ansan is located in the mid west of the Korean peninsular. The 
southwestern side of the city is bounded by the Yellow Sea. The eastern side of the 
city borders upon the Seoul metropolitan area. Ansan is about 20 miles away from 
Seoul. Motorway 15, which is the main west coastal corridor of Korea, connects 
Ansan and Seoul. Motorway 100, which is the Greater Seoul Outer Ring Road, passes 
through north Ansan. An electric railway is running between the two cities. The north 
of Ansan is on the border of the Incheon metropolitan area, which is Korea’s fourth 
largest city. The two cities are around 23.6 miles apart. Motorway 50 connects Ansan 
to the cities of Singal, Siheung, and Incheon; for a geographical layout of the transport 
network, see Figure 5-1. These convenient transport networks of the North-South 
corridor and its East-West counterpart have made Ansan a regional industrial centre.
Ansan was the first planned city in Korea during the 1970s. The city was designed to 
be self-sufficient in terms of economic and service activities. In accordance with the 
Banwol Construction Plan, which was Korea’s industrial complex creation plan, and 
the Population Dispersion Policy from Seoul, the Korean government developed the 
west coast industrial belt from Ansan to Asan, which made a conurbation along the 
west coast. Owing to a series of plans together with an efficient transport 
infrastructure, Ansan is a centre of production and a hub of distributive trades.
Table 5-1 Some indices of Ansan
1986 1998
Area (km2) 74.26 144.77
Population (1,000) 127 552
Number of households 31,162 193,736
Car ownership 4,429 135,750
Source: Ansan transport master plan (1998)
Since the establishment of the city of Ansan in 1986, the city has experienced rapid 
economic growth accompanied with the population increase. As shown in Table 5-1, 
the area has almost doubled. More than four times of the population growth has been 
recorded while there has been more than a six-fold increase in the number of 
households. The difference means that more nuclear families reside in Ansan, which 
can also be observed in many other cities in Korea. Car ownership shows more than a
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30-fold increase. However, the city was stable in terms of population and economic 
growth in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the rate of growth slowed down and there 
have been no significant changes since 1995.
Table 5-2 Land-uses in Ansan (1998)
km" %
Residential areas 20.67 14.28
Retail areas 2.75 1.90
Manufacturing areas 14.30 9.88
Open space 107.06 73.95
Total 144.77 100.00
Source: Ansan transport master plan (1998)
Table 5-2 shows land-uses in Ansan. While open space occupied more than 70 
percent of the Ansan area, each land-use shows some geographical trends. Residential 
areas are mostly spread around the periphery of the city centre. Retail activities 
exhibit centralisation. The activities accumulate in the oldest area, which is currently a 
part of the city centre. In the case of manufacturing, two principal factory districts can 
be found. The areas are on the border of the Yellow Sea.
To sum up, in common with most other cities around the capital city of Seoul, Ansan 
has experienced rapid growth, but the process has been taking place in an organised 
fashion. The government policy for Ansan to be self-sufficient has made the city have 
relatively less interaction with Seoul and Incheon compared with other satellite cities 
in the Seoul metropolitan area. This has established Ansan as a regional centre with a 
high proportion of self-employment in the production and distributive trades.
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5.3. Data for the application
5.3.1. Introduction
This section presents a set of data used in the simulation for the application of the bid- 
rent network equilibrium model. The simulation tried to maximise the use of the data 
surveyed from the Ansan transport master plan (1998). Some additional data were 
collected. This section begins by describing the spatial system for the case study. The 
zoning system consists of 22 internal zones and 7 external zones. The model requires 
disaggregate data for the upper level and aggregate data for the lower level 
respectively. Transport supplies include network for the physical transport 
infrastructure and cost functions for representing transport impedance in spatial 
interactions. Initial network performance indices are given for the application.
5.3.2. The spatial system
A definition of the spatial system is one of the core tasks in the application of this 
kind of model. Since the model in this study assumes that households compete for 
locations, it may be ideal to assign a detailed spatial reference to each individual. 
However, it is unrealistic to set a household too great locational detail. The aim of the 
application is not so much identifying an exact spatial location for an individual but 
suggesting a geographic system that allows households to perceive spatial variations 
between alternative locations. Therefore, it is useful to define the spatial system for 
households to distinguish the zones. In principle, the spatial units should reflect the 
areas that are regarded as homogeneous by households. However, this task is very 
complex and in fact beyond the scope of this study. In practice, it was decided to 
adopt the same zoning system as was used in the Ansan transport master plan (1998).
The spatial system adopted is shown in Figure 5-1. The system consists of 22 internal 
zones and 7 external zones; two external zones are not represented in the diagram. It 
is obvious that several zones are smaller than the others. It can be also seen that the 
two zones that border on the Yellow Sea are rather larger than desirable. Thus, some 
modifications to the zoning system for identifying desirable geographic sizes would 
be necessary. However, the modification requires considerable effort to change the 
zoning system in the simulation design. This is mainly because the spatial opportunity
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would have to be redefined. Most data available are in a format that satisfies the 
zoning system given. The adjustment does not necessarily led to better outcomes.
It is important to note that there would be some households that live inside the system 
but their primary activity locations are located outside the system or vice verse. Even 
though they contribute to the determination of transport impedance and locational 
attractiveness in the system, the OD table does not capture the volumes. Thus, the 
simulation may offer underestimated transport costs and locational benefits. In 
particular, the underestimation causes some significant problems when congestion is 
considered. However, this unsatisfactory aspect does not matter very much in this 
study because the unrepresented volumes are mainly related to the external zones.
5.3.3. Data of spatial interactions
In the simulation of the model, two kinds of spatial interaction data are needed. First, 
the upper level requires disaggregate data to represent the locational behaviour of an 
individual household. The disaggregate data are used to calculate the probability for 
the distribution of households across the area and to determine the vector of locational 
attractiveness. The other one is an aggregate OD matrix that is necessary in the lower 
level. The matrix is used to evaluate travel time for spatial interactions. The transport 
cost found in the lower level, together with the locational attraction determined in the 
upper level, is used to define the net interaction impedance.
It was not feasible to obtain the spatial interaction data of households that were 
exactly appropriate for the purpose of the model. Specifically, there were no data 
available about the preference of households on the locational characteristics, the 
practical residence choice of households, and factors that represent the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities. Thus, it was decided to convert data 
of travel demands into those of spatial interactions. For example, data on trips to 
workplace were interpreted as the residential location choice of households given 
workplace locations; it is noted that trips in the travel demand data are considered to 
be demand for activity locations given residences that are referred to as origins.
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As for the disaggregate data, data from each household’s travel diary were used. The 
survey was conducted for the Ansan transport master plan (1998). In the survey, a 
total of 4,000 households were selected by means of random stratified sampling. The 
number of samples was equivalent to two percent of the total number of households in 
the city. The effective sample size given in the master plan was 2,825. In this study, 
1,536 samples were used after the cleaning process. Most of the samples excluded had 
missing items that were necessary for the simulation.
Table 5-3 Monthly income by deciles (unit: W/Month)
Class % Blue Collar White Collar Overall
Class 1 -10 562,741 872,355 717,548
-20 1,005,431 1,342,287 1,173,859
-30 1,255,177 1,608,671 1,431,924
Class 2 -40 1,481,475 1,857,209 1,669,342
-50 1,703,445 2,128,427 1,915,936
-60 1,951,006 2,412,185 2,181,596
-70 2,252,089 2,732,076 2,492,083
Class 3 -80 2,628,348 3,117,683 2,873,016
-90 3,193,028 3,694,052 3,443,540
-100 5,294,871 6,103,192 5,699,032
Average 2,133,115 2,587,904 2,360,510
Source: Korea National Statistical Office (1998)
Table 5-4 Number of samples specific to the user classes
Class Income (104W/Month) Number of samples
Class 1 -50 36
50-100 279
100-150 414
Class 2 150-200 630
200-250 108
Class 3 250-300 30
300-350 39
Total 1,536
The disaggregate data were divided into three household classes. The criterion used 
was the level of income, as discussed in the development of the model. It was decided 
to adopt the same threshold values as suggested by the Korea National Statistical 
Office for the classification; the reference tables can be found in Table 5-3 and Table 
5-4; Table 5-3 shows the monthly income by deciles in Korea and Table 5-4 
represents the equivalent number of samples in Ansan. The number of samples for the 
third class is rather smaller than that of the others. Other classification rules might be
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incorporated to make the number of samples even across classes. However, the 
incorporation would make the classified groups inhomogeneous.
Table 5-5 Ratios of trips with respect to purpose
Home-based trips (%) Non-home-based trips (%)
School Workplace Return home Business Other
11.97 21.19 46.82 6.53 13.49
Source: Ansan transport master plan (1998)
To make the aggregate OD table, home-based trips were summed. This was because 
the home-based trips could be interpreted as primary spatial interactions in relation to 
residential locations. However, the matrix made had one crucial unsatisfactory aspect. 
Namely, non-home-based trips were not considered in the evaluation of travel time 
even though the trips obviously contributed to the determination of transport costs. In 
particular, these demands should be considered when the effect of congestion is 
involved. It was not feasible to explicitly address the non-home-based trips. As an 
alternative, it was assumed that the non-home-based trips were loaded on the 
background network that was not explicitly represented in the transport network for 
the simulation. These demands may be termed as background traffic.
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Figure 5-2 Ansan transport network
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5.3.4. Transport supply
Transport supply in the application is represented by a network and link performance 
functions. The network describes physical transport infrastructure and the functions 
address travel impedance for spatial interactions. The supply of transport, together 
with transport demands, determines travel time in the network, which is one 
component that defines the net interaction impedance for spatial interactions; the other 
component is locational attractiveness that is determined in the upper level.
Table 5-6 Roads in Ansan (unit: m)
Length (%) Number of lanes
2 4 6 8
Nat’al express 
National high 
Provincial 
City-county 
Total
14,389.0(2.0) 
40,194.0 (5.7) 
16,000.0 (2.3) 
637,993.6 (90.0) 
708,576.6(100.0)
16,000.0
409.429.8
425.429.8
6,578.0
144.591.7 62,548.8
144.591.7 69,126.8
14.389.0
33.616.0
21.423.3
69.428.3
Source: an internal document, the division of Construction and Transport of Ansan (1998)
Table 5-7 Link specifications
Link Node
From To
Free flow travel time (min) Capacity (veh-min)
1
2
1 2 
1 5
1.280
1.840
25.000
25.000
The network is considered for the car mode. Specifications of roads in Ansan are 
shown in Table 5-6. It is obvious that city-county roads are more dominant than any 
other type of road. The city-county roads occupy around 90 percent of roads in the 
study area. It can be also seen that the national expressway and the national highway 
are mainly used as trunk roads in the city of Ansan. This can be inferred by the fact 
that the two types of roads accommodate more than six lanes.
Figure 5-2 shows the Ansan transport network for the case study. This is a modified 
version of the network that was used in the Ansan transport master plan (1998), 
improving some components. The proposed network represents the internal zones, 
which consist of 484 OD pairs. The connection between the internal and external 
areas is simpler. It was assumed that the connection was represented with one single 
link that had infinite capacity. Each link in the network has a bundle of characteristics
163
in terms of link number, incoming node, outgoing node, free flow travel time, and 
capacity. The typical specification for link information is shown in Table 5-7.
It is worth stressing that not every road is represented in the network. It is almost 
impossible to represent the entire minor background network even though the 
background network carries some volumes of travel. This may generate 
underestimated travel time. As discussed in 5.3.3, this study assumed that the 
unrepresented network carried the entire background traffic; the background traffic 
was defined in the previous section as the aggregate sum of non-home based journeys 
that were not explicitly represented in the OD matrix.
In addition to the physical details, each link has a link performance function. The 
level-of-service function includes factors that influence travellers in making transport 
decisions and determines the travel time for spatial interactions. In fact, there are 
many cost functions to calculate transport impedance, but it was decided to adopt the 
standard US BPR function (1964). The BPR function has been successfully used in 
many applications. This is mainly because the function has a simple form but 
reasonably represents the theory of traffic flow. The dual advantages mean the 
efficiency of computation and the representation of traffic flow respectively. Since the 
link performance function should be evaluated numerous times during an 
equilibration process, a complicated form may impose a significant computational 
burden. Furthermore, a complicated form does not necessarily produce better 
outcomes. The US BPR function is given by
t =t°„
f ( \  ti 4>
1 + 0.15 a
V c j y
(5.1)
where ta is the travel time on a link a ;
t°a is the free flow travel time on a link a ;
va is the traffic flow on a link a ; and
Ca is the capacity of a link a .
The multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model tries to describe class-specific 
behaviour in making transport decisions. This requires a class-specific cost function.
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The function is represented by means of incorporating parameters that identify a 
class-specific value of travel time (van Vliet et al., 1986).
f ( \ 4 \
1 + 0.15 Va
V I c J
where wm is a weighting factor that is associated with an equivalent travel time unit 
for a value of travel time of a household class m .
In calibrating the weighting parameters, it was decided to adopt a simplified method 
suggested by the Korea Development Institute (1999). The Institute, in the report of 
an extensive survey, notes that value of travel time can be approximated with an 
equivalent 130 percent income level per hour, even though many factors should be 
considered for an exact evaluation of the value. Following this simplified formula, the 
values were calibrated by dividing 130 percent average monthly income by average 
monthly working hours. For the single class model, the overall monthly income was 
used to calibrate the parameter. The detailed references are shown in Table 5-8.
Table 5-8 Value of travel time for user classes (unit: W/hr)
Monthly income1 (W) Monthly working hours Value of travel time
Class 1 1,009,300 218.5 6004.746
Class 2 1,823,200 218.5 10847.240
Class 3 3,032,600 218.5 18042.981
Overall
1 A _________
2,360,510 218.5 14044.224
1 Ansan transport master plan (1998)
2 Korea Ministry of Labour (1999)
5.3.5. Initial network performance indices
The bid-rent network equilibrium model requires two sets of initial network 
performance indices for the simulation; they are initial locational attractiveness and 
initial transport impedance. Since the solution-finding mechanism for the model is 
fundamentally heuristic, a good model outcome may depend on a good initial solution. 
Thus, the initial values of transport costs and locational benefits would be essential.
Locational attractiveness represents activity opportunities available in a specific 
location. In this study, the posted price o f standard land was used as an initial 
locational attraction. The Korea Ministry of Construction and Transportation publicly
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announces a standard index for the value of each land lot every year. The evaluation is 
undertaken by the Korea Association of Property Appraisers. The process is as 
follows: first, land lots are classified in terms of land-use patterns; and then about 
1.5% of the sample that is believed to represent the whole land value is selected; 
finally, the price with respect to the unit area Wfm2 is evaluated
Table 5-9 The posted price of standard land (1998)
zone No. of sample Average S. Deviation Min Max
1 70 341.2 113.1 225.0 710.0
2 63 354.0 123.9 235.0 850.0
3 35 376.9 128.2 240.0 700.0
4 60 305.8 193.5 14.0 850.0
5 28 424.8 174.9 220.0 900.0
6 30 509.8 357.6 140.0 1,650.0
7 88 247.4 158.6 9.0 880.0
8 60 343.8 171.7 9.5 1,000.0
9 76 296.3 160.2 10.0 740.0
10 26 382.4 230.2 34.0 900.0
11 18 812.8 498.2 210.0 1,800.0
12 17 470.4 445.5 11.0 1,050.0
13 49 637.0 412.5 21.0 1,850.0
14 11 737.3 754.8 310.0 3,000.0
15 13 26.3 4.1 21.0 31.0
16 22 185.1 186.2 15.0 720.0
17 16 270.6 107.3 25.0 420.0
18 56 316.3 219.5 16.0 1,050.0
19 24 514.2 344.8 240.0 1,450.0
20 47 395.4 209.8 149.8 1,027.5
21 74 295.6 165.2 9.3 940.0
22 168 280.9 193.1 10.0 790.0
Table 5-9 shows the posted price of standard land (1998) in Ansan. There are some 
unsatisfactory aspects. First of all, zones 14 and 15 have small samples. The figures 
may be underestimated or overestimated. In addition to the number of samples, some 
zones have large standard deviations. This would mean that households would 
heterogeneously perceive the zones. Notwithstanding these unsatisfactory aspects, 
using the posted prices as an initial locational attractiveness does not necessarily 
matter because the vector of the attractiveness is adjusted in the model run.
The net interaction impedance, which is a composite measure of locational attraction 
and travel time, is used as a network performance index in the lower level. Since the 
values of the initial locational attractiveness have already been decided, the remaining 
task is to select an appropriate travel time for the initial value. In this study, three
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candidates were examined; they were the solutions of system optimal, user optimal, 
and all-or-nothing assignment. The system optimal solution is one extreme that would 
represent the lower bound performance in the network. In contrast, the outcome of all- 
or-nothing assignment is the other extreme that would be understood as the upper 
bound performance of the network. The simulation separately ran with the respective 
candidates. Then, the final outcome recording the highest average bid-rent was 
chosen. This is because the situation is believed to represent the level of maximised 
social welfare that the bid-rent network equilibrium model intends to address; note 
that the location market has been assumed to be perfectly competitive.
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5.4. The design of the simulation
As noted in the introductory section of this chapter, the simulation follows the same 
strategy as adopted in the study of ISGLUTI (Webster et al., 1988) and the model of 
MASTER (Mackett, 1992; 1993a). Hence, the experiment for the validation of the 
model is carried out in both the base and the policy runs. Each run is simulated in the 
single class and the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium models.
The base run is defined as a simulation conducted using survey data. The policy run is 
performed modifying some input data. The changes in the input data are regarded as 
tests of policies. The results of the model runs should be understood as a 
demonstrative simulation rather than a definitive forecast. This would be because the 
availability of data for the application is relatively poor and the experiment has some 
strong assumptions (Mackett, 1993a). Therefore, the discussion on the outcomes 
focuses on the ability of the bid-rent network equilibrium model to represent the 
relationship between transport and the location of activities.
Two scenarios for the policy run were tested; they were the congestion charging run 
and the greenbelt run. The former introduces increases in transport costs to and from 
the city centre in spatial interactions. The latter assumed an increase in residential 
stocks. In both cases, the simulation sought to illustrate changes in model outcomes 
produced by the policies. The descriptions of the scenarios are given as follows:
The congestion charging run: the city o f Ansan has suffered from chronic 
congestion. In order to reduce car uses in the primary activities o f people ’ daily 
life, the local council has introduced the charging scheme. The cordon has 
circled the city centre, which has covered zones one, ten, eleven, and twelve.
The greenbelt run: the population in Ansan has increased by five percent. In 
order to accommodate the increased number o f households, the local 
government has released green belt area in zones four, seven, and eighteen. The 
released areas have been used for housing development.
Comparisons between the outcomes of the base and the policy runs can be made using 
elasticity values. These values are useful for examining the behavioural difference 
between household classes. In this study, the formulation of the linear arc elasticity is
168
used, which is in line with the research of ISGLUTI (Webster et al., 1988) and the 
study of MASTER (Mackett, 1992; 1993a). The value is given by
where qpm is the class-specific number of spatial interactions in the policy run;
qbm is the equivalent number of the base run;
cpm is the class-specific cost of spatial interactions in the policy run; and
chm is the equivalent cost in the base run.
The values of elasticity for each policy run are calculated against the results of the 
base run. The values represent the overall changes in the level of the spatial 
interaction of each class between the base and the policy runs. The elasticity treated in 
this section is the direct effect only. When the volume adjustment between classes, 
which was not represented in this case study, is considered, the calculation of cross 
elasticity values would be attractive. This is because the cross effect is useful to test 
the volume shift between user classes by a class-specific policy. In particular, the shift 
can be useful to investigate an intermodal network as some research focuses on.
In general, the model can produce huge quantities of output. Two principal outputs are 
noted. First, the model offers a class-specific spatial distribution. The fundamental 
purpose of this type of model is to describe the allocation of households across an 
area. The model developed in this study faithfully serves the basic necessity. Hence, 
as with some other models being used, the results can be easily used for a trip table 
analysis. The other important output is a network performance index in terms of 
transport costs and locational benefits. The model produces the endogenously 
determined travel time and locational attractiveness. The values are determined by the 
process of interaction between transport and the location of activities. The two 
principal outputs may make the model a useful tool for policy tests.
(5.3)
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5.5. The base run
5.5.1. Introduction
This section presents the results of the base run of the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model. The base run was defined in the simulation design section of this chapter as a 
model run using the data surveyed. Hence, the results of the base run mean a changed 
urban structure from the base year by the simulation. Usually, the base run 
incorporates a calibration step. That is, the base run involves the process of finding 
and adjusting values of parameters in order to make model outputs conformable to the 
model specification, which yields the best fit with the observed data. In the 
calibration, certain previously defined measures of goodness-of-fit are normally used. 
However, it was infeasible in the case study to obtain the reference statistics in terms 
of the time period for the model design. This study has assumed that the bidding game 
for locations requires a sufficient amount of time to allow all households that consider 
moving the location of activities to make their decision. It has been also supposed that 
the output of the base run is regarded as the structure after the end of the bidding 
competition, namely the urban structure at the end of the game. According to the 
statistics for the average tenure in residence (2001) in Korea, which is one of the 
irregular surveys conducted by the Korea National Statistical Office, 6.6 years was 
reported as the tenure in Ansan. Thus, the results of the model run would be the 
equivalent urban structure six to seven years after the base year; for discussion details 
on the time period, see the section on the conceptual basis of the model in chapter 
three. Unfortunately, since the Ansan transport master plan (1998), the local authority 
has conducted no comprehensive transport survey that is a similar scale to the master 
plan. Thus, the base run could not conduct the calibration comparing the model 
outcomes of the base run with those of real statistics relating to the time period.
In the next section, the results of the model runs are investigated. The description on 
the results is presented in two ways: first, the general trends of the model outcomes 
are discussed; secondly, comparison and contrast of the output are provided between 
the single class and the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium models.
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5.5.2. The results of the base run
Figure 5-4 at the end of this section shows changes in the number of households in 
zones for the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model, and Figure 5-5 shows 
those of the multiclass model respectively. The changes in these diagrams mean the 
difference in the number of households between the initial volumes of households in 
each zone of the base year and those in the results of the base run. The colour blue 
represents zones that show the increased number of households, and the colour red 
shows areas in which the number of households has decreased. Blank areas mean 
zones showing no significant changes in household numbers.
In general, the two models suggest that there has been an increase in population across 
zones in the southern belt of the city and a decrease in the number of households in 
Northeast Ansan. It has been also shown in the diagrams that there are some buffer 
zones between the southern belt and the Northeast areas. In fact, these buffer zones 
show no significant changes in the number of households. These results are not 
surprising. The southern belt is relatively more attractive for residential locations than 
the other areas for several reasons. First of all, the southern areas have good access to 
the primary workplace locations. The belt includes the two factory districts and 
borders on the city centre. Thus, living in the southern belt would save travel time in 
spatial interactions for primary activities. In addition to this property, the southern 
zones show the good quality living environment. The zones border on the Yellow Sea. 
This would mean that the areas do not significantly suffer from extra congestion 
generated by through traffic and have the good opportunity for refreshment. Another 
important aspect on the good quality of the living environment is open space. For 
example, according to the Ansan transport master plan (1998), zone 16 alone has 23.5 
percent of the entire open space in the city. These good aspects of the job opportunity 
and the residential environment are thought to be the reason why households have bid 
more rent than the other areas. The two good residential attractions together with the 
bidding have created the increase in the number of households in the southern belt.
Even though the above explanation suggests an intuitive understanding of the 
outcomes in terms of the spatial distribution of households, the discussion is indirectly 
related to the model operation. The investigation concerning the operational
171
mechanism of the model should focus on the examination into the network 
performance indices of transport costs and locational benefits. In the analysis into the 
network performance indicators, three representative patterns are found. First of all, as 
would be expected, the demand for a specific location has increased when the cost has 
gone down and the attraction has gone up. In contrast, a decrease in the attractiveness 
and an increase in the impedance have reduced demands for locations. Secondly, 
when changes of one factor dominate those of the other factor, net changes in terms of 
demands for locations have been determined by the dominant factor. That is, even 
though one factor has increased or decreased, the larger responses of the other factor 
compensated the effect of the factor. Finally, there have been no significant changes 
in demands for locations that show counterbalancing effects between the cost and the 
attractiveness. Zones with a similar degree of increased cost and increased 
attractiveness or with decreased cost and decreased attractiveness have no distinct 
changes in the locational demand; zone-specific references are found in Table 5-11 
for the single class model and in Table 5-12 for the multiclass model respectively.
Responses in the changes of household numbers appear to have a relationship to the 
size of zones. While most zones that have suggested changes in the number of 
households show a similar magnitude in the switch, the effect was larger in the 
geographically small areas; full references are found in Table 5-11 and Table 5-12. 
The asymmetric patterns would mean that small-sized zones would respond more 
elastically to changes in the household number than large-sized counterparts.
The discussion on the relationship between zonal sizes and model responses would be 
simply examined by merging the results of several small zones. Figure 5-3 shows a 
modified version of the outputs of the base run of the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model. In this diagram, zones 14, 15, and 17 were merged into the single large zone, 
and zones five and six were integrated. The groupings would be reasonable in the 
sense that the merged zones would be thought to share relatively homogeneous 
characteristics. Zone 14, 15, and 17 are located between the city centre and the factory 
districts. Zones five and six are adjacent to the city centre.
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Figure 5-3 The results o f  the modified base run o f the single class model
The output in F igure 5-3 w ou ld  su ggest the m echanism  for the relationship  betw een  
the m od el resp on ses and the s ize  o f  zon es. First, the e ffec t o f  resp on ses is lik e ly  to  be  
buried in geograp h ica lly  larger zon es. This in ference can be checked  in the m erged  
zo n es  o f  14, 15, and 17. E ven  though zo n e  14 sh ow s an increase in household  
num bers, the overall resp on ses in the m erged zon e su ggest no sign ificant changes. 
Second , an e ffect o f  tra d e-o ff is  another im portant factor that determ ines the  
m agnitude o f  resp on ses in zon es. The integrated zon es o f  fiv e  and s ix  sh o w s no  
sign ifican t changes in the num ber o f  h ou seh old s, even  though zo n e  fiv e  and six  sh ow  
an increase and decrease o f  dem ands resp ectively . T he se to ff  b etw een  the tw o  zon es  
even tu a lly  created no sign ifican t ch an ges in  hou seh old  num bers. H ow ever, this  
im p lication  is provisional. A  con fid en t con clu sio n  requires various sc ien tific  
references. E xperim ent sim ulations in term s o f  adding or sp litting zo n es  w ou ld  
provide ev id en ces to  draw a con clu sion . H ow ever, the investigation  in term s o f  
varying  the spatial system  is a huge fie ld  in its ow n  right and in fact beyon d  the scop e  
o f  th is study. The d ifficu lty  is m ain ly  b ecau se  the spatial opportunity in each  zon e  
w ou ld  have to  be redefined. Furtherm ore, the m od ification  w ou ld  not be helpful to  the 
m odel operation b ecau se  m ost data availab le are in a form at that sa tisfies the spatial
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system given. Nevertheless, it would be useful to stress that demands for locations 
might be sensitive to the design of the spatial system.
Several zones show interesting different responses in the changes of population 
between the two models. Zone three shows an increase in household numbers in the 
single class model but no considerable changes in the multiclass model, whereas zone 
ten shows the reverse. While zone six suggests a decrease in household numbers in 
the single class model but no significant changes in the multiclass model, zone 15 and 
21 show the reverse. In fact, these differences are minor compared to the entire 
responses of the model runs; note that around eighty percent of zones show similar 
responses between the two models. In addition, there have been no sudden different 
responses. All the zones mentioned above show a smooth transition between coloured 
and blank. It is found that no zones changed from red to blue or blue to red. This 
would mean that the results generated by the two models are relatively stable.
Table 5-10 Social welfare indices of the base run
Single class Multiclass
Mean percent changes in the transport impedance: 
Lower income class N/A -7.93
Middle income class N/A -9.50
Higher income class N/A -1.17
Total -6.31 -8.38
Mean percent changes in the locational attractiveness 17.65 14.87
Table 5-10 shows the mean percentage changes of transport impedance and locational 
attractiveness in the base run. Since changes in the two factors would determine 
average costs and benefits in the spatial interaction, the values are interpreted as 
indices of social welfare in this study. The values are calculated against the initial 
network performance indicators of the mean travel time and the mean locational price. 
The figures are weighted averages that consider the size of population in each zone 
for the locational benefit and in each OD pair for the transport impedance.
As would be expected, both models suggest negative values for transport impedance 
and positive values for locational attractiveness. These results are thought to be 
created by the selfish bidding of households for locations. That is, in the process of 
the competition, people choose locations that reduce costs and increase benefits in the
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long run. The behaviour is related to the fundamental assumption for the travellers as 
economic men who minimise the cost and maximise the benefit.
The multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model shows the larger responses in the 
changes of transport costs compared to those of the single class counterpart. This 
result might mean that the multiclass model would be more sensitive to changes in the 
transport impedance than the single class model. However, it has not been generally 
known whether either model is more sensitive than the other. It could be thought that 
this difference would be related to the parameters that have been used in the 
multiclass model for representing the class-specific behaviour. If the parameters have 
been finely calibrated, the two models might produce very similar mean percentage 
changes in the cost of travel time. The tuning, however, requires considerable data to 
specify the values. In fact, the job is indirect to the purpose of this study. This 
research has simply assumed that the given parameters are well identified. A further 
important point in this issue is the OD matrix. It was not feasible to obtain the class- 
specific OD tables for simulating the lower level of the multiclass bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. This study has assumed that the ratios of classes in the volumes of 
the origin-destination matrix are exactly the same as those of sample household data 
in the upper level. Hence, the volumes in the OD table might be biased.
Although the bid-rent network equilibrium model shows less sensitive changes in 
transport costs than the multiclass model, the single class model suggests larger 
responses in the changes of locational benefits. This result is not surprising. The bid- 
rent function in the upper level has been formulated to maximise utility with respect 
to the network performance indices of the transport cost and the locational 
attractiveness. This is represented by a composite function of the two performance 
factors. Even though the random component that has been incorporated in this study 
could open the possibility of the utility being determined inside or outside the 
deterministic indifference curve, it would be expected that the stochastic indifference 
curves would be in the vicinity of the deterministic utility level. Hence, both models 
would produce a similar magnitude of utility value. This can be simply checked in 
Table 5-10 by examining the net welfare that the two factors produced together in 
each model; changes in the transport impedance show negative signs in both models, 
which suggests increases in the benefit from a social viewpoint; then, the total social
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benefits created by the model run can be calculated summing the locational benefits 
with the transport savings; the results are similar, which is in line with the process of 
the formulation of the model. The different values of the cost and benefit in the two 
models are due to the solution algorithm. The heuristic algorithm that has been 
adopted for the solution-finding method in this study produces a mutually consistent 
solution. Hence, two critical factors of the transport cost and the locational 
attractiveness are determined in such a way in which they cope with the utility values. 
Unfortunately, there is no known way to decide that either solution is better than the 
other. This is one of the most critical issues in bi-level mathematical programmes.
It is worth stressing that the multiclass model suggests class-specific benefits in the 
changes of transport costs; note that the single class bid-rent network equilibrium 
model shows the average benefit for the entire people only. Again, in Table 5-10, the 
lower and middle income classes have more benefits than the higher income 
households. The benefits are mainly created by the residential changes of people to 
maximise utility in the long run. That is, the changed demand for locations is the 
background reason for the different benefits. It is not difficult to suppose that rich 
households are less keen on saving transport costs by moving their home. In contrast, 
the poor are likely to be elastic in saving transport costs. The dissimilar behaviour is 
reflected in the values of the benefits for each class. An interesting result in the 
sensitive group is that the middle class households are the greatest beneficiaries in 
terms of saving the transport cost. This would be because the middle class has more 
reserve power in changing home than the lower income group. It might be expected 
that the lower income group would change more frequently than the middle income 
class. However, their choice would be spatially less flexible than the mid group 
because of budget limits. This means that the middle income class has a more 
advantageous position to save the transport impedance than the lower income class.
In conclusion, it can be expected from the above discussion that, everything else being 
equal, there will be an increase in the number of households in the southern belt of 
Ansan and a decrease in the Northeast of the city. These results are created by the 
non-cooperative competition of households for occupying residential locations in 
which households seek to maximise welfare, namely to minimise transport costs and 
maximise locational benefits. The two models suggest that the competition saves
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resources in terms of travel time and increases the worth of locations. The middle 
income class is forecast to be the maximum beneficiary.
It is important to note that even though the single and multiclass models agree on the 
general spatial pattern, the zone-specific effects and their causes would be different 
between the two models. For example, zone 14 shows an increase in the number of 
households in both models, but their background causes are different. The explanation 
goes towards an effect of dominance for the single class model and a commonsense 
pattern for the multiclass model. In the single class model, the larger decrease in the 
impedance has created a net effect of increase in household numbers even though 
there has been a decrease in the attractiveness. In contrast, the decreased impedance 
and increased attractiveness have increased household numbers in the multiclass 
model; the full references are found in Table 5-11 and Table 5-12. These different 
circumstances are influenced by the introduction of the multiclass cost function in the 
multiclass model. The variation created by the multiclass cost function causes user 
classes to perceive the cost differently at a micro-level. These class-specific 
perceptions lead to the different behavioural pattern of users. This settles the cost and 
the attractiveness differently from the outcomes of the single class model. The new 
settlement, in the end, determines the level of demands in each zone.
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Figure 5-4 The results o f  the base run o f the single class model
Figure 5-5 The results o f  the base run o f  the multiclass model
Table 5-11 Results o f  the base run o f the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model
zone
Impedance1 Attractiveness1 Flows o f  spatial interactions
before after before after before after
total total m, m2 mi m1(%o) m2(%) m3(%)
1 105.27 108.40 135.42 134.26 11674 11627.08 6697.84 4555.34 373.90 57.61 39.18 3.22
2 84.41 79.10 119.20 143.84 5763 5777.07 2387.85 3078.85 310.37 41.33 53.29 5.37
3 64.80 78.55 145.56 145.17 9698 9719.50 4065.70 5140.88 512.92 41.83 52.89 5.28
4 99.18 108.68 77.96 93.62 11069 11077.46 5047.38 5503.55 526.53 45.56 49.68 4.75
5 98.02 80.00 149.29 139.02 8926 8941.59 3861.69 4624.87 455.03 43.19 51.72 5.09
6 103.40 107.85 108.92 100.43 7628 7613.40 3977.66 3341.63 294.12 52.25 43.89 3.86
7 98.19 114.84 91.40 89.13 6322 6318.61 3073.06 2972.55 273.00 48.64 47.04 4.32
8 118.90 105.44 108.45 82.73 13669 13654.01 6452.92 6583.68 617.40 47.26 48.22 4.52
9 112.50 118.68 70.91 82.54 13105 13113.72 6113.68 6396.28 603.77 46.62 48.78 4.60
10 102.44 104.51 76.34 79.98 9132 9139.89 4231.15 4483.78 424.96 46.29 49.06 4.65
11 116.65 108.73 103.57 93.72 8124 8129.46 3821.37 3939.62 368.47 47.01 48.46 4.53
12 105.39 109.84 111.89 110.41 10119 10092.62 5441.14 4282.61 368.86 53.91 42.43 3.65
13 76.70 86.96 90.60 96.40 8976 8981.54 4224.50 4354.26 402.78 47.04 48.48 4.48
14 108.08 88.14 90.39 78.47 6249 6254.95 2812.87 3139.18 302.90 44.97 50.19 4.84
15 102.66 105.51 140.43 146.58 3849 3848.20 1845.89 1831.81 170.50 47.97 47.60 4.43
16 89.75 75.88 101.73 102.06 6327 6339.05 2702.57 3315.97 320.50 42.63 52.31 5.06
17 80.27 84.63 84.56 87.72 10145 10146.50 4766.21 4917.49 462.80 46.97 48.46 4.56
18 104.56 114.93 76.38 81.07 11890 11890.14 5637.59 5719.60 532.94 47.41 48.10 4.48
19 94.38 115.19 93.31 91.26 16061 16044.58 8026.68 7353.67 664.22 50.03 45.83 4.14
20 117.72 108.65 64.05 82.58 6802 6808.77 3062.54 3420.20 326.04 44.98 50.23 4.79
21 121.10 114.84 91.60 80.33 4033 4034.65 1883.97 1965.72 184.96 46.69 48.72 4.58
22 95.62 80.67 68.06 80.66 4176 4183.21 1814.78 2162.77 205.66 43.38 51.70 4.92
total 193736 193736.00 91949.05 93084.32 8702.63 47.46 48.05 4.49
The value o f  the zonal average is set as a reference index 100.
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Table 5-12 Results o f the base run o f the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model
zone
Impedance1 Attractiveness1 Flows o f  spatial interactions
before after before after before after
total total mi m2 m3 m,(%) m2(%) m3(%)
1 105.27 102.94 135.42 124.24 11674 11659.51 6678.27 4587.72 393.52 57.28 39.35 3.38
2 84.41 93.81 119.20 138.70 5763 5770.46 2406.63 3077.52 286.31 41.71 53.33 4.96
3 64.80 60.15 145.56 140.24 9698 9692.67 4037.76 5131.48 523.43 41.66 52.94 5.40
4 99.18 102.27 77.96 79.38 11069 11060.80 5069.78 5497.01 494.00 45.84 49.70 4.47
5 98.02 94.87 149.29 148.66 8926 8991.54 3897.98 4620.56 473.00 43.35 51.39 5.26
6 103.40 127.28 108.92 124.86 7628 7631.55 3985.99 3348.55 297.02 52.23 43.88 3.89
7 98.19 135.54 91.40 103.07 6322 6310.11 3051.38 2987.76 270.97 48.36 47.35 4.29
8 118.90 124.44 108.45 95.65 13669 13626.49 6449.79 6559.05 617.65 47.33 48.13 4.53
9 112.50 120.08 70.91 75.39 13105 13088.90 6100.00 6381.96 606.95 46.60 48.76 4.64
10 102.44 103.35 76.34 92.48 9132 9177.63 4269.11 4478.52 430.01 46.52 48.80 4.69
11 116.65 118.34 103.57 106.81 8124 8121.65 3858.45 3900.08 363.12 47.51 48.02 4.47
12 105.39 129.64 111.89 107.67 10119 10101.46 5441.42 4285.97 374.07 53.87 42.43 3.70
13 76.70 82.63 90.60 93.86 8976 8981.03 4236.89 4349.73 394.41 47.18 48.43 4.39
14 108.08 104.03 90.39 98.43 6249 6276.91 2812.01 3163.61 301.29 44.80 50.40 4.80
15 102.66 124.54 140.43 141.87 3849 3836.22 1821.08 1846.54 168.59 47.47 48.13 4.39
16 89.75 80.24 101.73 106.97 6327 6349.94 2697.79 3339.64 312.51 42.49 52.59 4.92
17 80.27 83.67 84.56 89.88 10145 10143.41 4747.91 4919.38 476.11 46.81 48.50 4.69
18 104.56 125.66 76.38 93.74 11890 11895.89 5652.39 5698.90 544.60 47.52 47.91 4.58
19 94.38 135.96 93.31 90.96 16061 16006.00 8013.93 7323.55 668.52 50.07 45.76 4.18
20 117.72 128.23 64.05 95.46 6802 6824.92 3038.11 3462.75 324.05 44.51 50.74 4.75
21 121.10 135.54 91.60 92.07 4033 4005.66 1876.65 1958.94 170.07 46.85 48.90 4.25
22 95.62 104.04 68.06 92.60 4176 4183.24 1805.74 2165.08 212.43 43.17 51.76 5.08
total 193736 193736.00 91949.05 93084.32 8702.63 47.46 48.05 4.49
The value o f  the zonal average is set as the reference index 100.
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5.6. The congestion charging run
5.6.1. Introduction
The congestion charging run is concerned with changing transport costs to and from 
the city centre in the spatial interactions of households, namely increasing costs of 
travel for journeys involving the city centre. The cordon line circled the city centre of 
Ansan, which included zones 1, 10, 11, and 12. The amount levied in this procedure 
was equivalent a half an hour value of travel time. The charge was imposed as a fixed 
rate across household classes, but the class-specific perceptions for the extra costs are 
differentiated in the multiclass model because the model has incorporated the class- 
specific weighting factor. No discount scheme for certain categories of households in 
terms of their social status and residential area was considered. In the next section, 
discussion detailed about the congestion charging run is presented.
5.6.2. The results of the congestion charging run
The single and multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium models generally agree on the 
spatial distribution of households in the congestion charging run. As shown in Figures 
5-6 and 5-7 at the end of this section, fairly similar responses are found in most zones 
between the two models. Even though a few areas show rather contrary patterns, no 
drastic disagreement in the demands is captured; note that all the differences are 
related to a smooth transition from coloured to blank or the reverse. As discussed in 
the section on the base run, the responses are larger in geographically small areas. The 
response again would imply that the demands for locations would be sensitive to 
zonal sizes; the full reference table is suggested in Table 5-18 and Table 5-19.
Table 5-13 Mean percentage changes in the network performance indices for the charging 
zones in the congestion charging run
Zone The transport impedance 
Single class Multiclass
The locational attractiveness 
Single class Multiclass
1 -3.95 -4.87 -6.01 -5.36
10 -3.32 -3.55 -16.08 -12.25
11 -2.76 -2.67 -13.55 -15.40
12 -4.14 -3.16 -8.27 -9.62
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Table 5-13 shows the mean percentage changes in the network performance indices of 
transport costs and locational benefits in the congestion charging scheme. The values 
are calculated referenced against those of the base run. As would be expected, the 
transport cost and the locational attractiveness in the zones inside the cordon line have 
decreased. These areas include zones 1, 10, 11 and 12. In both models, the impedance 
changes show a marginal decrease, but the locational benefit shows a relatively larger 
decrease. The marginal responses in the cost reflect that the charging scheme would 
not sufficiently relieve the chronic delay in the city centre, even though the scheme 
would decrease traffic volumes within the charging boundary. This would be because 
the levied amount would not be enough to resolve the congestion in central Ansan. It 
might be thought that increasing the amount would create more responsive results, or 
some trial-and-error experiments in terms of an incremental raising or reducing the 
collection would offer a desirable charge rate. In fact, these investigations are indirect 
to the purpose of this chapter. The interesting experiments are left for future study. In 
spite of this provisional conclusion, it is useful to stress that the two models suggest 
that congestion level in the charging areas would be reduced by the charging scheme.
An understanding on the decrease in the locational attractiveness is rather complex. 
Since the charging zones cover the city centre, people may think that these areas are 
undesirable for residential locations. Thus, people would bid for the areas relatively 
less than for the other zones. The asymmetric bidding may cause a decrease in the 
locational attraction. However, this explanation does not satisfactorily offer a 
systematic interpretation of the operation in the bid-rent network equilibrium model. 
It would be better to understand that the charging scheme has made these areas less 
attractive. This is inferred from the fact that the scheme requires more costs than those 
previously required for the spatial interaction. A technical explanation for the 
decrease should focus on changes in household numbers. In these areas, the number of 
households has decreased, which has meant that the number of bidders has decreased; 
therefore, the maximum expected bid-rent is likely to decrease in the calculation of 
logsum. The mechanism leads to a decrease in the locational attractiveness.
In summary, the congestion charging scheme has decreased the impedance and the 
attractiveness of the zones inside the boundary. The effect was larger in the locational 
benefit than the transport cost. These asymmetric responses cause a decrease in
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household numbers in the central areas. It is worth noting that there have been no 
significant differences in the responses between the two models, as shown in Table 5- 
13. Again, there is no established belief on either outcome should be more sensitive 
than the other. However, it should be noted that similar responses would be influenced 
by an aggregation process; the values are calculated for zonal average without 
considering class-specific behaviour nor zone-to-zone responses. These two 
aggregation biases may prevent the outcomes of the models from being differentiated.
Table 5-14 Mean percentage changes in the network performance indices for the adjacent 
charging zones in the congestion charging run________________________________________
Zone The transport impedance The locational attractiveness
Single class Multiclass Single class Multiclass
North
7 7.97 5.90 2.78 4.20
8 14.86 12.15 2.22 2.14
9 8.46 15.57 4.59 3.99
South
2 3.63 0.15 3.71 7.62
6 3.67 4.93 5.54 3.99
16 2.93 5.18 7.69 15.21
20 0.19 0.02 8.54 7.35
Table 5-14 shows changes in the network performance indicators for the zones 
adjacent in the charging areas. As would be expected, the impedance and the 
attractiveness have increased in both single and multiclass models. Again, fairly 
similar responses are observed between the two models. This would be also because 
of the aggregation processes explained above. Two important patterns are observed in 
Table 5-14. The zones that are geographically southern adjacent to the cordon were 
predicted to show a marginal increase in the cost but a relatively larger increase in the 
attraction. In contrast, the northern zones adjacent to the charging boundary were 
forecast to show a marginal increase in the benefit but a larger increase in the 
impedance. These trends appear to be influenced by through traffic. The southern 
zones border on the Yellow Sea, and so the zones have not much through traffic. This 
causes that the areas were marginally affected by the charging scheme. In contrast, the 
northern counterparts were significantly affected because the areas have a large 
amount of through traffic. The converse effects have determined the different patterns 
of demands for locations between the North and South. Namely, the zones in the 
South have shown increased demands while the areas in the North the reverse.
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Table 5-15 Mean percentage changes in the network performance indices for some interesting 
zones in the congestion charging run
Zone The transport impedance The locational attractiveness
Single class Multiclass Single class Multiclass
17 13.76 19.42 -4.61 -4.78
18 12.61 16.23 -5.95 -2.98
22 -16.12 -9.81 10.22 8.26
Some zones show interesting responses to the congestion charging scheme. As shown 
in Table 5-15, zones 17 and 18 show larger changes in the transport impedance. This 
appears to be resulted from the fact that a vertical corridor, which is located next to 
the main north corridor and leading to the charging areas, passes through these zones. 
A large amount of traffic that seeks bypasses has converged in these zones. Hence, the 
cost of travel has considerably gone up. The cost increase in turn has decreased the 
number of households in the zones. The decreased household numbers have reduced 
the attractiveness. The reduction of the locational attraction, technically, results from 
the mechanism of the calculation for logsum value. In zone 22, larger responses in 
both the transport cost and the locational benefit are observed. The cost decrease is 
because the main horizontal corridor to the city centre passes through this zone. 
Traffic that used to use this corridor seeks bypass in order not to have additional costs. 
This has drastically reduced the cost. The increase in the attractiveness results from 
the increased number of households. The charging scheme has motivated people to 
live close to the locations of activities. As mentioned above, the main factory district 
is located in this zone. This opportunity has attracted households to move in this area. 
The increased household numbers have increased the maximum bid-rent.
Table 5-16 Social welfare indices for the congestion charging run________________________
______________________________________________ Single class  Multiclass
Mean percent changes in the transport impedance:
Lower income class N/A 0.54
Middle income class N/A -1.50
Higher income class N/A -2.02
Total -0.51 -0.66
Mean percent changes in the locational attractiveness_____________ -0.34____________ -0.32
Table 5-16 shows public welfare changes of the congestion charging scheme. The 
direct effect of the scheme was a saving of transport costs in both models, though the 
changes were marginal. The marginal variation is mainly because the delay caused by
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the extra congestion adjacent to the charging zones balances the extra cost reduction 
inside the city centre. However, it should be borne in mind that the responses might be 
influenced by the level of charging. As noted above, the trial-and-error investigation 
could be an interesting sensitivity experiment for future study.
Table 5-17 Elasticity of cost changes to changes of residential locations in the congestion 
charging run____________________________________________________________________
Single class Multiclass
Changes of residential locations: 
Lower income class N/A -0.64
Middle income class N/A -0.61
Higher income class N/A -0.03
Total -0.43 -0.21
The interclass effects can be examined in the results of the multiclass bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. As shown in Table 5-16, the maximum beneficiary from the 
charging scheme was the higher income class and the poorest added the costs. The 
result would be because the perceived extra costs in the scheme are differentiated to 
the household classes. It is not difficult to imagine that the rich travel with marginal 
impedance imposed by the scheme. However, the amount added would be significant 
to the lower income class. This explanation is supported by examining the elasticity 
values of cost changes to changes of residential locations. As shown in Table 5-17, 
the frequency with which the higher income class moved home was not effectively 
affected by the congestion charging scheme, but the effects were larger for the middle 
and lower income classes. Overall, the two models suggest that the maximum 
beneficiary from the congestion charging scheme is the higher income group.
It is worthwhile commenting on the different viewpoints on the charging scheme 
between an individual and a planner. From an individual viewpoint, the scheme is 
acceptable only if the value of saved travel time surpasses the money paid. Thus, it 
might be argued that even though the congestion charging scheme would reduce the 
total transport costs in the area, the scheme should be implemented in the case of an 
individual not suffering losses from the scheme. In contrast, the loss of an individual 
is not important from the social viewpoint. This is because the amount of money paid 
does not disappear but is transferred from an individual to a local authority. Thus, the 
problem on whether the scheme would reduce the overall social costs is meaningful
185
from the social perspective. The discussions in this chapter are implicitly based on the 
social viewpoint as normally assumed in model-based policy interpretations. In this 
context, the bid-rent network equilibrium model and this case study do not explicitly 
consider the money balance of an individual.
In conclusion, the effect of the congestion charging scheme in the charging zones was 
a reduction in delay. However, the scheme created a larger decrease in the locational 
attractiveness because the scenario requires extra costs. Consequently, the number of 
households inside the boundary has decreased. The zones adjacent to the charging 
areas showed two broad patterns. While the number of households has increased in 
the South, the number has decreased in the North. These converse results were 
understood in terms of the effect of through traffic. A large amount of through traffic 
in the North has considerably increased the transport cost, but less through traffic in 
the South has contributed to the marginal increase in the impedance. It is worth noting 
that the maximum beneficiary from the scheme was the higher income class, but there 
have been no significant welfare improvements across the classes. Of course, the level 
of social welfare might depend on the amount of the charge. Thus, some trial-and- 
error experiments in terms of raising or reducing the levy would suggest a desirable 
rate of charge with respect to an improvement of social welfare as well as the 
reduction of congestion. These issues are left for future study.
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Figure 5-6 The results o f  the congestion charging run o f  the single class model
Figure 5-7 The results o f  the congestion charging run o f  the multiclass model
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Table 5-18 Results o f the congestion charging run o f the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model
zone
Impedance1 Attractiveness1 Flows o f  spatial interactions
base policy base policy base policy
total total mi m2 m3 m,r%) m2(%) m3(%)
I1 108.40 104.12 134.26 126.19 11627.08 11614.68 5670.93 5451.96 501.79 48.78 46.90 4.32
23 79.10 81.97 143.84 149.19 5777.07 5789.11 2475.29 3017.09 296.74 42.76 52.12 5.13
3 78.55 74.85 145.17 145.68 9719.50 9737.49 4160.13 5077.64 499.72 42.72 52.15 5.13
4 108.68 105.72 93.62 88.83 11077.46 11087.29 5305.99 5277.97 491.33 47.91 47.66 4.44
5 80.00 74.12 139.02 147.39 8941.59 8963.26 3826.14 4676.72 460.40 42.69 52.18 5.14
6 107.85 111.80 100.43 105.98 7613.40 7619.22 3655.28 3619.47 336.46 48.02 47.55 4.42
f 114.84 123.99 89.13 91.61 6318.61 6311.49 3078.62 2963.54 272.33 48.75 46.93 4.31
83 105.44 121.11 82.73 84.56 13670.01 13654.05 6650.21 6415.33 591.51 48.69 46.97 4.33
9 118.68 128.72 82.54 86.33 13109.72 13092.39 6282.87 6240.42 579.10 47.95 47.63 4.42
102 104.51 101.04 79.98 67.12 9135.89 9126.14 4395.59 4328.88 401.67 48.16 47.43 4.40
l l 2 108.73 105.73 93.72 81.03 8125.46 8117.11 3898.61 3862.44 359.07 48.01 47.57 4.42
122 109.84 105.30 110.41 101.28 10092.61 10081.49 5010.81 4659.44 424.24 49.64 46.16 4.20
13 86.96 78.88 96.40 88.69 8977.54 8984.69 4186.67 4379.98 413.03 46.62 48.78 4.60
14 88.14 81.17 78.47 74.10 6254.95 6260.00 2980.56 3001.03 279.40 47.61 47.93 4.46
15 105.51 100.82 146.58 135.54 3848.20 3837.99 1949.77 1733.01 155.21 50.80 45.15 4.04
163 75.88 78.10 102.06 109.91 6339.05 6357.30 2691.54 3335.48 330.28 42.34 52.47 5.20
17 84.63 96.27 87.72 83.68 10146.50 10125.03 5062.84 4642.91 419.28 50.00 45.86 4.14
18 114.93 129.42 81.07 76.24 11890.14 11878.40 5861.62 5514.03 502.74 49.35 46.42 4.23
19 115.19 123.88 91.26 97.68 16044.58 16050.44 7970.53 7391.60 670.31 49.72 46.10 4.18
203 108.65 108.85 82.58 89.63 6808.77 6817.02 3090.78 3400.15 326.09 45.34 49.88 4.78
21 114.84 119.40 80.33 83.82 4034.65 4037.38 1960.72 1901.49 175.17 48.56 47.10 4.34
22 80.67 67.66 80.66 88.91 4183.21 4194.05 1783.55 2193.75 216.75 42.53 52.31 5.17
total 193736.00 193736.00 91949.05 93084.32 8702.63 47.46 48.05 4.49
The value o f  the zonal average is set as the reference index 100.
2 Zones inside the cordon line.
3 Zones adjacent to the cordon line.
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Table 5-19 Results o f the congestion charging run o f  the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model
zone
Impedance1 Attractiveness1 Flows o f  spatial interactions
base policy base policy base policy
total total mi m2 m3 m,(%) m2(%) m3(%)
l 2 102.94 97.93 124.24 117.58 11679.34 11654.09 5648.70 5497.34 508.05 48.47 47.17 4.36
23 93.81 93.95 138.70 149.28 5737.51 5787.86 2475.75 3015.64 296.47 42.77 52.10 5.12
3 60.15 55.46 140.24 138.77 9700.76 9739.86 4161.58 5078.59 499.69 42.73 52.14 5.13
4 102.27 108.38 79.38 87.04 11052.83 11068.91 5293.35 5283.45 492.10 47.82 47.73 4.45
5 94.87 95.15 148.66 146.51 8991.60 8994.33 3839.46 4690.30 461.56 42.70 52.16 5.13
6 127.28 133.55 124.86 129.85 7631.50 7632.20 3653.69 3635.22 338.29 47.90 47.66 4.44
73 135.54 143.53 103.07 107.40 6310.10 6309.98 3090.36 2949.21 270.42 48.98 46.74 4.29
83 124.44 139.57 95.65 97.70 13626.50 13607.70 6612.56 6404.24 590.90 48.59 47.06 4.34
9 120.08 138.77 75.39 78.40 13088.92 13076.28 6286.05 6214.23 576.00 48.07 47.52 4.40
102 103.35 99.68 92.48 81.15 9177.65 9129.50 4388.97 4337.79 402.73 48.07 47.51 4.41
l l 2 118.34 115.17 106.81 90.36 8154.65 8123.41 3889.12 3873.70 360.60 47.88 47.69 4.44
122 129.64 125.55 107.67 97.31 10101.36 10088.49 4992.16 4670.42 425.91 49.48 46.29 4.22
13 82.63 87.65 93.86 101.89 8981.03 8986.20 4173.23 4397.16 415.81 46.44 48.93 4.63
14 104.03 102.60 98.43 97.20 6276.93 6272.69 2976.50 2994.52 278.68 47.63 47.91 4.46
15 124.54 120.57 141.87 136.90 3836.22 3839.61 1945.63 1738.14 155.84 50.67 45.27 4.06
163 80.24 84.39 106.97 123.25 6269.99 6356.77 2685.26 3340.40 331.10 42.24 52.55 5.21
17 83.67 99.92 89.88 85.58 10173.42 10123.78 5082.86 4624.28 416.64 50.21 45.68 4.12
18 125.66 146.05 93.74 90.95 11925.88 11871.18 5893.32 5479.93 497.93 49.64 46.16 4.19
19 135.96 138.79 90.96 94.53 16005.93 16020.72 8016.72 7349.73 664.27 50.01 45.85 4.14
203 128.23 128.26 95.46 102.48 6824.95 6832.36 3091.58 3413.18 327.60 45.25 49.96 4.79
21 135.54 137.53 92.07 94.64 4005.67 4008.86 1967.79 1888.60 173.47 48.83 46.87 4.30
22 104.04 93.83 92.60 100.24 4183.27 4211.21 1784.41 2208.24 218.56 42.37 52.44 5.19
total
l
193736.00 193736.00 91949.05 93084.32 8702.63 47.46 48.05 4.49
The value o f  the zonal average is set as the reference index 100.
2 Zones inside the cordon line.
3 Zones adjacent to the cordon line.
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5.7. The greenbelt run
5.7.1. Introduction
The greenbelt run is concerned with examining transport and land-use implications 
provoked by the exogenous changes in patterns of land-use. The scenario 
implemented in this study was an increase in residential stocks in some zones. As 
described in the section on the simulation design, the population of Ansan was 
assumed to increase, and some open space in zones 4, 7, and 18 were supposed to be 
released to accommodate the increased numbers of population. The other land-uses, 
except residential areas and the former open space that was released, were assumed to 
be unchanged. It was also supposed that no additional transport infrastructure was 
supplied. The next section presents the details on the results of the greenbelt run.
5.7.2. The results of the greenbelt run
As shown in Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9 at the end of this section, the single and 
multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium models predicted fairly similar responses in 
the changes to the number of households in each zone by the greenbelt run. The 
increase in the number of households is observed in the released greenbelt zones. On 
the other hand, the decrease in household numbers is found at the gateway zones 
which are located in the way from the released greenbelt zones to either the city 
centre or the main factory districts. Again, the responses were larger in geographically 
small zones; the full reference is found in Tables 5-24 and 5-25 for the single class 
and the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium models respectively.
Table 5-20 Mean percentage changes in the network performance indices for the released 
greenbelt zones in the greenbelt run_________________________________________________
Zone The transport impedance The locational attractiveness
Single class Multiclass Single class Multiclass
4 9.94 11.84 12.78 12.58
7 7.14 8.11 13.92 14.76
18 8.23 9.86 16.76 15.02
Table 5-20 shows mean percentage changes in transport costs and locational benefits 
for the released greenbelt zones in the greenbelt run. These values were calculated 
referenced against the results of the base run. As would be expected, the network
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performance indices have increased in these zones. While the two indicators show a 
relatively high increase, the responses were larger in the changes of the locational 
attractiveness. Because of these different effects, the number of households in the 
released greenbelt areas has increased.
The reason for the increase in the transport cost is self-evident. The simulation has 
assumed that the population in Ansan had increased with no additional transport 
infrastructure supplied. Hence, the increased flows of spatial interactions would 
increase the transport impedance. In contrast, an explanation on the increased 
attractiveness is rather complicated. The release of greenbelt would imply a 
redevelopment, which normally produces a good quality living environment. Thus, 
people would bid higher rent than those before the scheme. Again, a technical 
understanding in terms of the model operation focuses on the increased number of 
households and residential stocks. The more people, the higher the aggregate amount 
of the attractiveness. This is, technically, because of the calculation mechanism of 
logsum value. It is worth noting that there have been no significant differences 
between the results of the two models. The similar responses again would be because 
of the aggregation effects that were discussed in the previous section.
Table 5-21 Mean percent changes in the network performance indices for the gateway zones 
in the greenbelt run______________________________________________________________
Zone The transport impedance The locational attractiveness
Single class Multiclass Single class Multiclass
From 4:
2 2.11 6.65 -1.06 -1.45
3 7.08 8.83 -2.13 -0.73
5 6.35 4.51 1.30 -1.26
6 6.81 7.28 -0.05 1.88
From 7:
8 10.23 8.14 -3.19 -1.06
Froml8:
9 7.18 2.24 -2.28 3.96
13 6.03 10.92 -2.56 5.52
14 6.14 12.08 3.03 -3.07
15 7.47 7.25 -2.42 -3.51
17 9.16 12.25 -2.33 1.09
Table 5-21 shows mean percentage changes in the network performance indices of the 
gateway zones in the greenbelt run. The gateway zones represent areas located 
between the released greenbelt zones and primary workplace locations. The primary
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workplace areas meant either the city centre or the main factory districts. As shown in 
Table 5-21, the transport impedance shows relatively larger responses while the 
locational attractiveness shows no significant changes. These asymmetric changes 
have resulted in the decrease of household numbers in these zones. The responses can 
be easily understood. The released greenbelt increased the number of households in 
the released zones. The augmented household numbers meant the increased traffic 
volumes. The volumes would pass the gateway zones to the primary workplace 
locations. Thus, roads in the gateway zones would accommodate more traffic with no 
additional transport infrastructure supplied. The increased traffic would generate extra 
congestion in the gateway areas. Thus, the cost has gone up.
Table 5-22 Social welfare indices of the greenbelt run
Single class Multiclass
Mean percent changes in the transport impedance:
Lower income class N/A 3.95
Middle income class N/A 5.52
Higher income class N/A 9.94
Total 4.34 4.84
Mean percent changes in the locational attractiveness 3.12 3.98
Table 5-23 Elasticity of attractiveness changes to changes of residential locations in the
greenbelt run
Single class Multiclass
Changes of residential locations:
Lower income class N/A 0.61
Middle income class N/A 0.75
Higher income class N/A 0.23
Total 0.57 0.46
Table 5-22 shows social welfare changes in the greenbelt run. The indices of social 
welfare in this study meant the changes in the network performance indicators of 
transport costs and locational benefits. As would be expected, the direct effect was an 
increase in the locational opportunity, but the changes were rather insignificant. This 
is because the decreased attractiveness of the gateway zones has offset the increased 
locational attraction of the released greenbelt zones. In other words, even though the 
effect of the release of open space would be positive to increase the locational 
opportunity, the overall responses across the city are not distinct because the gateway 
zones became less attractive owing to the additional congestion. This explanation is 
supported by examining changes in the transport impedance of the study area; it is
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observed in Table 5-22 that the transport cost shows relatively larger increases than 
the locational attractiveness. Thus, the release of greenbelt area in this scenario would 
reduce the overall social welfare. However, these results are not definitive because the 
welfare changes would depend on the amount of released area and its spatial location. 
In this context, the welfare responses generated by the changes in the size and location 
of greenbelt release would be another interesting issue for future study.
The class-specific responses in terms of the changes in the transport impedance can be 
examined using the results of the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model; 
again, note that the single class model only shows overall responses regardless of the 
class-specific behaviour. The reference for the class-specific responses is shown in 
Table 5-22. While all the classes were predicted to add extra transport costs, the 
higher income group was forecast to suffer the most loss in the greenbelt run. The 
outcome comes up to the expectations of the design for this simulation in the sense 
that the higher income class was associated with the greatest value of travel time in 
the multiclass model. In spite of this result, the elasticity values in Table 5-23 show 
the higher income group is insensitive to the effect of changes in the locational 
attractiveness. The insensitivity is because the perceived extra costs created by the 
greenbelt run are not very significant to the higher income class. Thus, it can be 
summarised that even though the higher income class was predicted to suffer from the 
greatest loss in the greenbelt run, the scheme designed in this application was not 
enough to attract the higher income households to elastically move their residence.
In conclusion, the greenbelt run that is related to exogenous land-use changes has 
created interesting responses in the interaction between transport and the location of 
activities. Two important issues should be noted. First of all, the values of the network 
performance indices have increased in the greenbelt released zones. The increased 
traffic volumes generated by the increased population with no additional transport 
infrastructure contributed the increase in the transport impedance. The increase in the 
locational attractiveness was understood with respect to the bidding mechanism 
accompanied with the increased number of households; the more people, the higher 
the maximum expected bid-rent. Secondly, the gateway zones from the released 
greenbelt areas to the primary workplace locations showed an increase in the transport 
cost, while no significant changes were found in the locational benefit. This response
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is self-evident because the increased households create extra congestion in the 
gateway zones. Even though the release of greenbelt has created dynamic responses in 
terms of land-use transport interactions, it was found that the simulation designed in 
this study did not improve social welfare. This is mainly because the increased 
locational benefits in the released greenbelt area balance the decreased attractiveness 
created by the extra congestion in the gateway zones. However, this result would not 
be definitive because the outcome would depend on variations from the strategy for 
the release of greenbelt areas, namely the result would be sensitive to the amount and 
geographical locations in the release of open space.
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Figure 5-8 The results o f  the greenbelt run o f the single class model
Figure 5-9 The results o f  the greenbelt run o f  the multiclass model
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Table 5-24 Results o f the greenbelt run o f the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model
zone
Impedance1 Attractiveness1 Flows o f  spatial interactions
base policy base policy base policy
total total m, m2 m3 mi(%) m2(%) m3(%)
1 108.40 114.95 134.26 131.54 11627.08 11597.06 6657.09 4553.47 386.50 57.40 39.26 3.33
2 79.10 80.76 143.84 142.33 5777.07 5779.62 2378.57 3091.40 309.66 41.15 53.49 5.36
3 78.55 84.11 145.17 142.08 9719.50 9693.12 4049.93 5131.54 511.65 41.78 52.94 5.28
42 108.68 119.48 93.62 105.58 11077.46 16007.24 7294.65 7965.38 757.21 45.57 49.76 4.73
5 80.00 85.08 139.02 140.83 8941.59 8913.56 3845.02 4618.23 450.32 43.14 51.81 5.05
6 107.85 115.19 100.43 100.38 7613.40 7603.96 3964.78 3337.78 301.41 52.14 43.90 3.96
72 114.84 123.03 89.13 101.54 6318.61 9131.00 4491.70 4279.21 390.09 49.19 46.86 4.27
8 105.44 116.23 82.73 80.09 13670.01 13645.71 6450.94 6575.07 619.70 47.27 48.18 4.54
9 118.68 127.21 82.54 80.66 13109.72 13086.35 6101.50 6378.44 606.41 46.62 48.74 4.63
10 104.51 109.56 79.98 77.31 9135.89 9122.21 4212.17 4478.23 431.81 46.17 49.09 4.73
11 108.73 115.12 93.72 90.43 8125.46 8101.40 3805.24 3923.34 372.82 46.97 48.43 4.60
12 109.84 120.36 110.41 107.50 10092.61 10066.19 5394.37 4298.40 373.41 53.59 42.70 3.71
13 86.96 92.20 96.40 93.93 8977.54 8961.39 4219.73 4346.76 394.90 47.09 48.51 4.41
14 88.14 93.55 78.47 80.85 6254.95 6246.63 2810.01 3131.40 305.22 44.98 50.13 4.89
15 105.51 113.40 146.58 143.04 3848.20 3810.84 1823.29 1823.75 163.81 47.84 47.86 4.30
16 75.88 79.61 102.06 107.62 6339.05 6333.80 2689.02 3306.33 322.45 42.46 52.20 5.09
17 84.63 92.38 87.72 85.67 10146.50 10101.05 4757.31 4891.45 452.29 47.10 48.43 4.48
182 114.93 124.40 81.07 94.65 11890.14 17078.18 8161.55 8174.16 749.47 47.79 47.86 4.39
19 115.19 125.11 91.26 99.84 16044.58 16029.67 8037.75 7306.05 663.86 50.14 45.58 4.14
20 108.65 106.02 82.58 80.23 6808.77 6802.77 3057.53 3416.76 326.48 44.95 50.23 4.80
21 114.84 119.55 80.33 85.05 4034.65 4036.93 1900.99 1951.05 184.89 47.09 48.33 4.58
22 80.67 84.72 80.66 86.85 4183.21 4180.16 1822.47 2156.37 194.33 43.60 51.59 4.65
total 193736.00 206328.84 97925.60 99134.56 9268.68 47.46 48.05 4.49
The value o f  the zonal average is set as the reference index 100. 
2 The zones that have the released greenbelt areas.
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Table 5-25 Results o f the greenbelt run o f the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model
zone
Impedance1 Attractiveness1 Flows o f  spatial interactions
base policy base policy base policy
total total m, m2 mj m,(%) m2(%) m3(%)
1 102.94 124.24 113.93 128.76 11679.34 11597.50 6676.22 4554.42 366.87 57.57 39.27 3.16
2 93.81 138.70 100.05 136.69 5737.51 5730.98 2351.46 3073.28 306.23 41.03 53.63 5.34
3 60.15 140.24 65.46 139.22 9700.76 9688.19 4071.37 5105.22 511.60 42.02 52.70 5.28
42 102.27 79.38 114.38 89.36 11052.83 16019.47 7293.82 7962.61 763.04 45.53 49.71 4.76
5 94.87 148.66 99.15 146.79 8991.60 8980.11 3869.78 4617.53 492.80 43.09 51.42 5.49
6 127.28 124.86 136.55 127.22 7631.50 7618.65 4007.86 3330.46 280.34 52.61 43.71 3.68
i 1 135.54 103.07 146.53 118.29 6310.10 9127.42 4474.15 4263.09 390.18 49.02 46.71 4.27
8 124.44 95.65 134.57 94.64 13626.50 13602.71 6441.47 6579.34 581.90 47.35 48.37 4.28
9 120.08 75.39 122.77 78.37 13088.92 13094.84 6129.96 6343.76 621.12 46.81 48.44 4.74
10 103.35 92.48 109.68 93.42 9177.65 9118.75 4192.26 4520.33 406.16 45.97 49.57 4.45
11 118.34 106.81 127.17 104.87 8154.65 8140.36 3789.00 3982.96 368.41 46.55 48.93 4.53
12 129.64 107.67 140.55 105.12 10101.36 10089.35 5379.06 4292.90 417.38 53.31 42.55 4.14
13 82.63 93.86 91.65 99.04 8981.03 8948.42 4177.39 4355.41 415.62 46.68 48.67 4.64
14 104.03 98.43 116.60 95.41 6276.93 6243.26 2786.58 3144.08 312.59 44.63 50.36 5.01
15 124.54 141.87 133.57 136.89 3836.22 3805.48 1821.01 1807.82 176.65 47.85 47.51 4.64
16 80.24 106.97 86.19 97.96 6269.99 6264.53 2669.55 3297.42 297.57 42.61 52.64 4.75
17 83.67 89.88 93.92 90.86 10173.42 10112.59 4763.76 4892.27 456.56 47.11 48.38 4.51
182 125.66 93.74 138.05 107.82 11925.88 17102.07 8172.39 8170.69 758.99 47.79 47.78 4.44
19 135.96 90.96 145.79 98.18 16005.93 15993.03 8082.78 7298.25 612.01 50.54 45.63 3.83
20 128.23 95.46 131.26 98.45 6824.95 6830.70 3094.97 3442.41 293.32 45.31 50.40 4.29
21 135.54 92.07 137.53 99.06 4005.67 4040.68 1876.95 1958.79 204.94 46.45 48.48 5.07
22 104.04 92.60 111.83 100.59 4183.27 4179.75 1803.83 2141.52 234.40 43.16 51.24 5.61
total 193736.00 206328.84 97925.60 99134.56 9268.68 47.46 48.05 4.49
The value o f  the zonal average is set as the reference index 100. 
2 The zones that have the released greenbelt areas.
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5.8. Comparative behaviour of the two models
This section presents the comparative behaviour of the single and multiclass bid-rent 
network equilibrium models in terms of their model responses in the simulation. The 
modelling structure of the two models is similar. Thus, the two models were expected 
to suggest consistent simulation results; the overall similarities in the model output 
between the two models were checked in the description of the results from the 
models. However, the specific outcomes from the two models were rather different. 
The differences in the outputs arise from the use of the class-specific cost function in 
the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model. As discussed above, the use of the 
multiclass cost function means that the multiclass model specifically represents the 
behaviour of user classes when the model evaluates transport costs. The class-specific 
representation makes the land-use transport interaction differently from that of the 
single class model. This determines dissimilar values of the transport impedance and 
the locational attractiveness across the study area. The redefined network performance 
indicators cause different patterns of the bidding process from that of the single class 
model. This in the end determines the distinct urban structure that is unlike to the 
results of the single class bid-rent network equilibrium model.
Drawing general conclusions about the comparative behaviour between the two 
models requires vast empirical references sufficient to be confident. Unfortunately, 
there is insufficient data available in a format that permits the empirical validation of 
this type of model. In fact, the investigation in terms of the comparative responses is 
beyond the scope of this study. Thus, this comparison should be understood as a 
provisional examination rather than a definitive conclusion.
The two models generally agreed on the responses in the distribution of households. 
In the base run, both models suggested that there would be an increase of household 
numbers in the southern belt of Ansan and a decrease in the Northeast. This output 
was thought to be created by the non-cooperative bidding game of households for 
locations. The policy runs have created dynamic responses in the network 
performance indices. As would be expected, the results of the congestion charging 
scheme showed a reduction of delay inside the cordon and extra congestion adjacent 
to the charging zones. These results, which are contrary to each other between the
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areas inside and outside the charging boundary, have suggested no significant increase 
in public welfare from the scheme, but the higher income class was the maximum 
beneficiary. The finding would be contrary to the common belief that the overall costs 
in terms of travel time could be saved by the charging scheme. Thus, it would be 
argued that the road pricing policy would improve the benefits of rich people only 
rather than the general social welfare. The greenbelt run was concerned with 
exogenous land-use changes. The scheme would improve the locational opportunity, 
but the gateway zones became less attractive because of extra congestion. Thus, the 
overall improvement in terms of social welfare was marginal.
Even though the two models suggested a similar degree of responsiveness in terms of 
the interaction between transport and the location of activities, the changes were 
slightly larger in the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model. This result would 
mean that the multiclass model could be more elastic to the model runs than the single 
class model. Unfortunately, there is no popular sense in which either model is more 
responsive than the other. The outcomes of this type of model are normally strongly 
influenced by the study area and the spatial system adopted. Exogenous factors such 
as the value of travel time and a charging amount would play an important role in the 
degree of the response. Another important issue which should be borne in mind is that 
a more responsive model is not necessarily a better model.
Table 5-26 Results for the number of routes used by the household classes in the base run of 
the two models
o D The number of routes used
Single class Multiclass
mi m2 m3
75 107 5 11 6 2
75 14 2 4 3 1
The multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model can be a useful tool for policy 
tests. This is mainly because the multiclass model represents class-specific behaviour 
in the transport decision. As suggested in this chapter, the multiclass model generated 
the class-specific degree of responsiveness in terms of the social welfare changes and 
the elasticity values, whereas the single class counterpart suggested the aggregate 
average values. Thus, the multiclass bid-rent network equilibrium model was
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advantageous in examining the effects responded to by different classes of population. 
Another example of the class-specific response can be found by examining the routes 
used by each class. Table 5-26 shows a part of the outcomes of the base run for the 
two models. As specified in the table, the multiclass model shows the class-specific 
number of used paths. Since link combinations for each route are predetermined 
before the algorithm runs, this output can be useful information for developing class- 
specific policy strategy towards an efficient urban structure.
To sum up, the broad results of the two models were similar. The similarity would 
imply that either approach could be used for investigating the interaction between 
transport and the location of activities. However, the multiclass bid-rent network 
equilibrium model would be more useful for policy tests in the sense that the 
multiclass model represents the class-specific degree of responsiveness.
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5.9. Conclusion
This chapter has shown the results on the application of the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. The overall purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the ability 
of the model to represent the relationship between transport and the location of 
activities. This was considered in terms of analyses on the cause and effect of the 
spatial distribution. The city of Ansan in Korea was chosen for the case study. The 
test was conducted using the data of the Ansan transport master plan (1998) with 
some additional data. The simulation was undertaken in the single class model and its 
multiclass counterpart. The base run and the two policy runs were simulated in each 
model. The base run meant a simulation conducted using the data surveyed. The 
policy runs represented the introduction of a congestion charge and the release of land 
for housing development. Results were obtained in terms of the spatial distribution of 
households, which were discussed with respect to class-specific behaviour. The 
behaviour was demonstrated using the network performance indices of transport costs 
and locational benefits. The results are consistent with the design of the model, and 
satisfied common beliefs on the process of the land-use transport interactions. Thus, it 
could be concluded that the overall performance of the model would be satisfactory.
Nonetheless, it would be useful to note that long-term responses of this kind of model 
are strongly influenced by the relocation of economic activities. Unfortunately, 
investigations on the relocation are beyond the scope of this study. The quest would 
be possible in comprehensive land-use transport interaction studies. Hence, it is clear 
that there is plenty of scope for further work. The carrying out of that work would 
offer more opportunities for the analyses of the comprehensive land-use transport 
interactions. Despite this unsatisfactory aspect, the promising outcomes of the model 
would offer little doubt about the model proposed being a framework for investigating 
the relationship between transport and the location of activities.
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6. Conclusions
This study has developed a bid-rent network equilibrium model. The model was 
suggested as an alternative framework for representing the nature of the relationship 
between transport and the location of activities. The model addressed the unique 
characteristics of locations using a hedonic interpretation. The compensatory decision 
and the best response competition under the framework of game theory systematically 
described the dual speculation of a household. The endogenous calculation of 
transport impedance and locational attractiveness was a successful approach to 
modelling of the interaction between transport and land-use. The three components 
were structured in a bi-level mathematical programme. The bid-rent network 
equilibrium model incorporated a multiclass framework in order to address interclass 
transport interactions. A heuristic algorithm solved the model reasonably. The 
operation was confirmed in numerical examples. The model was applied to a real 
network, which produced promising outcomes. The overall characteristics of the bid- 
rent network equilibrium model offer little doubt about the model being an alternative 
framework for investigating the relationship between transport and the location of 
activities. The key findings of this study responding to the research objectives that 
were specified in the introductory chapter can be summarised as follows:
In the Introduction, three essential components in the relationship between transport 
and the location of activities were identified. First, the unique characteristics of 
locations with regard to their heterogeneity and indivisibility were recognised as 
issues to be investigated. Secondly, decision-makers faced the interactions between 
decisions within a household and those between households. Thirdly, the mutual 
reaction between transport and land-use showed a cyclic relationship. The 
components were used as the nature of the relationship between transport and the 
location of activities in the development of the bid-rent network equilibrium model.
Chapter Two reviewed existing approaches classifying them into four major fields of 
models. Spatial interaction models were aggregate and deterministic, which meant the 
group failed to represent the unique characteristics of a location and the decision­
making processes of a household. Furthermore, there was no explicit consideration of
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the interaction between transport and land-use in this group. Mathematical 
programming models, owing to their aggregate nature, crudely addressed the 
systematic properties of a location and the behavioural context of a decision-maker. 
Combined models in this group showed a promising approach for analysing the 
interaction between transport and land-use, though the representation was partial. 
Random utility models treated a location as a bundle of attributes. The model offered 
a high degree of behavioural validity of a decision-maker. However, the interaction 
between transport and land-use was not explicit in this framework. Bid-rent models 
incorporated a hedonic theory to represent the heterogeneity and the indivisibility of 
locations. The decision-making process was considered using a bidding mechanism. 
However, it was not easy to establish the interaction between transport and land-use. 
Models may show interrelated outcomes. For example, the results of the spatial 
interaction model would be in agreement with those of the random utility model at the 
aggregate level; the Herbert-Stevens model could yield an analogous solution to the 
Alonso model provided that a planner had full information; the random utility and the 
bid-rent models might produce an identical market equilibrium in a perfectly 
competitive market. However, it should be borne in mind that none of the existing 
models, either independently or collectively, could satisfactorily represent the full 
nature of the relationship between transport and the location of activities.
The bid-rent network equilibrium model was developed in Chapter Three. The 
model was designed to satisfy the three characteristics of the relationship between 
transport and the location of activities. First of all, the hedonic interpretation of the 
model treated a location as being globally heterogeneous but consisting of 
homogenous elements. The interpretation reasonably recognised the two unique 
characteristics of locations. Secondly, game theory, accompanied by a bidding 
mechanism, represented the composite decision-making process of a household. The 
dual speculation was shown as an n-player non-cooperative game. Finally, the 
interaction between transport and land-use was realised as a mutual adjustment 
process towards a stable equilibrium. The adjustment produced the endogenous 
network performance indices of transport impedance and locational attractiveness. 
The three conceptual bases of the model were systematically embodied in a bi-level 
mathematical programme. The behaviour of households was translated into the 
problems of locators and non-locators. The decision-making process of locators was
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considered using the hedonic-based random bid-rent model. The minimisation of the 
net interaction impedance was used to represent the behaviour of non-locators. The 
two problems were combined in the bi-level mathematical programme. The 
formulation was interpreted as equivalent to an oligopolistic Cournot game. The Nash 
equilibrium for this game was defined. The bid-rent network equilibrium model 
incorporated a multiclass framework, which systematically represented inter-class 
interactions on the transport network. The resulting formulation was interpreted as a 
seamless oligopolistic competition form of the Cournot game.
In Chapter Four, a heuristic algorithm for solving the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model was suggested. The algorithm combined a path-based routine for evaluating an 
equilibrium solution at the lower level with the Newton-Raphson procedure for 
estimating the parameters of the hedonic-based random bid-rent function in the upper 
level. The solution algorithm proposed had some attractions. First of all, the algorithm 
reasonably represented the behaviour of decision-makers in terms of the best 
responsive competition. Secondly, the resulting mutually consistent solution was 
compatible with the definition of the Nash equilibrium. Thirdly, the solution 
algorithm was simple in form and relatively easy to implement. Finally, the heuristic 
algorithm produced an acceptable solution in a reasonable computation time. The 
solution algorithm was successfully implemented in the numerical examples.
Chapter Five showed case studies of the bid-rent network equilibrium model. The 
overall purpose of this chapter was to demonstrate the ability of the model to 
represent the relationship between transport and the location of activities. A medium 
sized city in Korea was chosen. A base run and the two policy runs were simulated. 
The base run meant a simulation conducted using survey data. The policy runs 
represented the introduction of a congestion charge and the release of land for housing 
development. The spatial distribution of households was obtained, which was 
discussed in terms of the class-specific behaviour. The behaviour was demonstrated 
using the endogenous network performance indicators of transport impedance and 
locational attractiveness. The results were consistent with the design of the model and 
satisfied reasonable expectations of the process in land-use transport interactions.
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Notwithstanding the successful modelling and the promising results from the bid-rent 
network equilibrium model, it is clear that there is plenty of scope for further work. 
Some representative areas can be discussed as follows:
(1) A trip table analysis: one of the principal outputs of the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model is a class-specific spatial interaction table. The table, in this study, 
represents the flow between residence and primary activity locations. The two 
locations of activities can be interpreted as origins and destinations respectively in 
travel demand analyses. This means that the bid-rent network equilibrium model can 
serve as a framework for trip table analyses.
(2) A tool for policy tests: the endogenous network performance indices in terms of 
transport costs and locational benefits are a distinct feature of the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model. In the policy runs of the case study, the model successfully 
evaluated the responses of the indicators invoked by some policy scenarios. The 
before-and-after references of the indices are the usual outcomes of policy tests. In 
particular, the bid-rent network equilibrium model suggests class-specific changes in 
demand and elasticity, generated by the changes in the endogenous indicators. These 
characteristics mean that the model is a useful tool for policy tests.
(3) Towards a comprehensive land-use transport model: long-term responses in 
the relationship between transport and land-use are strongly influenced by the 
relocation of economic activities. Unfortunately, investigations into these relocations 
were beyond the scope of this study. This extension of the model would mean the 
representation of multistage interactions between transport and diverse land-uses. In 
particular, the extension could involve the four types of locational behaviour that 
underlie urban dynamics. Thus, their incorporation would extend the model towards a 
comprehensive land-use transport interaction model. The carrying out of that work 
would offer more opportunities for the analysis of land-use transport interactions.
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Appendix I-Fundamentals of Game Theory
1. Introduction
This appendix describes the fundamentals of game theory. The bid-rent network 
equilibrium model has been developed using a game theoretical framework for 
representing the competition of households in the relationship between transport and 
the location of activities. The oligopolistic Cournot game, which is a special branch of 
n-player non-cooperative games, has supported the design of the model development. 
Even though the game theoretical interpretation in the development of the model has 
been satisfactorily specified, it would be useful to discuss some structures of game 
theory related to the framework adopted in this study. This is done in the appendix.
Since game theory is based on decision theory, this appendix starts with describing 
decision theory. Decision theory is divided into certainty and uncertainty cases in 
terms of the explicitness of ordering preferences. Subsequently, game theory is 
defined. Then, two forms of game representations are provided, namely normal and 
extensive forms. In the following section, the nature of game theory is investigated. 
Games are classified into cooperative and non-cooperative types. The non-cooperative 
games are subdivided into dominant strategy and best response games in terms of the 
characteristics of strategy. The Nash equilibrium is defined in the non-cooperative 
games under the best response strategy. In the next section, interpretations of 
applications of game theory to transport studies are examined. The interpretations are 
considered in relation to problem formulations of the applications.
The main body of this appendix is heavily dependent on two sets of lecture notes. One 
is the lecture notes on Game Theory (2003) by the Department of Economics, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), coordinated by Professor Muhamet 
Yildiz, and the other is the lecture notes on Introduction to Game Theory (2003) by 
the Department of Economics, Harvard University, coordinated by Professor Markus 
Mobius. The notes are downloadable from the web site of each department.
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2. Decision theory
2.1. Introduction
As noted in the introduction, game theory is based on decision theory. Thus, it would 
be useful to investigate decision theory before reviewing game theory. Decision 
theory deals with situations in which agents have to make a choice. In this framework, 
the preference of one agent is assumed to be independent of the actions of the others. 
This means that no strategic interactions between agents are considered in decision 
theory, even though the theory deals with multiple players. Therefore, decision theory 
would be regarded as representing a single-player game theory. Decision theory can 
be divided into certainty and uncertainty cases in terms of the explicitness of ordering 
preferences. When there is an explicit order between outcomes, it is referred to as a 
certainty case; otherwise, it is called as an uncertainty case.
2.2. Under certainty
A decision problem under certainty (A,^ )  consists of a finite set of outcomes A and
a preference relation ■<, e.g. a ■< b means that b is at least as good as a . The 
outcomes are assumed to be mutually exclusive, which means that an individual agent 
cannot choose two distinct alternatives at the same time. It is also supposed that a set 
of feasible outcomes is exhaustive so that the choice of a player is always defined. As 
for the preference relations, two self-evident definitions can be considered, namely 
completeness and transitiveness.
Definition 1. A relation ■< is complete i f  and only if, given any two outcomes 
a ,b e A , either a < b  or a>zb.
Definition 2. A relation ■< is transitive i f  and only i f  given any a,b,c e A ,  
a >z b and b>zc then a>zc.
These two axioms guarantee that all choices can be ordinal in a single chain with 
neither gaps nor cycles. The completeness represents the former, or no gaps, and the 
transitiveness shows the latter, namely no cycles. The two definitions suggest that any
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relation can be a preference relation if and only if the relation satisfies the conditions 
of completeness and transitiveness.
A preference relation can be represented by a utility function U : A -> R as follows: 
a ■< b if and only if U (a) :<£/(&), Va,b e A (1-1)
The utility function is called a VNM utility type because the representation was 
originated by von Neuman and Morgenstem (1944). The VNM utility function 
converts the decision problem easier because the function deals with physical values 
rather than an abstract preference relationship.
2.3. Under uncertainty
In decision problems under certainty, the preference relationship was explicitly 
ordered because the outcomes were finite. In contrast, the number of necessary 
comparisons is infinite in decision problems under uncertainty. This means that 
ordering preferences is difficult because the observation is, in principle, unobservable. 
In this case, the preference relation can be represented by probability.
Definition 3. A decision problem under uncertainty is defined as a set 
^  = {(a1,P1),(a2, i>2) ,•••,(«„,?„)} such that =1 and where the
outcome a( occurs with probability f .
The probability of outcomes has no consistent rank among alternatives. The 
probability is only meaningful when it is represented in terms of ordinal values. The 
most well-known alternative approach to overcome this problem is von Neuman and 
Morgenstem’ (1944) theory of an expected utility.
Definition 4. An expected utility o f a decision problem under uncertainty 
A = {(a\>pi)>{a2’p2) ’---’(a»>pn)} is defined as U(A) = Y t"MU(al)Pl where
£ ^ = 1  a n d O * P , * l
A  preference relation can be represented by von Neuman-Morgenstem’s utility 
function. This VNM utility representation is supported by the assumption that a player
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is a utility-maximiser. The assumption means that a player maximises their expected 
value of utility.
A y  B if and only if U (A) > U(B)  (1-2)
where A, B are distinct outcomes.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for the representation of the expected utility is, 
as is self-evident, the preference relation y  is complete and transitive. It is noted that 
a preference between utilities is represented by > rather than y . This shows that the 
preference is ordered in terms of physical values.
3. Game theory
3.1. Definition
Decision theory, which was considered in the previous section, virtually dealt with a 
single decision-maker whose preference is assumed to be independent of the actions 
of other agents. In contrast, game theory represents a decision problem involving 
multiple persons where the preference of an agent is related to actions taken by the 
other agents. A definition of game theory can be given as follows:
Definition 5. Game theory is a formal way to analyse interactions among a 
group o f rational agents who behave strategically.
Several important components for a framework of game theory can be observed in the 
definition. First of all, there is more than one decision-maker who is referred to as a 
player, namely N  = {1,2,••*,«} . Each player is assumed to be rational so that an
individual gamer chooses their best action to maximise payoffs. Secondly, the 
definition emphasises the interactions between players. Fundamentally, game theory 
assumes that the payoff of each agent is determined through the relationship between 
agents. In other words, the action of a player depends on actions available to each 
agent, each agent’s preference on outcomes, and each player’s speculation about the 
others’ circumstances with respect to which actions are available to each player, how 
each player ranks outcomes, and their beliefs about the other players’ beliefs. The
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complex situation requires a strategy for a player to win a game. Again, this is
because the action of a gamer is interdependent with other members of the group.
Definition 6. A strategy is a complete contingency-plan determining which 
action a player takes at each information set in which an agent is to move.
A player is assumed to have a finite set of alternatives of strategies
S'=(sl9- , s k)9V i e N  (1-3)
where S', is a finite set of all strategies that are available to a player i and
sk is the kth pure strategy of a player i .
When a player knows exactly what strategies the other gamers are taking, an agent is
believed to choose one definite strategy that can offer the maximum payoff. This case 
is referred as an agent playing a pure strategy game. However, in many cases, a 
player may not be exactly able to guess the other agents’ actions. In this case, it is 
reasonable to suppose that a player draws a mixed strategy, combining a set of pure 
strategies with a probability distribution over the set of strategies.
s, = £  <r4s* = Oi*, + " •+<v*, V/ e (1-4)
k
where a k is the k* non-negative real number satisfying a k > 0, ^  <jk = 1 and
k
§,. is a mixed strategy of a player i ; a strategy profile of players is 
defined as a vector of mixed strategies of an individual player
Two important characteristics of the strategy are noted. First, a pure strategy can be 
interpreted as a special case of mixed strategies. If a player chooses one strategy with 
probability 1 and any one of the remaining strategies with probability 0, then the 
agent has effectively chosen one definite pure strategy. Secondly, since a mixed 
strategy for a player is determined by the probability of the player choosing the 
available pure strategies, the probability distribution for the non-negative values crk 
could be interpreted as the speculations of the player about the strategies of the others.
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3.2. Representation of games
This section considers the way in which games are represented. In general, games are 
expressed in either a normal or an extensive form.
Definition 7. A normal form o f an n-player game is a system 
G = (N;Sl, ' " , SH;Ult' ‘' iU„) where, for each player i e N  = {1,2,•••,«}, S, is a
set o f strategies that are available to the player i and £/,. -> R is the
t
player i ’s von Neuman-Morgenstern utility> function.
The utility function in the list G is represented by the von Neuman-Morgenstern 
type. Hence, an individual player is believed to maximise their payoffs. The payoff is 
determined by the process of strategic interactions between agents, which is 
represented in G by incorporating the list of the strategies of all gamers.
The normal form of game implicitly assumes that each player moves once and 
simultaneously. However, in this framework, neither the multiple movements of 
gamers nor a sequential decision-making process can be considered. An extensive 
form of game generalises the representation of games overcoming the drawbacks of 
the normal form. The extensive form introduces a tree that is defined as a set of nodes 
and directed edges connecting these nodes.
Figure 1-1 A conceptual diagram of a tree in the extensive form of game
A typical structure of the tree is shown in Figure 1-1. Each node has at most one 
incoming edge except the first node. For any two nodes, there is a unique path that 
connects the two nodes. A definition of the extensive form of game is given:
Definition 8. An extensive form o f an n-player game is a system 
G = (N\ S^U^T) where N  is a set ofplayers, S, is a set o f available strategies
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for each player i , Ui is the von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function o f the 
player i, and T is the tree.
In the extensive form of game, each player is allocated to a specific node. The order 
of action is determined by the position of each individual player. The tree carries 
information set that is a collection of the position of a player, an order of movement, 
alternative successor nodes that are available to a player, and payoffs at each node.
4. Games and equilibriums
4.1. Introduction
There are many types of game that represent competition between players. Since each 
game has its own characteristics and a complex structure, it is impractical to classify 
games in terms of physical categories. Alternatively, it can be useful to impose some 
conceptual structures onto games for the purpose of analyses. The most widely used 
criteria for the classification are the characteristics of strategies and the relationship 
between players. This is because the two factors are basic components of games. In 
this study, games are understood as either a cooperative or a non-cooperative type in 
terms of the relationship between players. While the cooperative games allow the 
coalition of agents in the process of plays, the non-cooperative games assume no pre­
play communication between players. The non-cooperative games are subdivided into 
dominant strategy and best response games. The sub-grouping is considered with 
respect to the characteristics of the strategy of games.
4.2. Cooperative games
Cooperative games allow players to have complete freedom of pre-play 
communication to make joint binding agreements. In these games, there is a finite set 
of players N  = {1,2,•••,«} . Each player i e N  receives an amount xt that is the 
distribution of utilities available to the set of players in N . A  payoff vector is denoted 
x = (x1,---,x„). Some players are assumed to coordinate strategies to maximise joint 
payoffs. This subset is called a coalition g<zN  . Coalitions include one-player
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coalitions and void coalitions with no players at all. Payoffs to the players in the 
coalition g  are determined by a characteristic function v (g ) . The value of this 
function is assumed to guarantee the largest payoff to each coalition g . Two essential 
conditions should be met in order that games are formulated as the cooperative types.
Definition 9. Individual rationality is satisfied i f  and only i f  for each player i 
xt ^v(z), V ie W.
From the viewpoint of a player, participation in a coalition deserves consideration if 
and only if the coalition can guarantee higher payoffs than those of playing 
independently. No member in the coalition consents to receive fewer payoffs than 
those an agent can obtain by an independent play. Thus, the payoff of an independent 
action v(z) should always be less than or equal to that of a joint playing xt .
Definition 10. Group rationality is satisfied i f  and only i f  for each player i, 
Y,xt=v(N)’ v * e  N-l
The definition of group rationality is common sense because the characteristic 
function v(7V) represents the maximum obtainable payoffs of players from the game.
Otherwise, each player can gain without loss of the others, or exceed the amount at 
disposal. Thus, the condition can be interpreted as a special case of Pareto rationality.
Definition 11. A vector x = (x1,---,xw) that satisfies the conditions o f individual 
and group rationalities is called imputation under the characteristic function.
An imputation represents a distribution of the available payoffs to an individual 
player. In this distribution, the two rationalities define the upper and lower bounds of 
the payoffs for a player. Then, using the imputation and the characteristic function, 
the cooperative game is defined as follows:
Definition 12. A system G = (iV,v,x) that consists o f a set o f players N, a 
characteristic function o f this set v(-), and a set o f imputations x = (x1,-**,xw)
satisfying the conditions o f the individual and group rationalities is called a 
cooperative game.
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Optimality principles for the cooperative games are diverse and the mechanism of 
solution finding is complex. The difficulty is because there could be a diverse level of 
partial agreements between players. Furthermore, sharing payoffs is not always 
possible when non-transferable units are involved. An investigation into this issue is 
beyond the scope of this study.
4.3. Non-cooperative games
Non-cooperative games meant competition in which no pre-play communication was 
allowed between players. It is essential to distinguish the non-cooperative games from 
the cooperative counterparts. The outcome of the cooperative games was determined 
by imputation. The individual payoffs were assigned as a result of an agreement 
among players rather than as a consequence of their actions. Therefore, the 
cooperative games emphasis the preference of agents in payoffs rather than situations 
that players face. Furthermore, a comparison of imputations is not limited to the 
individual payoffs but is more complex in nature. This is because the cooperative 
games consider coalitions. In contrast, the non-cooperative games are strategic games. 
The outcome of the non-cooperative games is formed as a result of the actions of 
those players in a particular situation. Therefore, the strategies of gamers play an 
essential role in determining the individual payoffs in the non-cooperative games. In 
this study, the non-cooperative games are subdivided into dominant strategy and best 
response games in terms of the characteristics of strategies.
4.3.1. Dominant strategy games
The dominant strategy game is based on the rationality and common sense of players.
Definition 13. A pure strategy s* strictly dominates st i f  and only if  
U/ (s;9s.,.)>Ui(sl>s_l.)> V i e N ,  Vs_, eS_, where s_, =(sl9—9s_l9sM9 — ,s„).
The definition of dominant strategy means that no matter what the other players do, 
the strategy s* is strictly better than st for a player i . In this case, it is common sense
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that a player would never play the strictly dominated strategy sf because a gamer is 
assumed to be rational.
Definition 14. A pure strategy s* weakly dominates s, i f  and only if  
U, (s; ,s_t)> Ui (st,s_t), V/ e JV,Vs_, e S_,and 3s_t e S.,,Ui (s*, s_,) > Ui (s,,s_,).
The weak dominance means that no matter what the other players do, the strategy s* 
is at least as good as s ,, and there are some contingencies in which s* is strictly better 
than s , . When the strict dominance case is considered, it is common sense that a 
player would play st only if an agent believes that these contingencies will never 
occur. A cautious gamer who assigns some positive probability for each contingency 
will not play s, .
An extension of the definition for the dominance of strategy under the pure strategy 
games to that of mixed strategy games is straightforward. The representation extended 
allows players to choose mixed strategies.
Definition 15. A mixed strategy §* strictly dominates S, i f  and only if  
C/)(s;,S_ ,)> t/,(S „S -1), VieJV where S., = ( - ,S ,
Definition 16. A mixed strategy S* weakly dominates i f  and only if  
(7j (s;,S_,)>C/((S„S_()> V is TV and 3S.„ t/,(s;,S_,)> t/,(S„S_().
In conclusion, if a player is rational and has a strictly dominant strategy, then an agent 
always tries to play the dominant strategy game. If a player is cautious and has a 
weakly dominant strategy, then a gamer will not play other strategy games.
4.3.2. Best response games
In the best response games, there is no dominant strategy. This suggests that a rational 
player makes their best response with each other to achieve the maximum payoff.
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Definition 17. For any player i, a pure strategy s* is the best response to s_t if  
and only i f  Ut (s*, s_f) > Ui (s,, s_f), V ze# , Vs , eSr
Definition 18. For any player i, a mixed strategy §* is the best response to 
i f  and only ifU,  (s;,S_,) > U, V i e N .
The definition of the best response strategy is the same as that of the dominant 
strategy except that the definition is represented in terms of the best response of a 
player against a specific strategy profile of the other gamers, namely s_f or S_,; note 
that the dominant strategy is represented against all strategy set of the other players, 
namely Vs_, e S_t . If the best response strategy were preferable to all or , then 
the best response strategy would be a dominant strategy.
4.3.3. Equilibrium
A substantial part of an equilibrium theory for the non-cooperative games under the 
best response strategy was established by Nash (1950,1951).
Definition 19. A strategy profile (.Sj*, •••,*?*) is pure strategy equilibrium if  and 
only i f  for each z, Vz e N  the optimum strategy o f the player s’ is the best 
response to the best strategies o f the other players s*_t = (•?,*,•••, s’_x, j*+1 , • • •, s’).
Definition 20. For each player z, V/ e N , the Nash equilibrium o f the pure 
strategy game is strict i f  and only i f  Uj (s* ,£*,)> Ui Vs. e St .
Definition 21. For each player z, \ / i e N , the Nash equilibrium o f the pure 
strategy game is weak if  and only i f  Ui (s’, s’_f) > Ui (5,., s’_t), Vs,, e S ,.
At equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium because the 
strategy is the best response to their beliefs about the strategies of the other players. If 
a strategy profile is dominant, then the profile is also the Nash equilibrium; but the 
reverse is not always true. An extension of the pure strategy equilibrium to the mixed 
strategy counterpart is straightforward.
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Definition 22. A strategy profile (§[,•■•,§*) is mixed strategy equilibrium if  
and only i f  for each z, Vz <= N  the best strategy o f the player S* is the optimum 
response to the best strategies o f the other players S*, = (§[,•••, 8*_i , S*+1 ,•••,§*).
Definition 23. For each player z, Vz e N , the Nash equilibrium o f the mixed
strategy game is strict i f  and only i f  Ut (§*, §V) > Ut , SV ).
Definition 24. For each player z, \ f i e N ,  the Nash equilibrium o f the mixed
strategy game is weak if  and only i f  Uj (§*, ) > Ut ,8*,).
Nash (1951) showed the existence of equilibrium states in any finite non-cooperative 
game under the mixed strategies.
Theorem 1. In any non-cooperative game under the mixed strategy, there is at 
least one equilibrium point.
Proof See Nash (1951).
5. Game theory in transport
This section deals with applications of game theory in transport studies. Game theory 
investigates various problems concerning conflict of interest by abstracting common 
strategic features. The theory has been recognised as a useful tool for modelling 
interactions between groups of decision-makers whose actions jointly determine 
outcomes (Fisk, 1984). Since the theory was adopted to interpret an equilibrium flow 
pattern as an n-person non-cooperative game (Dafermos and Sparrow, 1969), there 
have been extensive applications of game theory to transport studies.
Applications of game theory to transport studies are summarised in Table 1-1. While 
non-cooperative games have been widely applied, an example of cooperative games 
can be found in the study of a highway cost allocation (Castafio-Pardo and Carcia- 
Diaz, 1995). The study used the Aumann-Shapley value of a non-atomic game 
supposing that the decisions of a single player are irrelevant to total outcomes. In this 
game, each platoon of vehicles is considered as a player and agents are assumed to co­
work for a fair and rational cost allocation in the supply of highway facilities.
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Table 1-1 Applications of game theory to transport studies
Types Examples
Non-cooperative games:
n-person games Hansen (1990)
Garcia et al. (2000)
Oligopoly:
Bertrand games Yang etal. (2001)
Cournot games Kita(1999)
Bell (2000)
Yang etal. (2001)
Bell and Cassir (2002)
Stackelberg games Yang and Bell (1998)
Yang and Bell (2001)
Cooperative games Castano-Pardo and Carcia-Diaz (1995)
Applications of non-cooperative games can be divided in terms of the number of 
players. While games of oligopoly deal with a small number of players, the n-person 
games represent competitions of a large number of agents, though the number of 
gamers is supposed to be infinite. Since the games implicitly assume that players have 
no dominant strategy, the general Nash equilibrium under the best response strategy 
can be defined. The equivalent mathematical representation of the Nash equilibrium 
can be proposed as follows:
T (s;,s:,)>T (S„s:(), V/eJV (1.5)
where T (•) is the payoff function of players;
§* is the optimal mixed strategy of a player i ; and
§1, is the optimal mixed strategy profile of all players except a player i ,
namely Sl( =(§;,-
Interesting examples of n-person non-cooperative games are as follows. A model of 
the airline hub competition was formulated in terms of a n-player non-cooperative 
game between a set of airlines seeking to maximise profits (Hansen, 1990). The model 
found a state of quasi-equilibrium in which the round-to-round strategy adjustments 
by the airline competitors were small. Another illustration of the n-person non- 
cooperative game is found in the research into dynamic system optimal routings 
(Garcia et al., 2000). The study interpreted a routing mapping as the best reply of each
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vehicle to routing decisions of the other vehicles in the system. A fictitious play 
represented an iterative procedure in which players, at each step, were supposed to 
make their best responses assuming the decisions of the counterparts would follow a 
historical probability distribution. In other words, players were assumed to compute 
the expected shortest paths supposing the other players were distributed according to 
the historical frequency of routing decisions.
The majority of the applications use an oligopolistic framework. Oligopoly represents 
interactions among small numbers of players who have conflict of interest. When 
there are only two players, this is called a duopoly. Three models of oligopolistic 
behaviour are found in the literature, namely a price-setting Bertrand model, a 
quantity-setting Cournot model, and a sequential quantity-setting Stackelberg model.
In the Bertrand competition, players compete in prices that firms simultaneously 
choose. In this game, products are assumed to be homogenous or identical no matter 
who produces them. Consumers are always believed to buy the product from firms 
that offer the lowest price. Therefore, each player addresses demand as follows:
D(p,)  if P,<P.„ V i e N
A ( p )  = ' D ( p , ) / n  if P i = P - i > V i e N  (1-6)
0 if pt >p_n V/eiV
where D(-) is a market demand function;
pt is a market price that a player / sets; and
p_t is the vector of market prices of players except an agent i, namely
V = {Pl-,P„-Pn)-
The Bertrand game is known to converge in an equilibrium in which firms set prices 
at the level of a marginal cost c . This can easily be demonstrated. When a player sets 
a price below the marginal cost pi < c , the setting causes a loss. Hence, a reasonable
player is likely to set the price at the price of rivals. The temporary price is unstable 
because some of the firms will reset their prices below the setting to maximise 
benefits. The change will motivate the remaining firms to adjust their prices up to the 
new setting. This process continues until no firm has an incentive to reset its price. In
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the theory of microeconomics, the point is known to be the same level as the marginal 
cost where the firms make zero profits. When a firm sets its price higher than those of 
the other firms c < p_t < pt , the firm makes no profits. A reasonable player is likely to
set the price equal to the price of rivals. The price converges in the marginal cost. 
Finally, when all firms set the same but higher price than the marginal cost 
c < Pt~ P-i > a reasonable player is likely to deviate from the setting to make bigger 
profits p i -  p_j — € > c where £ is a positive small value. The movement makes
rivals no profits, which motivates the other firms to adjust prices up to the price of the 
first-mover. The market price is determined at the level of the marginal cost. The 
price determined by firms is the point of the Nash equilibrium because no player has 
an incentive to deviate from equilibrium; if a player sets a higher price than the 
equilibrium price, the firm cannot sell any product, which makes zero profits; if a 
player sets a lower price than the equilibrium price, the price causes a loss.
Theorem 2. The Bertrand game has the unique Nash equilibrium 
= (c,c), \ / i e N .
Proof. See the above demonstration.
In general, firms in oligopoly make bigger profits than those in the perfectly 
competitive market because they can play as price-makers. However, in the Bertrand 
game, consumers play dominantly; consumers always choose a firm that supplies 
products at the lowest price. Firms should adjust prices up to the marginal cost in 
order to make profits. Thus, oligopolists act as if they were price-takers in the 
Bertrand game. This means that the outcome of the Bertrand game is the same as that 
of the perfectly competitive market. This is referred to as the Bertrand Paradox.
There are not many applications of the Bertrand game in transport studies. An 
interesting application of a mixed Bertrand-Coumot game can be found in the study 
of the competition between bus firms under the deregulated transport environments 
(Yang et al., 2001). The study formulated the types of bus firm as players that 
simultaneously choose their fleet size and frequency as well as fare to maximise 
profits; one has minibuses with a higher-fare and higher-quality service and the other 
has conventional buses with a lower-fare and lower-quality service. The study focused
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on the effect of value-of-travel time distributions to the price and quantity competition 
between the two bus services. The research reported that equilibrium occurred when 
no player could increase their profits by changing service frequency and fare.
While firms in the Bertrand game simultaneously compete for prices, players in the 
Cournot game compete in quantities that agents choose simultaneously. In this game, 
there are small numbers of identical firms. Each firm is assumed to produce an 
homogenous product with a constant marginal cost; hence, players face an identical 
market price. Each gamer is assumed to adjust quantities to maximise profits. In this 
process, an individual gamer is believed to follow the best strategy in response to 
every other player since no player is supposed to have a dominant strategy. At 
equilibrium, no player has an incentive to deviate from equilibrium because the 
strategy is the best response to their beliefs about the strategies of the other players.
The Cournot equilibrium is one of the Nash equilibriums. This is simply checked as 
follows: the equilibrium is determined by the mutual reaction of players in terms of 
their best response to each other; players have no reason to alter their strategies at the 
equilibrium because the changes cannot improve the expected utility.
The framework of the Cournot game has been applied in several areas. The game was 
used to analyse the merging and yielding behaviour of cars in a ramp merging section 
(Kita, 1999). The study formulated the behaviour of merging and through cars as a 
two-person-non-cooperative game in the sense that each type attempts to take the best 
actions considering the best action of the other. Another example can be found in the 
study of the performance reliability of a transport network (Bell, 2000). The study 
proposed the framework of a two-player non-cooperative game between a group of 
network users and an evil entity: the network user was assumed to seek a path to 
minimise the expected cost; the hypothetical demon was supposed to choose link 
performance scenarios to maximise the expected cost. The relationship between them 
was regarded as non-cooperative in the sense that the user had no idea which link state 
would be invoked by the demon and the demon did not know which path the network 
user would choose. At equilibrium, the user could not reduce the expected transport 
impedance by changing his or her path choice probabilities and the demon could not 
increase the cost by changing the scenario probabilities, which was compatible with
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the definition of the Nash equilibrium. An extension of this research (Bell, 2000) to 
the many-to-many case was made in Bell and Cassir (2002). The study included n- 
network users and m-OD specific demons, which represented a feedback between 
path choices and link costs; hence, the framework explicitly considered congestible 
network. A bi-level formulation was proposed to find a mutually consistent point. In 
the upper level, the demons maximised the total expected cost imposed on network 
users. In the lower level, a standard deterministic user equilibrium assignment 
problem was proposed from the viewpoint of network users.
There are similarities and dissimilarities between the Stackelberg and Cournot games. 
Both games deal with small numbers of gamers and investigate a quantity 
competition. In these games, no player has a dominant strategy. Hence, the best- 
response analysis can be applied to investigate the behaviour of decision-makers. The 
main difference between the two games is found in the order of gamers’ actions. 
While the Cournot game assumes that all players act simultaneously, the Stackelberg 
game assumes a sequential decision-making process. In the Stackelberg game, one 
player acts before the others. Thus, the Stackelberg game can be understood as a best 
response game under an extensive form; the decisions of the players are made by the 
rule of the best response; the structure of a sequential decision-making process in the 
Stackelberg game is a special case of the frameworks of the tree. The first mover is 
referred to as a leader. The others are denoted as followers. For this reason, the 
Stackelberg game is referred to as a leader-follower game. The leader begins the game 
by announcing his or her decision. The followers execute their policies after the 
decision of the first mover. The leader tries to maximise his or her profits taking the 
reasonable reaction of the followers into account. In contrast, the followers simply 
react to the leader’s choice, namely the best response to the leader’s decision. 
Therefore, the leader has an advantage, which is referred to as the first-mover 
advantage. The equilibrium of the Stackelberg game can be expressed as follows:
Y(s;,<D(s:,is;))>r(s„o(s:,is())
and (1-7)
Y(s:,o(s:i|s:))^Y(s;)<i.(s.(|s;))
where a player i is the leader and O(-) is the response function of the followers.
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The Stackelberg equilibrium is one of the Nash equilibriums. The leader can only do 
worse by deviating from the equilibrium and the followers have no reason to deviate 
from the equilibrium because the followers play the best response to the leader.
The Stackelberg game has been rigorously applied in many transport areas. In 
particular, since the framework was interpreted as a useful tool for policy evaluations 
linked with a bi-level formulation (Bard, 1983), there have been comprehensive 
applications in the literature. For detailed examples, see Yang and Bell (1998,2001).
6. Conclusion
This appendix has considered the fundamentals of game theory. The overview of 
game theory was intended to show the background framework of the design for the 
bid-rent network equilibrium model. The description started with representing 
decision theory. Then, game theory was considered. The review ended examining 
transport applications of game theory. Even though the game theoretical 
interpretations in the development of the model has been satisfactorily specified, this 
appendix would be useful to help understanding the conceptual basis of the model.
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Appendix II-Inverse Transform Method
1. Introduction
In the simulation for the numerical examples in chapter four, the household data were 
generated using the inverse transform method. A simulation that considers stochastic 
components explicitly involves sampling or generating random variables. The process 
is associated with desirable probability distributions. While sampling is normally used 
for empirical applications of models, generation is applied to numerical illustrations 
of models. The generation of random variates means obtaining observations of 
probabilistic variables from a desired distribution. Several algorithms could be 
considered, but the inverse transform method was chosen in this study. The method 
has some attractive characteristics: first of all, the algorithm generates random 
variables with exactly the desired distribution; secondly, the method is efficient in 
terms of storage space and computation time; the efficiency is robust because the 
condition is satisfied not merely for some variables but for all parameters; finally, the 
inverse transform method facilitates the desired synchronisation and variance 
reduction. Because of these advantages, the technique is one of the most generally 
used algorithms (Law and Kelton, 1991) in the generation of probabilistic variates. In 
the next section, this appendix considers the general framework of the inverse 
transform method. The discussion is provided by both mathematical and graphical 
illustrations. This is followed by a description for the generation process of household 
data, which were used in the numerical examples of the bid-rent network equilibrium 
model. Finally, brief conclusions are presented.
2. The inverse transform method
It is noted that the discussion of the inverse transform method in this section is an 
assorted summary of Law and Kelton’ description for the inverse transform method 
(Law and Kelton, 1991, pp. 465-474).
Let X  be a random variate that is continuous. Let F (  ) be a distribution function that 
is continuous and strictly increasing between the ranges [0, l ] . This means that if
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X j < x 2 and 0  < ./'’( x , )  < .F (x 2) < 1 ,  then F ( x , ) < F ( x 2 ) .  L et F  '( • )  be the inverse  
fu n ction  o f  the distribution function  F (  ) .  T hen, the inverse transform  m ethod can be 
sum m arised  in  the tw o  steps:
1. G enerate U  ~  L/ (0 ,1 )  and
2. Return X  =  F ' 1 ( U ) 
w here is read ‘is distributed a s ’.
F ( x )
Figure II-1 A conceptual diagram o f  the inverse transform method
Figure II -1 sh o w s a graphical illustration o f  the inverse transform  m ethod. First, the 
algorithm  takes the random  num ber t / , , w h ich  is d esign ed  to be ev en ly  spread on  the
interval [0 ,1] in the vertical ax is. T hen, the m ethod  reads across ( a ) and d ow n  ( 6 ) .
T he inverse fu n ction  F~] (•) is  a lw ays d efined  b ecau se the value o f  both the random
num ber U  and the distribution function  F (  ) have the range [ 0 , l ] .
T he va lu e  X  generated has the desired distribution function  F ( •). M athem atically ,
th is can be ju stified  by observing  that for any real num ber x ,  the probability that the 
random  variate X  takes a low er va lu e  than the num ber x  is ex a ctly  x .
P ( X  <  x )  =  p [ f ~' (U) < x )  =  =  F ( x )  (II. 1)
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This justification can be demonstrated graphically. Figure II-2 shows the Weibull 
distribution. Figure II-3 represents the density function of the Weibull distribution. In 
the diagrams, the shape parameter a  = 1.5 and the scale parameter p  = 6. The density 
function would represent the relative chance of observing variates in different parts of 
the range. This means that many variates would be observed when the value of the 
density function is high. On the other hand, only a few variables would be observed 
when / ( * )  is low. This relationship is easily confirmed in the diagram of the 
distribution function Figure II-2. The density function is the derivative of the 
distribution function, namely / ( x )  = F '( x ) .  This suggests that / ( * )  is the slope
function of F ( x ) .  Hence, a steep gradient in F (x )  means more variates in / ( * )  
and a flat gradient in F (x )  means less variates in f ( x ) . In Figure II-2, a and b are
selected in the steep and flat regions respectively. The ranges of a and b are designed 
to have the same size. This means that a and b have the same possibility of taking the 
random variates U . This is because the variates are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed. In spite of this setting, B has more space than A. This suggests that when 
the inverse transform method is considered, the random variates X  would concentrate 
on the range A ; note that A is associated with the steep region a. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that the inverse transform method deforms the random uniform distribution 
£/(•) into the desired distribution.
F ( x )
►  X
Figure II-2 The Weibull distribution (1.5, 6), source: Law and Kelton 1991, p. 467
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0Figure II-3 The Weibull density function (1.5, 6), source: Law and Kelton 1991, p. 467
3. G en e ra tio n  p rocess o f th e  h o u seh o ld  d a ta
The hedonic-based random bid-rent function in the upper level of the bid-rent network 
equilibrium model has assumed that the variates follow the Gumbel distribution. 
Since the natural logarithm of a Weibull random variable has a distribution known as 
the Gumbel distribution, the generation process considered the Weibull distribution in 
advance. Then, the values of the random variates were converted into the equivalent 
natural logarithm values. This section shows a technical summary of the process.
The Weibull distribution is given by
if jc > 0 
otherwise
(II.2)
where a  > 0 is a shape parameter and J3 > 0 is a scale parameter.
The density function of the Weibull distribution is given by
if x > 0  
otherwise
(II.3)
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a  = 3.0
a  =  2.0
0.9
0 .6 - a  = 1.0
a  = 0.50 .3 -
2.50.5 2.0 3.0 3.5 4 .0
Figure II-4 Weibull density functions ( a , l )
In the distribution and density functions, there are two parameters. The scale 
parameter changes the function of the distribution little. In the simulation, the value 
was set as /? = 1. In contrast, the shape parameter causes considerable changes in the 
spread of the random variates. This suggests that the value of the shape parameter 
should be decided appropriate to the purpose of the simulation. The Weibull 
distribution was used in the generation of the random variates because the shape of 
the distribution is similar to that of the normal distribution, but execution time for the 
algorithm runs is much less than the normal distribution. Figure II-4 shows the 
Weibull distributions according to diverse shape parameters. When the value of the 
parameter is less than one, the shape of the Weibull distribution is far from that of the 
normal distribution. When a  is greater than two, the deviation becomes bigger. Thus, 
it was decided to set the shape parameter as a  = 2.0 in the simulation.
The process of generating random variates is straightforward. First of all, the inverse 
function of the Weibull distribution is given by
/ " '( { / )  = >3 [ - In (1- U ) J a (II.4)
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Secondly, the inverse transform method is applied.
1. Generate U ~ C/(0,1) and
2. Return X  = - ln ( l-£ / )1/2.
4. Conclusion
This appendix briefly overviewed the inverse transform method. The generation 
process of the household data, which were used for the numerical examples, was 
outlined. The description in this appendix is supplementary to help understanding the 
process of the simulation in chapter four.
252
